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INTRODUCTION
It may have been only an after thought, but the Bill of Rights more
directly affects the personal lives of Americans than any other aspect
of our law.1  We cherish our right to speak, assemble and worship as
we please.2  We also cherish our privacy, one aspect of which stems
from the Fourth Amendment,3 our constitutional remedy for a
perceived evil of British law—the general warrant.
The British general warrant was a search tool employed without
limitation on location, and without any necessity to precisely describe
the object or person sought.4  British authorities were simply given
license to “break into any shop or place suspected” wherever they

1. See MARJORIE G. FRIBOURG, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:  ITS IMPACT ON THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE 10 (1967) (calling the Bill of Rights America’s “most prized possession” for
the personal rights it protects).
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”).
3.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(1) (a magistrate “shall issue a
warrant identifying the property to be seized and naming or describing the person or
place to be searched”).
4. See NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 16 (1970) (describing the general
warrant).
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chose.5  With that kind of unfettered discretion, the general warrant
could be, and often was, used to intimidate.6  General warrants
executed during the reign of Charles I sought to intimidate
dissidents, authors, and printers of seditious material by ransacking
homes and seizing personal papers.7  In 1765, the courts declared
general warrants illegal, and Parliament followed a year later.8
In the colonies, complaints that royal officials were violating the
privacy of colonists through the use of writs of assistance, equivalent
to general warrants, grew.9  Because English law did not, as yet,
recognize a right of personal privacy, the crown’s abuses in the
colonies were not remediable at law.10  It was thus no surprise that the
new American Constitution and the government it created would
respect a series of individual freedoms.
James Madison authored what would become the Fourth
Amendment and proposed it to the Congress on June 8, 1789.11  For
the new nation, warrants would require specificity to physically invade
the privacy of its citizenry.12  Today, that same specificity is required to
authorize electronic and physical invasions of privacy.13
Although the Fourth Amendment eliminated the abuses of general
warrants, its commands remain unclear, especially in the face of
technological progress.14  Moreover, the Fourth Amendment was
designed to protect against overreaching in investigations of criminal
enterprises.15  Investigations of politically motivated threats to our

      5.   See William Cuddihy & Carmon B. Hardy, A Man’s House Was Not His Castle:
Origins of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 37 WM. & MARY QTLY.
371, 381 (July 1980) (quoting a 1621 Privy Council general warrant).
6. See DAVID M. O’BRIEN, PRIVACY, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 38 (1979) (describing
the intimidation motives of the general warrant).
7. See id. (describing the motives for Charles I’s use of general warrants).
8. See Entrick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 818 (K.B. 1765) (calling the
general warrant “fatal to liberty”); see also O’BRIEN, supra note 6, at 38 (delineating
the end of British general warrants).
9. See O’BRIEN, supra note 6, at 38-39 (noting the colonists disdain for writs for
assisting); see also LASSON, supra note 4, at 28-29 (describing the historical emergency
of the writ of assistance).
10. See LASSON, supra note 4, at 13 (stating that the many years of arbitrary and
unrestricted powers of English government was one of the factors elevating
reasonable search and seizure to constitutional significance in the United States).
11. See O’BRIEN, supra note 6, at 39 (quoting James Madison’s initial draft of the
Fourth Amendment).
12. See id. (noting Madison’s initial demand for a particular description of the
place to be searched).
13. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 355 (1967) (upholding the
“narrow and particularized” warrant requirement for electronic surveillance of
conversations in a public telephone booth).
14. See generally James X. Dempsey, Communications Privacy in the Digital Age:
Revitalizing the Federal Wiretap Laws to Enhance Privacy, 8 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 65, 69-
70 (1997) (calling electronic surveillance the Fourth Amendment’s greatest threat).
15. See Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.)
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national security, such as terrorism or espionage, were simply not
contemplated.
The Fourth Amendment concern in national security matters arises
because the same techniques used in enforcing the criminal laws are
used in gathering intelligence.16  Likewise, some information
gathered for intelligence purposes may subsequently be used in
criminal prosecutions.17  Thus, invasions of privacy that are accepted
as necessary evils in enforcing the criminal laws may occur when the
government seeks intelligence information.18  Most Fourth
Amendment challenges to intelligence gathering concern electronic
surveillance and/or the physical entry required for the installation of
electronic, audio or video equipment.19  While secrecy may be an
essential ingredient of successful national security surveillance,
increasingly sophisticated forms of electronic eavesdropping may also
threaten personal freedoms.20
Although many question the wisdom of the executive branch’s
authorization of intrusive surveillance techniques,21 a traditional
warrant acquired from a magistrate, according to Rule 41 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, could “unduly frustrate the
efforts of Government to protect itself . . . .”22  Several Rule 41
requirements may not be well-suited to the needs of intelligence
gathering, including requiring that the target receive a copy of the

272, 285 (1855) (finding Fourth Amendment search and seizure warrant
requirements are limited to criminal and not to civil proceedings).
16. Intelligence gathering is the collecting of national security information.  See
generally NORMAN POLMAR & THOMAS B. ALLEN, SPY BOOK:  THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
ESPIONAGE (1998); JEFFREY T. RICHELSON, A CENTURY OF SPIES:  INTELLIGENCE IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY (1995).
17. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200, 211 (1982), reprinted in 50
U.S.C. § 401 note (1994) (allowing the dissemination of information incidentally
obtained during intelligence gathering that indicates activities potentially violating
any law).
18. See id. at 212 (requiring only the least intrusive collection techniques
feasible).
19. See, e.g., Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 248 (1979) (rejecting the
contention that the Fourth Amendment prohibits per se physical entry to install
electronic surveillance equipment); Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (changing the law to
declare that electronic surveillance without physical entry still falls under the
limitations of the Fourth Amendment).  
20. See, e.g., Dempsey, supra note 14, at 80 (discussing the privacy concerns of
government monitoring email from remote sites).
21. See, e.g., Neil King, Jr. & Jess Bravin, Corporate Spying Firms Thrive, WALL ST. J.,
July 2, 2000, at B1 (reporting that European government officials accused the U.S.
government of improper use of its electronic communications surveillance).
22. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 315 (1972)
[hereinafter Keith] (finding national security interests may justify warrantless
electronic surveillance despite a citizen’s right to privacy and free expression). This
case is commonly referred to by the name of the district court judge who first heard
it, Damon J. Keith.
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warrant and a receipt and inventory related to the seized property;23
that “reasonable cause” be shown to justify serving the warrant other
than in daylight hours;24 that the object of the search be described
with enough particularity to satisfy the magistrate that there is
“probable cause” that a crime has been or is about to be committed;25
and that the search will be for instrumentalities of a crime.26
By its nature, surveillance for intelligence depends upon stealth
and secrecy.27  Moreover, once an entity obtains intelligence
information, the value of the information depends on keeping the
target unaware of its acquisition.28  The Rule 41 notice provisions
could, thus, frustrate the purpose of the surveillance, as could the
requirements for criminal probable cause and specificity.29  It is
neither the objective nor the likely result that the target of a foreign
intelligence (FI) or foreign counterintelligence (FCI) search will be
criminally prosecuted.30  Because of those different objectives, the
Supreme Court has recognized that the traditional criminal law
warrant requirements might not apply in internal security

23. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d) (stating that the person conducting the search
“shall give the person from whom or from whose premises the property was taken a
copy of the warrant . . .”).
24. See id. at 41(c)(1) (describing how a magistrate finds probable cause to issue
a search warrant).
25. See id. at 41(b)(4) (“A warrant may be issued under this rule to search for and
seize any . . . person for whose arrest there is probable cause, or who is unlawfully
restrained.”).
26. See id. at 41(b)(1)-(3) (allowing a search warrant for evidence, contraband, or
other implements related to a crime or commission thereof).
27. See Keith, 407 U.S. at 319 (“Secrecy is the essential ingredient in intelligence
gathering.”).
28. See William F. Brown & Americo R. Cinquegrana, Warrantless Physical Searches
for Foreign Intelligence Purposes:  Executive Order 12,333 and the Fourth Amendment, 35
CATH. U. L. REV. 97, 130 (1985) (noting that the secrecy requirement for foreign
intelligence does not comport with Rule 41’s requirements).
29. See id. at 129-36 (discussing the various ways Rule 41 could frustrate the
government’s attempts to protect itself, qualifying for a warrant clause exception).
30. In counterintelligence investigations, the primary objective is to thwart
suspected threats to national security; prosecution is a secondary consideration. See
id. at 133-34.  For the most part, foreign intelligence investigations may be less
focused than those undertaken for counterintelligence purposes, and they are often
undertaken on a long-term and wide-ranging basis.  See id.  For purposes of this
Article, there is no reason to distinguish between foreign intelligence and foreign
counterintelligence.  They are, however, defined differently.  Foreign intelligence is
“information relating to the capabilities, intentions and activities of foreign powers,
organizations or person, but not including counterintelligence except for
information on international terrorists activities.” Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R.
200, 215 (1982), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 note (1994).  Foreign
counterintelligence is “information gathered and activities conducted to protect
against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted
for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons, or international
terrorist activities, but not including personnel, physical, document or
communications security programs.” Id.
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surveillance.31
Whatever the surveillance technique, domestic security surveillance
may also chill the free expression protected by the First
Amendment.32  The First Amendment, read literally, is unrealistically
absolutist; it provides no equivalent to the “reasonableness” standard
of the Fourth Amendment to guide official discretion.33  Of necessity,
First Amendment law has developed two analytic devices that
continue to shape the intersection of domestic security and freedom
of expression.
First, the courts isolated certain categories of expression as having
little or no value and afforded them correspondingly little or no
protection.34  These categories include incitements to violence35 and
publication of information likely to cause irreparable harm to the
national security.36  Second, the courts have asked whether expressive
interests were themselves targeted, or were affected as an incidental
by-product of government operations.37  This “purpose or effect”
analysis thus sets up a subjective inquiry whenever surveillance
activities are challenged.  Unless surveillance intentionally is directed
at chilling protected expression, the First Amendment may not be a
barrier to government surveillance activity.38  Despite such doctrinal
limitations on expressive freedoms in domestic security, challenges to
surveillance may also be based on the confluence of interests
protected by the First and Fourth Amendments, specifically, where

31. See Keith, 407 U.S. at 322 (stating that the unique nature and lack of “exact
targets” of domestic security surveillance may warrant a special Fourth Amendment
waiver).
32. See, e.g., Sarah Lyall, Stripping E-mail Privacy, HOUS. CHRON., July 19, 2000, at
A17 (reporting British and American proposals to monitor emails as a way of
combating modern terrorism despite First Amendment or privacy concerns).
33. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech . . . .”), with U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and efforts, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”)(emphasis added).
34. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 800-
01 (1997) (discussing the unprotected status of inticements of illegal activity, fighting
words, and obscenity).
35. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (removing First
Amendment protections for speech that exhorts others to “imminent lawless
action”).
36. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 730 (1971)
(White, J., concurring) (discussing that speech infringes on the First Amendment
only in situations where “direct, immediate, and irreprable damage to our Nation or
its people” may result).
37. See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Beacon Hill Architectural Comm’n, 100 F.3d
175, 183 (1st Cir. 1996) (allowing a ban of newspaper dispensers designed to
enhance the aesthetic qualities of the historical district despite the incidental effect
of hindering freedom of the press).
38. See Keith, 407 U.S. at 313-14 (proclaiming that unauthorized official
eavesdropping must not “deter vigorous citizen dissent and discussion”).
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intrusive surveillance is alleged to have chilled the exercise of
protected expressive activities.
It is increasingly doubtful that a remedy that regulates criminal
investigations will adequately serve similar objectives in national
security investigations.39  The reason is simple:  criminal investigations
and national security investigations are at spectral ends of societal
evils.40  One evil primarily harms individuals while the other strikes at
the very foundation of the society.41
Crime is generally recognizable and definable.  Even if it intrudes
from abroad, crime normally is still a commonplace event directed at
weaknesses in the group, usually at individuals.42  The criminal
investigation is normally directed at finding the criminal and
bringing that person to justice.43  National security investigations, on
the other hand, proceed from threats that would undermine the
entire social structure and are predicated on probable cause different
from that which triggers criminal investigations.44  Because of that
fundamental difference, and to protect the rights of U.S. persons,
national security threats today are considered to be threats arising
from an external base of operations.45  The Attorney General’s Threat

39. See, e.g., Daniel J. Malooly, Note, Physical Searches Under FISA:  A Constitutional
Analysis, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 411, 423-24 (1985) (illustrating that the national
security implications of the Aldrich Ames investigation impeded an application of
traditional criminal investigation limitations).
40. See id. at 424 (recognizing the inherent conflict between the “government’s
duty to preserve the security of its citizens and the prohibition against government
intrusion upon individual rights”).
41. See id. (characterizing the dichotomy as one where America must protect its
very existence or risk the ideals upon which it was founded).
42. National security crimes, however, do not always fit the traditional criminal
model.  Espionage, for example, despite its potential for devastating harm, is a less
direct harm to an individual than is murder.  Additionally, espionage occurs between
sovereigns, not between individuals.  See, e.g., John Walcott, War of the Spies:  Soviets
Gain Heavily as New-Breed Agents Unlock U.S. Secrets, WALL ST. J., Nov. 27, 1987, at 1
(discussing CIA and FBI attempts to stop Cuban and Russian espionage).
43. See, e.g., United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 72 (2d Cir. 1984) (implying
that unlike national security investigations, criminal investigations involve “exact
targets”).
44. See, e.g., id. (recognizing that the government interests in national security
investigations differ greatly from criminal investigations, thus justifying different
warrant requirements).
45. See Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Security Threat List (last modified
Apr. 6, 1998), available at http://www.fbi.gov/programs/ansir/ansir.htm#threatlist
(disseminating a list of “national security threat issues” and “a classified list of foreign
powers that pose a strategic intelligence threat to U.S. security interests” as part of a
program to thwart various kinds of espionage based in foreign countries)
[hereinafter National Security Threat List].  Security threats did not always arise from
an external base of operations.  Clearly the domestic crisis of the Civil War was a
national security threat. See JOAN M. JENSEN, ARMY SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA, 1775-
1980, at 24-28 (1991) (discussing the development of internal security forces when
Southern states began to secede).  Moreover, threats of the nature of the Oklahoma
City bombing may also be considered to undermine national security. See Frank J.
BANKSPP.DOC 8/15/2001  11:33 AM
8 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1
List is one source of reference for national security threats and it is
the predicate source from which most national security investigations
are authorized.  Published annually, this list focuses investigative
efforts on threats that could potentially cause significant and
fundamental harm to the nation.  As of April 1998, the National





5) Targeting the National Information Infrastructure
6) Targeting the U.S. Government
7) Perception Management
8) Foreign Intelligence Activities
The difference between domestic criminal investigations and
national security investigations is historically and legally significant.47
For example, if the government intends to invade privacy to
investigate a criminal enterprise, the Fourth Amendment has been
interpreted to require that government officials show that its
proposed actions will address the root problem.48  Accordingly, the
government has been required to show that a search or surveillance
will expose criminal activity.49
In contrast, investigations of national security threats normally
begin in advance of any criminal activity.  Additionally, they often
arise in the context of a vexing convergence of First and Fourth

Cilluffo et al., Bad Guys and Good Stuff:  When and Where Will the Cyber Threats Converge?,
12 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 131, 133-34 (2000) (noting that “in the wake of bombings at the
World Trade Center in New York and the Alfred P. Murrah Building in Oklahoma
City[,] . . . the national security community realized that the U.S. was becoming more
vulnerable to electronic attacks.”).  The dividing line between the foreign and
domestic threat has been artificially, but logically, pegged to foreign origin in order
to accommodate intrusive investigative techniques that may not be constitutionally
permitted in targeting U.S. persons.  See infra notes 521-705 and accompanying text.
46. National Security Threat List, supra note 45 (listing various categories of threats
to national security).
47. National security is sometimes referred to as domestic security.  Although
national security is the preferred terminology of the intelligence and law
enforcement communities, domestic security is frequently the language found in
case law and legal scholarship.  See, e.g., Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 523 (1985)
(using the term “domestic security”).  With the understanding that domestic security
does not mean domestic criminal investigation, the terms are used interchangeably
herein.
48. This requirement is to safeguard an individual’s privacy interest against the
unregulated exploratory searches of British experience which the Framers desired to
prohibit.  See Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987).
49. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) (stating a “reasonable”
search must be undertaken pursuant to a warrant, supported by probable cause).
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Amendment values not present in criminal cases.50  Finally, even
when criminal activity arises from a national security investigation, it
is usually an ancillary part of the threat and not the primary object.
In the modern era, terrorism is the exception to this general rule.
Terrorism looks to mayhem and individual harms as a primary, albeit
intermediate, objective.  However, the ultimate objective of terrorism
is the quintessential national security threat—an attack on the United
States as a sovereign nation.
Unlike criminal investigations, the investigative effort for national
security threats is directed at preventing the threatened harm, not at
securing a criminal conviction.  Coupling the preventive purpose
with the requirement that the threat be of foreign origin permits
relatively intrusive investigations.51  The probable cause requirements
for obtaining surveillance authority for the two threats are
fundamentally distinct.  For criminal investigations, the probable
cause requirement is “a fair probability that contraband or evidence
of a crime will be found in a particular place.”52  For national security
investigations, the predicate is an external threat to the security of
the nation.53  The Fourth Amendment cannot, and does not, provide
even-handed guidance to both types of probable cause.
Additionally, the government has never assumed that the Fourth
Amendment applies equally to both criminal and national security
threats.  In large measure this belief stems from previous experiences
in the United States and England that have shown that national
security threats often have a close nexus to advocacy.54  In England,

50. See Keith, 407 U.S. at 313.
51. Because it is possible that a U.S. person (defined to include a citizen, a
permanent resident alien, a U.S. corporation or an organization substantially
composed of U.S. persons, see infra note 633) may serve as an agent of a foreign
power, the law provides some additional protection for those to whom constitutional
protections have been extended. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h) (1994) (providing
“minimum procedures” to place limitations on electronic surveillance).  The Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) guards against infringement of First
Amendment rights by requiring that FISA authority be authorized for a U.S. person
only if that person is knowingly engaged in particularized criminal behavior.  See 50
U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2) (1994) (finding such individuals to be an “agent of a foreign
power,” thus a potential electronic surveillance target under the Act).
52. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
53. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1863 (1994 &
Supp. IV 1998), amended by Act of Dec. 3, 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-120, 113 Stat. 1606
(1999).  FISA requires that the subject of a search or seizure be a foreign power or a
person who is an agent of a foreign power.  See 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a) (1994) (limiting
who may be subject to electronic surveillance without a court order). The Act also
provides additional qualifications not limited to whether one is an agent of a foreign
power. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2) (delineating the various scenarios where “any
person,” even a citizen of the United States, would be subject to electronic
surveillance without a court order).
54. See Keith, 407 U.S. at 314 (explaining that history demonstrates that
BANKSPP.DOC 8/15/2001  11:33 AM
10 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1
search and seizure issues were inexorably intertwined with free
speech and press controversies.55  In the United States, the Fourth
Amendment has been a primary bulwark against abuse that can flow
from efforts to dampen the ardor of free expression:
Fourth Amendment protections become more necessary when the
targets of official surveillance may be those suspected of
unorthodoxy in their political beliefs.  The danger to political
dissent is acute where the Government attempts to act under so
vague a concept as the power to protect ‘domestic security.’56
This Article explores the parameters of executive authority for
national security surveillance.  We begin historically and survey the
nation’s experience with national security surveillance through the
19th century.  In Part II, we review the developing twentieth century
surveillance law contributed by the three branches. Included is a brief
overview of the developing law of privacy, designed to demonstrate
the relationship of emerging individual rights to legislative and
regulatory changes.  As privacy law matured in the 1960s and 1970s,
we show that the judiciary spurred the development of contemporary
national security law through decisions limiting executive discretion
to conduct surveillance on its own terms.  We then describe and
assess the modern executive and legislative prescriptions for national
security surveillance.  In Part III, we apply the modern authorities to
the problem of investigating terrorism in the United States.  We
review the World Trade Center and Oklahoma City bombings, and
use those tragedies to examine the utility of the surveillance
authorities in combating terrorist acts perpetrated by domestic and
foreign sources. We then assess the legislative and regulatory reforms
considered and implemented after these events.  Finally, we apply all
of the authorities in a case study of the investigation of a group of
Palestinian activists in California—the L.A. Eight.
I. NATIONAL SECURITY SURVEILLANCE:  THE EARLY YEARS
The origins of national security law may be traced to 1775, when
the Continental Congress created the Committee for Secret
Correspondence, thus authorizing the first official intelligence

Government, however benevolent or benign its motives, tends to view with suspicion
those who most fervently dispute its policies).
55. See id. at 313 (“Historically the struggle for freedom of speech and press in
England was bound up with the issue of the scope of the search and seizure power.”
(quoting Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 724 (1961))).
56. Keith, 407 U.S. at 314.  Keith arose precisely because presidents frequently
have authorized surveillance intrusions for domestic security purposes without an
appreciable distinction between threats emanating from abroad and those arising
from the citizenry.  See id. at 316-17.
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activity.57  With the creation of the Secret Correspondence
Committee, Congress classified (by deletion) the names of the
individuals with whom it corresponded.58  More noteworthy than the
creation of the Committee, however, were the events that led the
Continental Congress to contemplate a means of dealing with spies.
Paul Revere’s ride is well known to every school child.  Less well
known, however, is the fact that he was captured by the British at
Concord.59  British troops, moving perhaps too hastily, released
Revere but without his horse or funds.60  Learning of his pecuniary
plight, his wife, Rachael, attempted to send him a letter and one-
hundred twenty-five pounds through Dr. Benjamin Church.61
Unknown to the rebels, Dr. Church was a spy for the British.62  Not
surprisingly, then, Church promptly delivered the note to General
Gage,63 without the money.64
Subsequently, Church’s mistress was caught placing one of
Church’s cipher letters to General Gage in a dead drop.65  Church
was soon apprehended and tried by court martial.66  To the chagrin of
colonial authorities, they learned too late that they had neglected to
make espionage an offense for civilians.  By order of the Congress,

57. 3 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 392 (Worthington C.
Ford et al. eds., 1905) [hereinafter JOURNALS] (resolving “that a committee of five be
appointed for the sole purpose of corresponding with . . . Great Britain, Ireland, and
other parts of the world”).
58. 4 JOURNALS, supra note 57, at 345 (explaining that before the Committee of
Secret Correspondence lay their proceedings before the entire Congress, they were
directed to withhold the names of persons they employed or with whom they
corresponded).
59. See Univ. of Mich., Take the Money and Run (last modified May 13, 1999), at
http://www.clements.umich.edu/spies/stories-networks-1.html (explaining that after
Revere delivered a message of General Gage’s plans for a midnight raid on the town
of Concord to John Hancock and Sam Adams in Lexington, he continued on to
Concord where he was captured and questioned by British Troops).
60. See id. (indicating that the British officers hurried to return to Concord and
thus decided to release Revere).
61. See id. (noting that Rachel Revere entrusted the concerned letter to Benjamin
Church so that her husband could receive it as he tried to make his way home,
horseless and without funds).
62. See id. (asserting that Rachel and the rebel leaders did not know that Church
was reporting rebel movements and strategies to the British General Gage).
63. See Univ. of Mich., Sir Thomas Gage (1721-1787) (last modified May 13, 1999),
at http://www.clements.umich.edu/spies/people.html (stating that “[i]n 1774, . . .
the British General was sent to America as both commander-in-chief and governor of
Massachusetts, serving in his capacity during the events leading to the battles of
Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill.”).
64. See Take the Money, supra note 59 (noting that no mention was ever made of
the money Rachel sent in Church’s report to Gage and it is presumed that Church
kept the money).
65. See id. (explaining that Church’s “mistress was captured upon secreting one
of Church’s cipher letters to General Gage”).
66. See id. (noting that Church was captured in 1775 after his mistress was
caught).
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Dr. Church was imprisoned until 1777 when he was allowed to set sail
to the West Indies.67  With an irony worthy of Aesop, neither the ship
nor Dr. Church were ever seen again.  Both presumably were lost at
sea.68
To correct their oversight, the Continental Congress enacted the
first espionage legislation, which made it a capital offense for “all
persons, not members of, nor owing allegiance to any of the United
States of America . . . [to be] found lurking as spies.”69  The law was
revised in 1778 to include “any inhabitant of these states” who, by
giving intelligence, etc., should aid the enemy in the killing or
capturing of loyal citizens.70
The desultory development of national security law continued in a
similar manner after the Revolution.  During the intrigues over the
Spanish territories of the Floridas and Louisiana, the British Minister
to the United States engaged in a complicated scheme of intelligence
that involved a U.S. Senator and an American physician.71  The
Senator, William Blount of Tennessee, schemed to attack the Spanish
territories with British naval assistance, in order to profit from his
investments in western land speculation.72  In order to avoid a
diplomatic incident and maintain “plausible deniability,” Minister
Robert Liston kept the scheme at arm’s length by employing Dr.
Nicholas Romayne as his surrogate.73  If the scheme had been
discovered, the American and not the British diplomat would have
been seen to be the schemer.74
Secretary of State Timothy Pickering, through means unknown,




69. 6 JOURNALS, supra note 57, at 345 (stating that the penalty for violation of this
legislation was death by sentence of a court martial, or such other punishment as the
court martial shall direct).
70. 10 JOURNALS, supra note 57, at 204 (subjecting inhabitants to the same
penalties of death or other punishment that a citizen would incur for similar crimes).
71. See BUCKNER F. MELTON, JR., THE FIRST IMPEACHMENT:  THE CONSTITUTION’S
FRAMERS AND THE CASE OF SENATOR WILLIAM BLOUNT 93 (1998) (noting that Senator
Blount journeyed to see Dr. Nicholas Romayne, a physician in New York, with whom
he had collaborated to sell western lands to European customers).
72. See id. at 95 (summarizing the Blount Conspiracy, which consisted of three
attacks that were planned to take place on the same day with English support in the
form of money as well as a number of ships to blockade both Pensacola and New
Orleans).
73. This plan was somewhat successful.  When letters from Liston were found in
Dr. Romayne’s possession, Secretary Pickering tried to deny the connection and
shield Liston from culpability due to his affinity for England.  See id. at 138.
74. See id. at 106 (explaining that the Secretary of State wanted to deny or
downplay the English connection for fear of damaging Anglo-American relations).
75. See SAMUEL EDWARDS, BARBARY GENERAL:  THE LIFE OF WILLIAMS H. EATON 54
(1968).  Secretary of State Pickering asked the War Department to send him Captain
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Pickering’s agent baited Romayne with an offer to sell military
secrets; Romayne took the bait and was immediately arrested.76  The
plot exposed, Romayne fled the United States and Blount fled to the
frontier areas where he found safety.77  Since the United States had
never enacted criminal prohibitions on sedition or espionage that
stopped short of aiding the enemy, Romayne soon returned to the
United States—vilified, perhaps, but not a criminal.78
The newly independent Americans distrusted executive power, but
they were realists.79  Practical experience after independence had
proved that a strong executive was a necessity.80  Rather than opt for a
weak executive, they sought means to limit a strong one.81  By 1789,
the former colonists already had extensive experience with
government.  They had experienced unrepresentative royal
government from afar, disinterested governors both abroad and at
home, and the occasional enlightened local government.82  Many
colonists had even lived under military law during the colonial
rebellion.
Perhaps most importantly, after independence, all of the colonists
experienced the vagaries of undisciplined legislatures and an
ineffective Congress.83  It took but little time to realize that

Eaton to work on a confidential assignment that required a trustworthy and able
man.  See id. at 54.  Captain Eaton’s first assignment for Pickering was to expose a
physician in New York, Dr. Nicholas Romayne, who was used as an intermediary by
the British and French legions.  See id. at 55.
76. See id. at 56 (describing how Captain Eaton was able to obtain incriminating
documents and deliver the evidence as well as Dr. Romayne to the State
Department).
77. See MELTON, supra note 71, at 127 (explaining that Blount escaped from
custody and left Tennessee after satisfying demands as to bail and sureties).
78. See id. at 136 (explaining that after his arrest, Romayne was forced to become
an informant and provided the committee presiding over impeachment proceedings
considerable information about Senator Blount’s conspiracy).
79. See GARY WILLS, A NECESSARY EVIL:  A HISTORY OF AMERICAN DISTRUST OF
GOVERNMENT 47 (1999) (explaining that from 1786-1787, Congress was both a
legislative and an executive body as a result of the anti-government feeling that made
the Framers reluctant to create a separate executive body with powers of its own).
80. See DAAN BRAVEMAN ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  STRUCTURE AND RIGHTS IN
OUR FEDERAL SYSTEM 197 (3d ed. 1996) (explaining that the weakness of the Articles
of Confederation as well as an interest in improving the effectiveness of the
government led to the agreement on a single executive).
81. See id. (“That the delegates were hard-pressed to agree on a design for the
executive branch powers is evidenced by comparing the brief and relatively
uncharitable grant of power in Article II with the detailed and expansive grant to the
Congress in Article I.”).
82. See generally id. at 2-3 (describing the period of England’s neglect of the
colonies and the end of that neglect with imposition of different taxes that sparked
revolution in the different colonies).
83. See id. at 4 (noting that under the Articles of Confederation, which was the
first plan the Continental Congress ratified after independence in 1781, Congress
had no authority to regulate commerce or tax while the specific states reserved their
“sovereignty, freedom, and independence”).
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capriciousness in government could arise as easily from homespun
legislators as from distant royalty.84  As Jefferson remarked:  “Nothing
is so embarrassing nor so mischievous in a great assembly as the
details of execution.  The smallest trifle of that kind occupies as long
as the most important act of legislation, and takes the place of
everything else.”85
Jefferson also recognized that, under the Articles of Confederation,
the lack of an executive could pose a threat to national security:  “The
want of power in the federal head was early perceived, and foreseen
to be the flaw in our constitution which might endanger its
destruction.”86  It also became evident that a government without
power to govern cured no ills.87  It was the objective of the drafters in
Philadelphia to fill in the missing parts of government under the
Articles, namely a separate executive branch and an independent
judiciary.88  Consequently, the founders intentionally created a
government with both a system of shared and interdependent powers
and a strong executive.89  Madison described the separated powers as
complementary, “to unite a proper energy in the executive with a
proper stability in the legislative departments.”90
From the beginning, it became evident that the power of the
president would depend as much on personality as on the authority
vested by the Constitution.91  Over the next century, the strength of

84. See id. (noting that calls for a general reform of the government began as
early as 1783).
85. 11 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 679 (Julian P. Boyd et al. eds., 1955)
(emphasizing the need for executive power separate and independent from
Congress).
86. 7 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 630 (Julian P. Boyd et al. eds., 1953)
(acknowledging that the American people were becoming universally sensible of the
want of power in the federal land).
87. See BRAVEMAN, supra note 80, at 55 (asserting that the experience of the
government under the Articles of Confederation, with dominant power delegated to
the state legislatures, revealed itself as unstable and ineffective).  The ills that existed
under this weak government included the creation of many different sorts of paper
money and schemes as well as the changing of laws so frequently that common
citizens often complained that they did not know the law.  See id.
88. See id. at 56-57 (noting that the inclusion of a judicial branch and the
creation of an independent, popularly elected executive were two uniquely American
contributions to separation theory).
89. Although the Founders created a government with separation of powers, they
also recognized that “it is not meant to affirm, that they must be kept wholly and
entirely separate and distinct, and have no common link of connexion or
dependence, the one upon the other, in the slightest degree.”  JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 197 (Carolina Academic
Press 1987) (1833).
90. 10 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 207 (William T. Hutchison et al. eds., 1962)
(acknowledging that a primary objective at the Constitutional Convention was to
create a government that consisted of separate Executive and Legislative bodies).
91. See RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER 42-43 (1960) (asserting that
the Constitutional Convention created a government of separate institutions sharing
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the Executive, especially relative to the Congress, ebbed and flowed.92
No president of the nineteenth century matched Washington’s flair
for intelligence, but all exercised prerogatives for intelligence.  As
military commander, Washington served as both analyst and
spymaster.93  As President, he took personal responsibility for foreign
intelligence and requested a “competent fund” for intelligence
operations in his first State of the Union Address.94  Congress
complied with the Act of July 1, 1790.95  Washington also called out
the militia to suppress the Whiskey Rebellion.96
Ironically, despite numerous British intrigues in this era, it was a
French spy scare that prompted the next phase of American national
security law.97  The friendship with France that had blossomed with
revolutionary fervor in 1776 withered soon thereafter as diplomatic
relations were severed in 1796 and an undeclared naval war with
France raged until 1800.98  Moreover, the United States was host to
more than twenty-five thousand Frenchmen who had fled tyranny at
home.99  Having displaced a royal tyranny, the new government (the

powers and that a President’s success largely depends on his ability to persuade).
92. See generally CHRISTOPHER ANDREW, FOR THE PRESIDENT’S EYES ONLY 6-29
(1995) (detailing the intelligence actions taken by the early presidents and
explaining how these actions built strength in the Executive).
93. See 1 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT
SOURCES 1745-1799, at 492 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1931) (detailing Washington’s
recommendations for strengthening the militia based on observations of the frontier
lands).
94. His request was granted and his control over the funds complete.
Disbursement was by certification and the President was not required to reveal either
his purposes or the recipients of the funds.  ANNALS OF CONG., 1st Cong., 2d Sess.
2232, 1 Stat. 128.
95. See HENRY MERRITT WRISTON, EXECUTIVE AGENTS IN FOREIGN RELATIONS 122
(1929) (explaining that the contingent fund, also called the secret fund, illustrates
the manner in which Congress has recognized the authority of the President in
foreign affairs).
96. See THOMAS A. BAILEY, THE AMERICAN PAGEANT:  A HISTORY OF THE REPUBLIC
160-61 (1966) (explaining that Washington’s actions in crushing the Whiskey
Rebellion played an enormous role in substantially strengthening the new national
government).
97. See ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER:
THE ORIGINS 139 (1976) (recognizing that the military issues that arose during the
Adams presidency almost all concerned the Quasi-War with France).  All three
branches of the government participated in military affairs.  The executive
formulated and implemented military measures; Congress debated and determined
what military and fiscal means ought to be placed at the president’s disposal; and the
Supreme Court ruled on issues including the scope of the executive power to take
military actions pursuant to specific legislative authorizations.  See id.
98. See id. at 139-66 (noting that the deterioration of the friendship was due
largely to French decrees that were issued between 1793 and 1796 making American
trade increasingly difficult).
99. See 2 SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
77 (1965) (asserting that legislation was produced as a result of fears that political
refugees would engage in treasonable activities against the United States).
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Directorship) was greatly favored by the French expatriates who were
overwhelmingly supportive of the French cause.100
With spontaneity born of fear, in 1798 Congress acted to
criminalize unpopular and unpatriotic actions and enacted the Alien
and Sedition Acts.101  Popular opposition focused on the sedition law,
which prohibited citizens from criticizing the government.102  By
1801, when Jefferson became president, federal judges had convicted
dozens of people for violating the sedition law.103  Jefferson rightly
believed the measure unconstitutional and, on his inauguration,
promptly pardoned all those so convicted.104  The Alien and Sedition
Acts expired by their own terms on March 3, 1801.105
In the area of intelligence and foreign policy, Jefferson’s
presidency was marked by a broad exercise of executive control.106
Fearing foreign penetration, Jefferson authorized a wide spectrum of
covert actions.107  Jefferson sent naval forces to the Mediterranean to
protect American shipping, refused a request by Congress for “secret”

100. See id. at 77 (“Many [of the French refugees] were aristocratic émigrés, but
most were proscribed Jacobins who wished to stand in well with the Directory.”).
101. These included the Naturalization Act, 1 Stat. 566 (1798), the Alien Act, 1
Stat. 570 (1798), the Alien Enemies Act, 1 Stat. 577 (1798), and the Sedition Act, 1
Stat. 596 (1798).  These Acts were enacted, in part, because Federalists feared the
French as a potential source of Republican strength.  See 2 MORISON, supra note 99, at
76-79.  These statutes increased the period of residency required to become a citizen,
authorized the President to deport aliens deemed dangerous, authorized
incarceration of aliens in time of war and made it a crime to write or publish any
false, scandalous, and malicious writing against the government, Congress, or the
president.  See WILLS, supra note 79, at 135.
102. See 2 MORISON, supra note 99, at 78 (providing that opposition to the Alien
Act would have been futile because the power of expelling aliens belongs to the
federal government, not the states; the Sedition Act was easier to attack because of
the law’s conflict with the First Amendment).
103. See WILLS, supra note 79, at 140 (stating that about two dozen men were tried
under the Sedition Act, and of those convicted, all but one served under one year in
prison).
104. See 2 MORISON, supra note 99, at 82-83 (explaining that Jefferson believed his
election saved the country from militarism and monarchy when he let victims of the
Sedition Act out of jail).  “Jefferson’s political object, as he wrote in a letter of 1802,
was to prove that Americans were ripe for ‘a government founded not on fear and
follies of man, but in his reason; on predominance of his social over his dissocial
passions.’”  Id. at 83.  Cf. WILLS, supra note 79, at 136-39 (admitting that these laws
were clearly unconstitutional but that several factors undermined Jefferson’s
suspicion that the only explanation for the laws was a plot to create an American
monarch).
105. See WILLS, supra note 79, at 135 (explaining that the Alien and Sedition Acts
were passed as temporary measures during the crisis with France).
106. See STEPHEN F. KNOTT, SECRET AND SANCTIONED 83 (1996) (“Jefferson’s
employment of covert operations was not an example of a extraconstitutional abuse
of power but a simple exercise of the president’s prerequisite to implement foreign
policy.”).
107. See id. at 79 (remarking that Jefferson believed that the president alone had
the authority to make the difficult, but often necessary, decision to employ
surreptitious means to further American interests abroad).
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information, and authorized a military expedition to topple a foreign
ruler.108
Most early presidents, following the model set by Washington,
assumed the authority to engage agents for intelligence matters.109  In
general, Congress was content to provide contingency money to the
president and to leave the resultant intelligence matters in the hands
of the executive.110  For example, Lincoln exercised his authority for
intelligence in much the same manner as had his predecessors.111
Lincoln mobilized state militias, blockaded rebellious states and
suspended the writ of habeas corpus.112  Diffidence, more than
obstinance, was sufficient to turn aside the occasional challenge to
presidential authority.113  On the whole, intelligence remained purely
an executive matter and presidents successively did what they felt
necessary to gain information.114  This approach offended no one,
because the nature of intelligence activities rarely touched the private
lives of the citizenry.115

108. See generally id. at 61-84 (elaborating on Jefferson’s intelligence operations
and policies throughout his presidency).
109. See generally Edward F. Sayle, The Historical Underpinnings of the U.S. Intelligence
Community, 1 INT’L J. INTEL. & COUNTERINTEL. 1 (1986) (demonstrating that
presidents, from the time of the American revolution to the present, typically have
found secrecy and an intelligence operation essential when national security is
threatened); ANDREW, supra note 92, at 29 (documenting presidential forays in
intelligence, secrecy, and use of secret agents).
110. The process began with Washington, but was not codified.  See WRISTON,
supra note 95, at 219.  In 1818, the issue of public appropriations for secret purposes
was put squarely to Congress. See id. Henry Clay championed the argument that
secret missions should be paid for from the contingency fund to keep them secret.
See id. at 219-24.  From time to time the issue arose, and even expanded, and
legislators debated what matters should be publicly acknowledged and what should
be paid from contingency funds. See id. at 221-22.
111. See generally ANDREW, supra note 92, at 14-23 (defining Lincoln’s policies and
activities regarding intelligence during his administration until his assassination in
1865).
112. See LOUIS FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
157 (3d ed. 2000) (observing that Lincoln exercised military force without first
obtaining congressional authorization).  Subsequently, “Congress passed legislation
‘approving, legalizing, and making valid all acts, proclamations, and orders of the
President, etc., as if they had been issued and done under the previous express
authority and direction of the Congress of the United States.’”  Id. at 166-67 (citing
12 Stat. 326 (1861)).
113. See Sayle, supra note 109, at 12-15 (addressing occasional challenges from
Congress about secret agents and the sums to support them that were ultimately
defeated).
114. See id. at 15 (noting that “President Polk, in defending the integrity of the
President’s Contingent Fund stated, ‘The experience of every nation on earth
demonstrated that emergencies may arise in which it becomes absolutely necessary
for the public safety or the public good to make expenditures, the very object of
which would be defeated by publicity . . . .’”).
115. See id. at 1 (noting that the secrecy involved conflicts with the ideological
American view of an open society fostering a free flow of information, so the citizenry
often turns away or separates itself from any evidence regarding intelligence).
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Intelligence and national security were, however, important issues
from the earliest days of the Republic.116  Appropriations for the
contingency fund demonstrated early on that Congress recognized
the need for secret executive activity.117  The need for intelligence was
so well understood that the luminaries of the day frequently debated
the need for secrecy.118  In addition, both Washington and Jefferson
exercised substantial presidential prerogatives in authorizing covert
action.119  The practice of limiting those officials with access to secrets
was established early.120  The Committee of Secret Correspondence
(consisting of Franklin and Morris) wrote, on learning of projected
French aid in the Revolution:  “We find, by fatal experience, the
Congress consists of too many members to keep secrets.”121
It was evident that intelligence had legal underpinnings in our
nation’s early history.  In general, Congress shied from these
activities, not because they considered them unlawful, or even
unsavory, but because they were activities vested in the executive.122
Congress consistently deferred to the president when he withheld
secret official records, when he employed secret agents, when he
ransomed hostages, and even when he engaged in covert
operations.123  It was common for Congress to withdraw requests for
official records when the president balked at providing them and to
appropriate funds for secret purposes when the president requested
them.124

116. See id. at 5 (explaining that the origins of our foreign intelligence
undertakings rest in the Continental Congress).
117. See id. at 9 (“When Washington asked for a ‘competent fund,’ the Congress
understood, and on 1 July 1790, it gave the President the Contingent Fund of
Foreign Intercourse, the so-called secret service fund.”).
118. John Jay, for example, argued that the need for secrecy when conducting
foreign relations was the norm.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, at 188-89 (John Jay) (Roy
P. Fairfield ed., 1966).
119. See generally KNOTT, supra note 106, at 48-84 (detailing the covert operations
of the Washington and Jefferson administrations that set precedents for their
successors).
120. See SOFAER, supra note 97, at 128 (indicating that President Washington also
established practices respecting the control of information).  Washington, for the
most part, had no problem disclosing information, but he did withhold some
material regarding “private” correspondence with agents and ministers.  See id. at
128.
121. John S. Warner, Where Secrecy is Essential, 31 STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE 47
(1987).
122. See SOFAER, supra note 97, at 129 (contending that the role of the presidency
today is due in part to Congress’ decisions to allow or to require the executive to
plan policy and to exercise broad policy-making discretion in implementing
legislatively unarticulated but shared objectives).
123. See id. at 128 (acknowledging that Congress realized the danger and
constitutional impropriety of broad delegations but still delegated broad discretion
to the President and the departmental secretaries).
124. See id. (noting that there appears to be no occasion when any member of
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II. THE COMPONENTS OF MODERN NATIONAL SECURITY LAW
A. Awakening to the Modern World
For the next century, the presidential exercise of executive
authority continued to shape national security law. Inexorably,
however, as the technological and political sophistication of nations
evolved, so did threats to the national security.125  As the world edged
toward war, the United States slowly began to realize that German
hegemonic designs did not exclude our own territory.126  In the early
years of the new century, German naval officers created numerous
plans for invasion of the United States.127  These plans included
invasions of New York, beachheads at Cape Cod, invasion of Puerto
Rico, and blockade of the coast from Mexico to New England.128  The
German Admiralty levied specific intelligence tasking on their
intelligence branches and attaches, and German officers came to the
United States to assess beachhead sites.129  Although the fledgling
United States’ Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) understood the
reality of the German threat, ONI’s warnings were largely
unheeded.130
Nevertheless, in 1915, President Wilson instructed the Secretary of
the Treasury to put German and Austro-Hungarian delegations

Congress accused Washington of abusing his discretion in withholding information).
See generally WRISTON, supra note 95, at 224-39 (highlighting the early debates in
Congress that recognized the President’s power to appoint executive agents without
the advice and counsel of the Congress).
125. See G.J.A. O’TOOLE, HONORABLE TREACHERY:  A HISTORY OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE,
ESPIONAGE, AND COVERT ACTION FROM THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION TO THE CIA 206
(1991) (explaining that between 1900 and 1903 the German threat grew serious as
alarming reports of German advances in technology-advanced torpedoes, torpedo-
boat destroyers, and experiments with the newly invented wireless telegraph were
sent to Navy Intelligence).
126. See id. at 202 (discussing that Kaiser Wilhelm II was determined to make
Germany ruler of the seas and a major colonial power at a time when the United
States was also moving onto the world stage with overseas possessions in Puerto Rico,
the Philippines, Hawaii, and Guam).  “[N]avalists in both countries agreed that they
were in direct competition and apparently on a collision course.”  Id.
127. See id. at 203-04 (acknowledging that a recent exploration of German naval
archives disclosed that in 1897 the emerging naval power of the United States
prompted the German naval staff officers to shift their focus to contingency planning
for an American war).
128. See id. at 204 (detailing the German plans for American invasion, which
included plans for the destruction of the United States Navy’s North Atlantic
Squadron off the eastern seaboard).
129. See id. (explaining that a German naval attaché in Washington, Lieutenant
Hubert von Rebeur-Paschwitz, had personally inspected Cape Cod in 1899, and later
examined all possible landing sites in the Boston-New York area to assess their
feasibility as German beachheads).
130. See id. at 205 (reporting that the Navy was unable or unwilling to persuade the
State Department to place any restrictions on the travels of attachés).
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under surveillance.131  Acting in furtherance of Wilson’s instructions,
the Secret Service also installed wiretaps on the German and Austro-
Hungarian delegations.132  Combining British intelligence with the
confessions of a spy turned collaborator and American wiretaps,
sufficient evidence of involvement in sabotage activities was gained to
expel Captain Franz von Papen, Naval Attaché to the United States.133
Soon thereafter, Secret Service agents raided the office of the
remaining Attaché, arrested him despite his diplomatic immunity,
and seized highly incriminating documents.134
Awakening slowly to the nuances of national security in a new era,
presidential authorities were given, or assumed, for a variety of
purposes.  National security threats, both real and imagined, drove a
variety of initiatives.135  Heading the list of concerns were the varied
threats of domestic subversion.136
The American psyche was prepared to accept the fact that
Germany might have designs on the Caribbean, but not on the
United States.137  It would take one of the more intriguing episodes in

131. See id. at 224 (noting that the sinking of the Lusitania in May 1915, which
caused the deaths of American men, women, and children on board, prompted
President Wilson to step up surveillance).  This heightening of surveillance soon led
to a scene, on July 24, 1915, that was reminiscent of a Keystone Cops sequence.  A
German diplomat, being followed by a Secret Service agent, left a briefcase on a New
York train.  The agent grabbed the briefcase only to see the German return to
retrieve it.  The agent then ran off with the briefcase, with the German in futile
pursuit.  Upon opening the briefcase, the agent discovered an extensive outline for a
propaganda campaign, but nothing unlawful was recorded in those papers.  See id. at
224-25.
132. See BARBARA TUCHMAN, THE ZIMMERMAN TELEGRAM 77 (1958) (recounting the
testimony of Secret Service Chief William J. Flynn that he received a daily
stenographic report of all conversations of the previous twenty-four hours, copies of
which were given to the State Department in a procedure known to the president);
see also ARTHUR LINK, WILSON:  THE STRUGGLE FOR NEUTRALITY 563 (1960)
(confirming in a letter written by President Wilson that he feared the Germans had
thoroughly infiltrated the United States with agents of all kinds).
133. See generally HORST VAN DER GOLTZ, MY ADVENTURES AS A GERMAN SPY 207-11
(1917) (recounting the author’s disclosure of several documents revealing the
conspiracy involving Captain von Papen when Horst van der Goltz was arrested and
brought to testify in front of a grand jury).
134. See JOHANN BERNSTORF, MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 262-63 (1920)
(recounting that Count Bernstorf secured release of his diplomat and was offered
return of the documents if he would claim them as official papers, which he declined
to do).
135. See ANDREW, supra note 92, at 53 (noting that security threats sparked
Secretary of State Robert Lansing to propose initiatives geared at solving the divorce
between foreign and domestic intelligence and competition between the Secret
Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation).
136. See id. at 54 (noting that threat of domestic subversion was the primary target
of United States wartime intelligence).
137. See O’TOOLE, supra note 125, at 203 (“While American strategists of the day
feared that Germany might send a task force to the Caribbean to gain a foothold in
the Western Hemisphere, few shared [Captain Charles] Sigsbee’s estimate that the
United States itself was the object of German invasion plans.”).
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intelligence history to convince even American policymakers that
Germany might have bellicose intentions toward the United States.138
Ironically, it was a peace effort by the United States that brought
German designs to light.
In an effort to advance the peace effort, the State Department
succumbed to the pressure of Bernstorff, the German ambassador, to
transmit enciphered German telegrams between the Foreign Ministry
and the German ambassador in Washington.139  The Zimmerman
telegram proposed a pact with Mexico which stipulated that if the
United States could not be kept neutral, Mexico and Germany should
ally and, on successful conclusion of the war, Mexico would regain
the southwestern territories of the United States.140  The British
intercepted the telegram in United States channels and deciphered
it.141  Finally, after arranging a clever subterfuge so it would appear
that the telegram had been intercepted in Mexico, over lines using a
less secure cipher, the telegram was presented to the United States.142
There was widespread isolationist belief that the telegram was a
forgery until, on March 3, 1917, Foreign Minister Zimmermann
confirmed that he had sent the telegram.143
As the war progressed, the industrial might of the United States
engaged in feeding the belligerents.144  In reality, however, since
Great Britain controlled the seas, our industrial might fueled only the
allied nations—a fact that the Axis meant to change.145  Operations by
Germany in the United States were neither extensive nor appreciably

138. See ANDREW, supra note 92, at 40 (explaining that realization of Germany’s
bellicose intentions resulted from British naval intelligence’s ability to intercept and
decrypt German diplomatic and naval traffic).
139. See id. (explaining that this constituted Germany’s second and more direct
communication link with North America).
140. See TUCHMAN, supra note 132, at 146 (defining the text of the telegram and
three different routes over which it was dispatched).
141. See DAVID KAHN, THE CODEBREAKERS:  THE STORY OF SECRET WRITING 285
(1967) (detailing how Britain seized copy as it was sent from Berlin to Copenhagen
and London before reaching Washington).
142. See TUCHMAN, supra note 132, at 156-58, 163-64 (indicating that the British
obtained a copy of the telegram sent directly to Mexico by an Englishman operating
a printing press in Mexico City in order to give the impression that it was intercepted
in Mexico, not by cryptographic means).
143. See id. at 183 (noting that as stated in the opinion of Robert Lansing,
Secretary of State, Zimmermann’s admission illustrated his lack of astuteness and
resourcefulness, as he forfeited the opportunity to discover how the telegram was
obtained).
144. See ANDREW, supra note 92, at 31 (discussing that the primary objective of
German espionage and sabotage was to prevent American industry from supplying
Britain and its allies).
145. See id. (documenting that American exports to Britain and France rose from
$750 million in 1914 to $2.75 billion in 1916, while exports to Germany fell from
$345 million to $2 million during the same period).
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effective, but sabotage, intelligence and propaganda operations did
occur.146  Without an adequate legal structure to address these issues,
operational requirements and remedial measures continued to flow
exclusively from the authority of the President.147
The specter of German subversion far surpassed reality, but the
result, nevertheless, was reminiscent of the Alien and Sedition Acts.148
Enacted on June 15, 1917, the Espionage Act authorized the
government to confiscate property, wiretap, search and seize private
property, censure writings, open mail and restrict the right of
assembly.149  Vague regulations took their aim not at German spies,
but at agitators, while legions of informers, private investigators and
federal agents combined to root out subversive elements.150
One significant concern of the era was the threat of subversion in
the armed forces.151  An early anti-draft movement prompted an
initial concern, which evolved into a larger concern over German and
Austro-Hungarian aliens in the military.152  The concern was not
unfounded as German agents were uncovered in the U.S. Army.153  Of
greater significance was the beginning of the “red scare.”154
Revolutionary unrest in Europe dominated the political scene abroad
and industrial disruption in the United States added to the fear of
socialism.155

146. See O’TOOLE, supra note 125, at 225-26, 241 (discussing German operations
which included, for example, fires and explosions targeted at munitions industry).
147. See id. at 241-42 (explaining that Wilson’s administration viewed German
sabotage and subversion as a foreign relations problem; therefore, the State
Department, rather than Justice Department, assumed leadership role).
148. See id. at 272-73 (discussing acts of sabotage and subversion that preceded
passage of Espionage Act).
149. See id. at 272-73 (noting that the Act was the most brutal attack on free speech
since the Sedition Act of 1798).
150. See generally PAUL L. MURPHY, WORLD WAR I AND THE ORIGIN OF CIVIL LIBERTIES
IN THE UNITED STATES 71-132 (1979) (discussing the beginning of the surveillance
state); WILLIAM PRESTON, ALIENS AND DISSENTERS:  FEDERAL SUPPRESSION OF RADICALS,
1903-1933, at 208-37 (1963) (discussing the Red Raids and the FBI’s program
designed to target subversive aliens).
151. See SIDNEY FORRESTER MASHBIR, I WAS AS AMERICAN SPY v (1953) (noting that a
significant degree of treason stemmed from individuals who were unaware that they
were dupes of the Kremlin; often, these people were a greater threat than the
admitted traitors).
152. See THEODORE DRAPER, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN COMMUNISM 93 (1957)
(describing an emergency Socialist convention in St. Louis, which began a day after
the declaration of war); see also O’TOOLE, supra note 125, at 271, 279 (contending
that the passage of the Selective Service Act after declaration of war galvanized anti-
war activists to new heights of resistance).
153. See, e.g., MASHBIR, supra note 151, at 18-21 (providing an account of the events
leading to the discovery of a German officer in the U.S. Army).
154. See generally O’TOOLE, supra note 125, at 271-73 (discussing a series of
incidents depicting a climate favorable for German subversion and the rise of the
radical Left).
155. See ANDREW, supra note 92, at 63 (noting that the “Big Red Scare,” which
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When a spy scare swept the nation near war’s end, the Justice
Department’s four hundred Bureau of Investigation agents, who had
assumed domestic counter intelligence responsibilities, were quickly
overwhelmed with investigative requirements.156  Reacting to the
constraint on resources, Attorney General Gregory accepted an offer
of assistance from the American Protective League (APL), an army of
unpaid volunteers.157  After each volunteer was given a badge similar
to a police shield, the APL waged a zealous campaign against
disloyalty in any form.158  Acting without police powers, volunteers
conducted arrests, searches and seizures, tapped telephones and
conducted “slacker raids” to root out draft dodgers.159
World War I also brought with it the “concept of a continuing war
with an internal enemy composed of civilians who could no longer be
trusted, even in peacetime[.]”160  Although protests over the “slacker
raids” reached the President’s desk, he was assured by Attorney
General Gregory that the breaches of the law occasioned by the raids
were necessary.161  Sparked by the Bolshevik revolution in 1917 and
the eventual urging by the Bolshevik leaders that workers everywhere
revolt against capitalism in favor of a socialist state, the U.S. Military
Intelligence Division (MID) developed War Plans White, contingency
plans for a war at home.162  MID believed that the radical labor
movement was allying itself with foreign ethnic groups sympathetic to
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began with a series of bombings in 1919, resulted from a combination of
revolutionary unrest in Europe and industrial disruption in the United States).
156. See DON WHITEHEAD, THE FBI STORY:  A REPORT TO THE PEOPLE 32, 34 (1956)
(acknowledging such requirements as policing enemy aliens, protecting harbors and
war industry zones and locating draft evaders and deserters).
157. See id. at 35 (discussing the organization’s evolution and snowballed
expansion to include 250,000 members and divisions in every major city).
158. See O’TOOLE, supra note 125, at 275 (noting that the tin badge was to be
displayed only when necessary to establish an agent’s semi-formal status).  Even if no
law existed to punish “disloyal” acts, APL volunteers were often able to convince
authorities to prosecute for other reasons.  One person, for example, was arrested
and sentenced to 90 days confinement for saying that the President is a “damned
fool.”  Id. at 277.
159. See id. at 276 (noting that managers of telephone and telegraph companies,
banks and office buildings, who were also APL volunteers, facilitated authorized
behavior); see also WHITEHEAD, supra note 156, at 38 (detailing the tactics used to
identify draft evaders).  One operation in the New York metropolitan region involved
35 Bureau agents, 2,000 APL agents, 1,350 soldiers and National Guardsman, 1,000
sailors and several hundred policeman.  Over three days, tens of thousands of men,
most of whom simply were not carrying their draft cards, were rounded up and
herded into public buildings for temporary incarceration.  See O’TOOLE, supra note
125, at 278.
160. JENSEN, supra note 45, at 178.
161. See 49 THE PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON 497-503 (Arthur S. Link ed., 1985)
(documenting letters received by the President expressing concern over raids).
162. See JENSEN, supra note 45, at 178-79 (explaining that White targeted American
civilians capable of causing civil disturbance that threatened government, primarily
radicals, Bolsheviks, or internationalists who renounced nationalism).
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the Russian revolution.163
The end of the war implied to General Churchill, Director of
Washington’s MID, that groups such as MID would be disbanded.164
However, executive branch officials encouraged Congress to
continue funding MID at a reduced level.165  After racial violence
erupted in Washington, D.C. and Chicago in 1919, Congress
determined that “radicals” caused the unrest and permitted
expanded MID domestic activities.166  MID began to issue “weekly
situation reports” in which it gathered and presented information
about dissident groups.167  As delusions about an imminent attempt to
overthrow the government continued to guide army intelligence and
the thinking of new Assistant Attorney General J. Edgar Hoover, MID
engaged in raids on suspected radical groups and continued
surveillance of a wide array of citizens.168
Wilson’s last Attorney General, A. Mitchell Palmer, conducted a
vigorous anti-Red campaign.169  “Slacker raids” were displaced by
“Palmer Raids” that targeted Communists and Communist labor
parties across the United States.170  Thousands of individuals were
arrested without probable cause.171  The Palmer Raids were the first

163. See id. at 179 (indicating that the opposition to the government was now
based on the idea that workers should control government rather than on mere
opposition to war).
164. See id. at 180 (reasoning that war’s end would also bring the end of civilian
investigations within United States).
165. See id. at 180-82 (rationalizing that the current activity of “radicals” justified
MID’s continued existence).
166. See id. at 185 (noting that additional activities  included gathering
information on black communities and extending surveillance to include blacks).
167. See id. at 189 (explaining that such reports were issued using ad hoc field
forces of intelligence and recruiting officers, both hired and volunteer).
168. See id. at 191-97 (discussing MID’s reliance on volunteer groups, primarily the
American Legion, for surveillance assistance).  In 1921, General Pershing became
the head of MID and, within a few months, he rescinded all orders allowing Army
surveillance of civilians and turned over all law enforcement to the Justice
Department.  MID’s name was changed to G-2 and, although its formal role in
surveillance ended, abuses continued, kept underground out of concern for public
sentiment.  G-2 still reported on alleged communists and activities of labor groups,
while it maintained Emergency Plan White.  See id. at 197, 206-07.
169. See A. Mitchell Palmer, The Case Against the Reds, FORUM, Feb. 1920, at 73-76,
reprinted in THE FEAR OF CONSPIRACY 226-27 (David Brion Davis ed., 1971)
(maintaining that the Bureau of Investigation intelligence reports lead Palmer to
envision 60,000 Trotskyites in the United States).
170. See generally FRED J. COOK, THE FBI NOBODY KNOWS 96-102 (1964)  (discussing
Palmer’s raids and the impact on communists across the country); DRAPER, supra
note 152, at 204 (noting that so many communists were indicted during the two years
following the initial raids that everyone in the movement regarded himself or herself
as a potential political prisoner); RICHARD GID POWERS, SECRECY AND POWER:  THE LIFE
OF J. EDGAR HOOVER 103-05, 138 (1987) (discussing the scope of raids and actions
taken by agents and their auxiliaries).
171. See ROBERT K. MURRAY, RED SCARE:  A STUDY IN NATIONAL HYSTERIA, 1910-1920,
at 213 (1955) (noting that virtually every local and national leader of the movement
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instance of a presidentially approved, even if tacitly so, campaign
against domestic subversion.172  Protests existed, but they were few
and the perceived red threat loomed larger than life.173  Extra-legal
processes were employed with confidence, but in the climate of the
day, they surely seemed less a governmental excess than they would
today.174
In retrospect, despite the threats to protected constitutional
liberties posed by the early intelligence institutions, dismantling the
intelligence services was a significant error of policy.175  Three
international forces were building.  First, of course, was the Bolshevik
revolution.176  The second, largely unrecognized at first, was the
Fascist ascendancy in Europe.177  Third, and largely ignored, was
Japanese hegemonic militarism.178  When these forces began to
threaten U.S. interests, intelligence became a primary need and the
pattern of extra-legal government activity and public acquiescence
was repeated. Through the 1920s and 1930s, domestic intelligence
became increasingly important.
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was arrested); see also Palmer, supra note 169, at 227 (noting that the government was
“sweeping the nation clean” of tens of thousands of communist aliens).  Lists were
drawn up.  Then, on the morning of January 2, 1920, some 4,000 people were
rounded up and jailed awaiting deportation.  There were no search or arrest
warrants.  This, reportedly, was the catalyst that launched the American Civil
Liberties Union.  See MURRAY, supra, at 213; see also JENSEN, supra note 45, at 296
(noting that the American Civil Liberties Union evolved during the war to defend
dissenters from prosecution).
172. See ANDREW, supra note 92, at 65-66 (conceding that President Wilson had
minimal personal interference with raids and had little idea of their extent).
173. See O’TOOLE, supra note 125, at 317 (acknowledging Assistant Secretary of
Labor Louis Post’s impact on the anti-communist campaign by declaring that
membership in the Communist Party was no longer sufficient to support
deportation); see also ANDREW, supra note 92, at 65-67 (indicating that the Bureau of
Investigation reports of organized communist conspiracy sparked raids aimed at
rounding up “alien filth”).
174. See, e.g., O’TOOLE, supra note 125, at 317 (noting that the Bureau of
Investigation deputized former APL members as temporary agents in order to
circumvent their lack of authority to arrest).  Cramped and unheated detention
centers were set up to hold those snatched off the streets.  Deportations were
ordered on aliens who were members of the Communist Party until a federal judge
stopped the practice. See id.
175. See infra Part II.D.1 (explaining factors contributing to the need for
heightened intelligence efforts).
176. See MURRAY, supra note 171, at 15 (noting that during and after the war, the
Bolshevik experiment presented one of the most crucial worldwide problems).
177. See ANDREW, supra note 92, at 63 (acknowledging that revolutionary unrest in
Europe contributed to the “Big Red Scare”).
178. See O’TOOLE, supra note 125, at 329 (noting that Japan exited World War I
more powerful than before and was viewed as America’s chief potential adversary for
two decades following the war).
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B. Assigning Responsibility for Domestic Intelligence
Eventually, authority for domestic intelligence would include the
Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency.179
However, in the early years, and for most of our history, responsibility
was vested in the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The modern era of
the FBI began with  J. Edgar Hoover’s appointment in 1924, first as
acting Director, then as Director.180  Operational policy for the
Bureau, and the new Director, limited the FBI to investigations
operating under the direction of the Attorney General for the
purpose of gathering facts concerning violations of federal laws.181
Although those principles remain the essence of FBI investigative
policy today, there was a period of time when official policy
encouraged more open-ended investigations.182  In 1936, J. Edgar
Hoover made two visits to the White House during which Roosevelt
charged him to gather information on Fascism and Communism.183
The FBI understood its presidential mandate to be the investigation
of all individuals engaged in activities detrimental to the internal
security of the United States.184  Therefore, it is not surprising that
FBI files were eventually filled with information on private citizens
and their private lives.185  The resulting direction to FBI field offices

179. See id. at 431 (documenting the creation of the National Security Act of 1947,
which created the Department of Defense, the National Security Council, and the
Central Intelligence Agency).
180. See WHITEHEAD, supra note 156, at 67 (noting that Hoover’s acceptance was
contingent upon the Bureau being divorced from politics, responsible to the
Attorney General only, and appointments based on merit and promotions based on
demonstrated ability).
181. See id. at 68 (discussing that the policy resulted from the agreement between
Hoover and Attorney General Stone which was issued as a memorandum of
instructions three days after Hoover’s appointment). Lacking a legislative charter,
the FBI operates on the basis of the Attorney General’s authority to appoint officials:
“(1) to detect and prosecute crimes against the United States; (2) to assist in the
protection of the person of the President; and (3) to conduct such other
investigations regarding official matters under the control of the Department of
Justice and the Department of State as may be directed by the Attorney General.” 28
U.S.C. § 533 (1994).
182. See, e.g., DIARMUID JEFFREYS, THE BUREAU:  INSIDE THE MODERN FBI 170 (1995)
(noting that investigations based purely on an individual’s political beliefs no longer
take place absent strong and justifiable suspicion that crime has taken or will take
place, which was not the case during the Hoover era).
183. See ANDREW, supra note 92, at 88-89 (noting that Roosevelt was interested in
obtaining a broad picture of movement and concerned with the movement’s
economic and political implications).
184. See JEFFREYS, supra note 182, at 65-66 (indicating that agents used Roosevelt’s
grant of authority to gather intelligence as means of violating civil and constitutional
rights of individuals believed to threaten established order).
185. See id. at 69 (noting that files existed on thousands of Americans who had
committed no crime and merely took stands contrary to those attitudes Hoover
imposed on Bureau).  In the early 1950s, Hoover granted Don Whitehead an
unprecedented look behind to collect material for his book.  See WHITEHEAD, supra
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around the nation was to “obtain from all possible sources
information concerning subversive activities conducted in the United
States by Communists, Fascists, and representatives or advocates of
other organizations or groups advocating the overthrow or
replacement of the government of the United States by illegal
methods[.]”186  This presidential directive is significant for two
reasons.  First, the President by-passed his Attorney General and
tasked the FBI directly.  Second, the investigation he ordered was for
intelligence purposes only and not for collection of evidence showing
a violation of criminal law.  A mere twelve years after the ground rules
for FBI investigations had been established, they were displaced by
this personal decision of President Roosevelt.
At the same time that the narrowly focused guidelines were
displaced, the policy direction became open-ended, and was not
restricted to foreign threats:
The executive orders upon which the Bureau based its intelligence
activity in the decade before World War II were vague and
conflicting.  By using words like ‘subversion’—a term which was
never defined—and by permitting the investigation of ‘potential’
crimes, and matters ‘not within the specific provisions of prevailing
statutes’, the foundation was laid for excessive intelligence
gathering about Americans.187
Throughout the 1930s the Justice Department utilized telephone
wiretaps for intelligence investigations.188  Authority for the use of
those wiretaps was based solely on the personal approval of bureau
chiefs.189  This authority was employed in “exceptional cases where the
crimes are substantial and serious, and the necessity is great and [the
bureau chief and the Assistant Attorney General] are satisfied that
the persons whose wires are to be tapped are of the criminal type.”190
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note 156, at Preface (noting the tremendous amount of unpublished material that
was made available to him).  Material from this research revealed unpublished notes
maintained by Hoover and Roosevelt and their personal direction of FBI programs
regarding fascism and communism.  See ANDREW, supra note 92, at 88-89 (discussing
the legal loophole where the FBI could investigate matters referred to it by the State
Department, which allowed the FBI to acquire general intelligence information).
186. S. REP. NO. 94-755, at 560-62 (1976) [hereinafter CHURCH COMMITTEE].
Presumably this directive could be interpreted as targeting activities that violate
espionage laws.  As time passed, however, it appears to have been more broadly
interpreted.
187. 2 CHURCH COMMITTEE, supra note 186, at 24.
188. See S. REP. NO. 95-604, at 8 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3909
(quoting the Church Committee’s assertion that intelligence agencies tapped and
bugged citizens without the benefit of judicial warrants).
189. See id. at 10 (noting that Attorney General William D. Mitchell made this
authorization three years after the Supreme Court held that wiretapping was a search
protected by the Fourth Amendment).
190. Id.
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Congress soon recognized the threat to personal privacy that
wiretapping occasioned.  Consequently, in 1934 the Federal
Communications Act placed the first restrictions on wiretapping.191
Logically, if wiretapping were unlawful, it should not be permitted to
generate evidence.  Legally, the Supreme Court held in Nardone v.
United States192 that evidence obtained from the interception of wire
and radio communications and the fruits of the evidence were
inadmissible in court.193  Nonetheless, the Justice Department
interpreted the Federal Communications Act and the Nardone
decision as prohibiting only the interception and divulgence of the
contents of wiretaps conducted outside the authority of Federal law
enforcement.194  In short, the wiretaps continued.195
Beginning in 1940, President Roosevelt authorized the Attorney
General to approve electronic surveillance where “grave matters
involving defense of the nation”196 were at stake.  The President
authorized and directed the Attorney General to:
. . . secure information by listening devices [directed at] the
conversation or other communications of persons suspected of
subversive activities against the Government of the United States,
including suspected spies. . . . The Attorney General was requested
to limit these investigations so conducted to a minimum and to
limit them insofar as possible to aliens.197
By 1954, J. Edgar Hoover announced to the FBI that the Bureau
was authorized to enter private property for the purpose of installing
electronic surveillance devices, without regard for surreptitious entry
and without prior authorization from the Attorney General.198
According to FBI policy, “[s]uch surveillance was simply authorized

191. See Federal Communications Act, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1103 (1934) (making it a
crime for any person to divulge or publish the contents of wire and radio
communications except through authorized channels of transmission to any person
other than the authorized receiver).
192. 302 U.S. 379 (l937).
193. See id. at 380 (discussing whether evidence obtained by Federal Agents by
means of tapping telephone wires is admissible in a criminal court).
194. See S. REP. NO. 95-604, at 10 (1977) (“[T]he Justice Department did not
interpret the Federal Communications Act or the Nardone decision as prohibiting the
interception of wire communications per se; rather only the interception and
divulgence of their contents outside the Federal establishment was considered to be
unlawful.”).
195. See id. (“[T]he Justice Department found continued authority for its national
security wiretaps.”).
196. Id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 15 (1978) (House counterpart to
Senate Report), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1783, 1790-93.
197. S. REP. NO. 95-604, at 10; see also FROM THE SECRET FILES OF J. EDGAR HOOVER
134-35 (Athan Theoharis ed., 1991) (showing written communication between
President Roosevelt and Attorney General Robert Jackson).
198. See S. REP. NO. 95-604, at 11 (describing Attorney General Brownell’s 1954
memorandum to FBI Director Hoover giving him such authorization).
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whenever the Bureau concluded that the ‘national interest’ so
required.”199  Through the 1940s and 1950s, an Interdepartmental
Intelligence Conference (IIC) coordinated efforts by the FBI and
military departments to implement the new instructions.200  After the
National Security Act of 1947201 created the National Security Council,
the IIC continued to function.  Notably, the IIC chain of authority
still continued to run directly to the President, bypassing the Attorney
General.202  Not until 1962, when President Kennedy transferred
internal security administration to his brother, did the Attorney
General regain control.203
Similar to the era of the Alien and Sedition Acts, and the hysteria
in World War I, things foreign became suspect.  For example,
Congressmen called on constituents to hunt down “internal
enemies,”204 while the State of Georgia issued a declaration of war
against aliens.  Hoover, basking in the reflected glory of his Bureau,
aligned himself with the Republicans when he found that he had
little influence over President Truman.205  He then precipitated a
propaganda campaign against domestic Communists.206  By the early
1950s, several Soviet spy rings had been uncovered in the United
States, Communists had overrun China and Americans were dying in
Korea.207  During this time, the now infamous House Un-American
Affairs Committee and the Smith Act emerged.208  Once again the

199. Id.
200. See W. Raymond Wannall, Setting Straight the FBI’s Counterintelligence Record,
WORLD & INTEL., Jan. 1987, at 176.
201. Ch. 343, 61 Stat. 495, 497 (1947) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 402 (1994)) (stating
the provisions for the National Security Council).
202. See 6 CHURCH COMMITTEE, supra note 186, at 573.
203. See ANDREW, supra note 92, at 276-78 (discussing Attorney General Robert
Kennedy’s relationship with the FBI and Director Hoover); Wannall, supra note 200,
at 176 (There was no love lost between either Kennedy brother and Hoover, but,
after more than thirty-five years as Director of the FBI, Hoover was an untouchable
institution.  Although there was apparently no thought given to replacing Hoover,
Robert Kennedy quickly discarded Hoover’s legendary anti-communist mission
because he felt it was a waste of time pursuing an enfeebled United States
Communist Party.  Robert Kennedy recognized Communism as a threat to, but not
in, the United States).
204. See ERNEST VOLKMAN & BLAINE BAGGETT, SECRET INTELLIGENCE:  THE INSIDE
STORY OF AMERICA’S ESPIONAGE EMPIRE 91-92 (1989) (stating that Hoover described
“internal enemies” as “domestic Communists” whose intention was to “aid the Soviets
during the approaching war between communism and capitalism in taking over the
United States.”).
205. See id. at 92 (“In the 1946 congressional election campaign, the Republicans,
sensing the public’s alarm over communism, rode the issue for all it was worth,
declaring that the election amounted to a choice between “Republicanism or
communism.”).
206. See id. (discussing Hoover’s belief of a “Communist internal security threat”).
207. See id. at 92-94 (discussing Truman’s decreasing political power and the
emergence of the public panic over communism).
208. See Smith Act, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 808 (1940) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
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nation was willing to accept extraordinary measures in the name of
national security.209  Foreign threats were targeted, but so was a
domestic fifth column of Americans who were viewed as potential
threats to the national security.210
The post-World War II years gave rise to investigative and
intelligence techniques that would later be scrutinized and regulated
by a combination of executive, legislative and judicial guidance.211
Probably the most ambitious intelligence project, one that generated
the most far-reaching activity and scrutiny, was Operation
Shamrock.212
Shamrock arose because the cryptanalytic successes of the war years
had proved vital to the outcome of World War II.213  As the war came
to an end, the Army Security Agency, a predecessor to the National
Security Agency, sought a means to continue to receive foreign
communications in order to maintain the cryptanalytic skills acquired
in wartime.214  Arrangements were made with major cable companies
to gain access to all overseas cables to and from foreign embassies
and consulates, and from U.S. persons and commercial firms.215
Assurances were sought by the companies, and given by the
government, that the activity was vital to national security and that
they would not be prosecuted for their part.216

§ 2385 (1994)) (making it illegal to advocate the overthrow of the government or to
belong to a group which did).
209. See VOLKMAN & BAGGETT, supra note 204, at 90-92 (discussing the return of
the “Red Scare” panic over two decades after the end of World War I).
210. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.85(d) (2000) (stating that the Code of Federal Regulations
continues to direct the FBI to “[c]arry out the Presidential directive of September 6,
1939, as reaffirmed by Presidential directives of January 8, 1943, July 24, 1950, and
December 15, 1953, designating the Federal Bureau of Investigation to take charge
of investigative work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive activities
and related matters.”). Although ambiguity exists here concerning domestic targets,
the Attorney General Guidelines (AGG) substantially reduce the risk of abuse by
exhaustively describing both the circumstances and the methods by which the FBI
can investigate domestic and foreign influences. See id. (showing the Attorney
General’s supervisory role over the FBI).
211. See JAMES BAMFORD, THE PUZZLE PALACE 1-4 (1982) (discussing the birth of the
National Security Agency).
212. See generally id. at 302-08, 373 (describing Operation Shamrock).
213. See id. at 236 (stating that Operation Shamrock was established after World
War II).
214. See id. at 237-39 (explaining the process by which Operation Shamrock was
developed).
215. See id. at 238 (“By September 1, 1945, even before the Articles of Surrender
were signed by Japan, the first batch of cables had been secretly turned over to the
Agency.”).
216. See id. at 237-42 (describing the government’s attempts to ease companies’
concerns regarding the possible illegality of the operation).
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This operation continued into the early 1960s, when technology
displaced paper communications with electronic media.217  It was no
longer necessary to hand sort paper copies of communications
because computers could be programmed to look for words of
interest.218  With this technological advance, “watch lists” of names
were developed without reference to foreign or domestic interests.219
As Attorney General, Robert Kennedy employed the watch lists
against major crime figures to capture their communications.220  A
spin-off called Operation Minaret specifically targeted both cables
and telephone calls for information about possible foreign influence
on civil disturbances in the U.S. related to the Vietnam conflict.221
The possibilities for the new technologies were virtually endless.
In the span of little more than a decade, the targeting evolved from
paper copies focused primarily on foreign missions to include
electronic watch lists focused on both intelligence and non-
intelligence targets.222  These lists included crime figures and
dissidents engaged in speech otherwise protected by the First
Amendment.223  The expansive nature of these operations came to an
end only when congressional interest in intelligence activities began
to focus on privacy issues.224  With public hearings a certainty,
disclosure was imminent, so the Director of the National Security
Agency aired the story of Shamrock.225
C. Legislative and Regulatory Change in the 1970s
Only in recent history has Congress taken an active interest in
intelligence matters.  In 1956, Senator Leverett Saltonstall explained
congressional inactivity this way:

217. See id. at 244-45.
218. See id. at 245 (“In microseconds the full text of any telegram containing
selected material could be reproduced.”).
219. See id. (stating that the computer “could be programmed to ‘kick out’ any
telegram containing a certain word, phrase, name, location, sender, or addressee, or
any combination”).
220. See id. at 247-48 (noting that the resulting intelligence contributed to several
prosecutions).
221. See id. at 253-54 (describing the purpose and development of Operation
Minaret).
222. See id. at 244-48 (showing the effect of new technologies on intelligence
activities).
223. See id. at 248 (“Now, for the first time, NSA had begun turning its massive ear
inward toward its own citizens.”).
224. See id. at 378-79 (addressing the Congress’ concern that the technological
capabilities of the intelligence community could be used against the American
people, thereby destroying all rights to privacy).
225. See id. at 302-05 (detailing the congressional investigations of Operation
Shamrock).
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It is not a question of reluctance on the part of CIA officials to
speak to us . . . it is a question of our reluctance . . . to seek
information . . . on subjects which I personally, as a member of
Congress and as a citizen, would rather not have. . . .226
By the mid-70s, the political climate had markedly changed.  With
this change came the War Powers Resolution,227 the Hughes-Ryan228
and Boland amendments,229 and intelligence oversight committees in
Congress.230  By 1975, activities of the intelligence community in
general, and the CIA in particular, had been subject to an
unprecedented public spotlight.  The CIA was charged by many with
violating the rights of private citizens through a pattern of domestic
activity.231  Responding to the allegations, on January 4, 1975,
President Ford created the Commission on CIA Activities Within the
United States.232  This Commission was known as the Rockefeller
Commission after its chairman, former Governor Nelson
Rockefeller.233  President Ford “directed the Commission to
determine whether any domestic CIA activities exceeded the

226. 102 CONG. REC. 5924 (1956), cited in 1 CHURCH COMMITTEE, supra note 186, at
149.
227. See Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1541-1548 (1994)) (“It is the purpose of this chapter to fulfill the intent of the
framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective
judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of
United States Armed forces into hostilities.”).
228. See Pub. L. No. 93-559, § 662, 88 Stat. 1795, 1804 (1974) (codified at 22
U.S.C. § 2422), repealed by Pub. L. No. 102-88, 105 Stat. 441 (1991) (amending the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to prohibit the expenditure of funds for covert
operations unless, and until, the President formally made a finding that the
proposed operation is important to the national security of the United States).
229. See WILLIAM C. BANKS & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW AND
THE POWER OF THE PURSE 57-60 (1994) (stating that there were actually a series of
appropriations restrictions sponsored by Representative Boland, all generally
designed to limit U.S. assistance to Sandinista forces in Nicaragua).  The most
restrictive of these, commonly referred to as Boland II, prohibited the use of any
funds which would have the effect of supporting military or paramilitary operations
in Nicaragua. See Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 8066, 98 Stat. 1837, 1935
(stating that no funds available to agencies involved in intelligence activities “may be
obligated or expended for the purpose or which would have the effect of
supporting . . . military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua.”).
230. See Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1981, Pub. L. No. 96-450,
§ 501(a), 94 Stat. 1975, 1981 (1980) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 413 (1994))
(requiring that the Senate and House Permanent Intelligence Committees be kept
“fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities. . . .”).
231. See generally COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES,
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT at xi (1975) (reporting on the CIA’s role and authority
with specific focus on domestic activity) [hereinafter ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION
REPORT].
232. See id. at ix (“[T]he President took steps designed to ensure that the charges
would be fully and impartially investigated and that necessary corrective actions
would be taken.”).
233. See id. at x (describing the appointment of Vice President Rockefeller and the
various other Commission members).
BANKSPP.DOC 8/15/2001  11:33 AM
2000] NATIONAL SECURITY SURVEILLANCE 33
Agency’s statutory authority and to make appropriate
recommendations.”234
The Rockefeller Commission undertook the first serious study in
the United States of the propriety of intelligence activities.235  The
Commission studied several aspects of CIA domestic activity and
found assorted abuses that have since been used by many to
demonstrate the excesses of the intelligence community.236  When the
study was completed, the Commission found that the appropriate way
to gauge the propriety of CIA activity was to determine its purpose:
The Commission finds that whether Agency activity is prohibited
depends principally on the purpose for which it is conducted.  If
the principle purpose of the activity is the prosecution of crimes or
protection against civil disorders or domestic insurrection, then the
activity is prohibited.  On the other hand, if the principal purpose
relates to foreign intelligence or to protection of the security of the
Agency, the activity is permissible, within limits, even though it
might also be performed by a law enforcement agency.237
Although the Rockefeller Commission Report supplies one of the
many explanations for the changed attitude of Congress, the driving
force was undoubtedly the Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, also created in
1975, and better known as the Church Committee.238
For fifteen months the Church Committee, spurred by allegations
of wrongdoing within the national intelligence system, conducted the
first major inquiry of the intelligence community.239  The Committee
found multiple shortcomings in intelligence operations,240 adverse
effects of secrecy,241 failure by Congress to oversee intelligence
activities,242 and in some cases, seemingly unlawful actions.243  More

234. Id. at ix.
235. See id. at x-xi (“The Commission ha[d] been determined from its inception to
make a thorough and vigorous investigation.”).
236. See id. at 115, 149-50, 250 (stating that such abuses include mail openings,
operation CHAOS and maintaining indices on American citizens).
237. Id. at 62.
238. See S. Res. 21, 94th Cong. (1975) (proving that even though other
committees with similar purposes, notably the Pike and Abzug committees, also
contributed to the change, the Church Committee stands alone for both its far-
reaching consequences and its revelations).
239. See 1 CHURCH COMMITTEE, supra note 186, at 2 (noting that the committee’s
task was to “conduct an investigation and study governmental operations with respect
to intelligence activities and of the extent, if any, to which illegal, improper, or
unethical activities were engaged in by any agency of the Federal Government”).
240. See id. at 425 (noticing that a lack of statutory guidelines surrounding
intelligence activities significantly affected efficient operation of intelligence
activities).
241. See id. (finding that “the operation of an extensive and necessarily secret
intelligence system places severe strains on the nation’s constitutional government”).
242. See id. (stating that “[t]he Committee finds that Congress has failed to
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often, they found that activities of the intelligence community had
violated individual privacy.244
The Committee determined that secret government activities,
while necessary to the effectiveness of government, were,
nevertheless, a threat to democratic society.245  They found
duplication, waste and inertia.246  The Committee believed control
and accountability were lacking and that covert actions had been
both excessive and a means of circumventing the democratic
process.247  Most importantly, they determined that intelligence
efforts had violated the Constitution and that the reason was lack of
legislation.248  The remedy, they asserted, was to have Congress
prescribe rules for intelligence activities.249
The Church Committee and several legislators proposed a charter
for the intelligence community aimed at restricting the intelligence
community.250  Although the initial charter legislation was never
enacted, a primary spin-off of this era of activism was the dawning of
“intelligence law” and a first-time focus on the President’s authority
for national security surveillance.251

provide the necessary statutory guidelines to ensure that intelligence agencies carry
out their necessary missions in accord with constitutional processes”).
243. See id. (“The Committee finds that covert action operations have not been an
exceptional instrument used only in rare instances when the vital interests of the
United States have been at stake.”).
244. See id. (finding specifically that the NSA, existing without a congressional
charter and statutory limitations, dangerously threatens individual privacy).
245. See id. at 424-25 (describing the continuing need for effective intelligence
activities in light of challenges posed by “strong and potentially hostile” foreign
powers while recognizing the need to conform those activities to democratic and
constitutional principles).
246. See id. at 425 (“In addition, covert action has become a routine program with
a bureaucratic momentum of its own.”).
247. See id. (noting that covert action has become a “routine program” and that
“intelligence programs should not be regarded as ends in themselves,” but should be
better organized and directed to ensure their consistency with legitimate foreign and
national security policy).
248. See id. (noting that Congress must prescribe statutory guidelines for the
intelligence community in attempting to ensure compliance with constitutional
principles).
249. See generally id. at 424-74 (describing various statutory remedies to be
implemented in regard to each federal intelligence agency).
250. National Intelligence Reorganization and Reform Act of 1978, S. 2525, 95th
Cong. (1978).  The goal of this legislation was to replace the National Security Act of
1947 with more specific lines of responsibility and limits on authority.  In the midst
of debate about charter provisions, the U.S. Embassy in Teheran was seized on
November 4, 1979, and fifty-two American hostages were imprisoned.  Due to a
widespread impression that there had been an “intelligence failure” regarding Iran,
the impetus for the charter quickly vanished.  See JOHN OSETH, REGULATING U.S.
INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS 122-31 (1985) (noting that political resolve to curb
intelligence operations weakened after failure to anticipate Iranian revolution).
251. See STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 432-35 (2d ed. 1997)
(noting S. 2525’s grant of authority to the President to suspend the provisions of the
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The Church Committee’s proposed charter for intelligence
agencies would have regulated covert action and imposed a statutory
ban on assassination.252  President Ford quickly sought to displace
those proposals by issuing Executive Order 11905, which
implemented many of the Church Committee recommendations.253
The Executive Order addressed the primary issues identified by the
Committee and as a result, most ambitious legislative proposals
withered thereafter.254  Interest in intelligence activities persisted,
however, both in Congress and with the public.
Public interest in intelligence and government information not
only persisted, but also increased after publication of the Pentagon
Papers, the Watergate scandal, and the revelations by the Church
Committee of U.S. complicity in overseas and domestic intelligence
abuses.255  Congress responded by granting statutory rights to
government information, and for the protection of private
information.256  It was only natural that with new awareness, the public
began to challenge intelligence activities as never before.
D. The Evolving Judicial Role
Privacy law in the United States has always been about the
breaching of boundaries. This section will show that, before the
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act during times of war and the bill’s requirement that the President approve all
special intelligence operations necessary to “the national defense or the conduct of
the foreign policy of the United States”).
252. See S. 2525, § 134 (prescribing punishments of up to life in prison for any
officer or employee of the United States who conspires to kill, attempts to kill, or kills
a foreign official).
253. See Exec. Order No. 11,905, 41 Fed. Reg. 7707 (1976).  The Ford Executive
Order was a template for future Executive Orders that would regulate the
intelligence community.  President Carter replaced Executive Order No. 11,905 with
Executive Order No. 12,036, 43 Fed. Reg. 3678 (Jan. 24, 1978), and President
Reagan replaced Executive Order No. 12,036 with the still current Executive Order
No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1982), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 note (1994).
254. Congress did not become quiescent after the failure of charter legislation.
The Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980 mandated that the Intelligence committees
be kept “fully and currently informed” of all intelligence activities. See Pub. L. No. 96-
450, § 501, 94 Stat. 1975, 1981 (1980) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 413(a)(1)
(1994)).   
255. See JOHN PRADOS, PRESIDENTS’ SECRET WARS:  CIA AND PENTAGON COVERT
OPERATIONS FROM WORLD WAR II THROUGH THE PERSIAN GULF 331-34 (1996)
(discussing that in light of recent public concern about covert intelligence
operations, Congress’ “lackadaisical” attitude toward monitoring intelligence
operations, and the realization that of the approximately 274 legislative proposals
intended to restrict the CIA’s power, none had passed, effective congressional or
executive action was necessary).
256. See Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994) (guaranteeing public
access to agency rules, opinions, orders, records, and proceedings); Privacy Act, 5
U.S.C. § 552a (1994) (protecting private and personal information that may be in
the possession of a government agency from public dissemination).
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Constitution was construed to recognize a right of privacy, the
common law protected some dimensions of privacy by extending the
law of personal property. In the late nineteenth century, some began
to fear that expanding technologies would enable eavesdroppers to
learn the contents of conversations.257  As a consequence, common
law and natural law sources evolved into constitutional doctrine,
again based on protecting geographic and spatial boundaries.258  In
1999, the Supreme Court confirmed the long maintained view that
the right of residential privacy is at the core of the Fourth
Amendment.259
1. The conceptual bases for privacy
There are several conceptual approaches to and definitions of
privacy.  These include a broad-based right to be let alone, an interest
in seclusion, a right to protect personal information, an interest in
making important personal choices free from governmental
interference, and an interest in the autonomy of one’s body.260  In
addition, for constitutional lawyers it matters whether privacy is a
right or a liberty—the former carries more constitutional weight.261
For political philosophers, privacy is valued for its intrinsic worth and
is thus broader than either liberties or rights.262  For those responsible
for establishing the rules for national security surveillance, it is
necessary to distill from the privacy caldron those aspects of privacy
that may be threatened by national security surveillance.
Alan Westin’s classic taxonomy of privacy facilitates an assessment
of the privacy at stake in national security surveillance.263  Westin first
asserts the importance of an interest in personal autonomy, based on

257. See, e.g., O’BRIEN, supra note 6, at 50-51 (discussing generally public concerns
surrounding the development of modern technology and privacy).
258. See id. at 51 (noting that the Supreme Court has still applied traditional
property notions of privacy even in the face of technological advances).
259. See Wilson v. Lane, 526 U.S. 603, 609-10 (1999) (holding that police officers
who brought Washington Post reporters with them into a house while executing a
valid warrant violated the expectation of privacy in one’s home guaranteed by the
Fourth Amendment).
260. See generally ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 33-38 (1967) (discussing how
privacy protects the “core” elements of a person’s own autonomy, which is often
masked from the public while the individual interacts with others).
261. See generally Cruzan v. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-79 (1990)
(recognizing the existence of broad liberty interests that must be balanced against
legitimate state interests in determining when the state may invade an individual’s
privacy interests in the context of a patient’s right to refuse medical treatment).
262. See O’BRIEN, supra note 6, at 25 (recognizing that privacy is primarily a “non-
legal” and “non-political” concept).
263. See WESTIN, supra note 260, at 32-39 (discussing four analytical models of
privacy—personal autonomy, emotional release, self-evaluation, and limited and
protected communication—in considering the “choices about individual privacy that
Americans may have to make”).
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the Western idea of the worth and dignity of the individual in
democratic societies.264  To maintain individuality, people require
autonomy—“the desire to avoid being manipulated or dominated
wholly by others.”265  The autonomy interest is threatened when a
private person or government official penetrates an inner zone and
learns intimate personal information.266  The suffered harm is caused
by stripping “the individual’s protective shell, his psychological armor
[leaving] him naked to ridicule and shame.”267  The autonomy
interest “is also vital to the development of individuality and
consciousness of individual choice in life.”268
A second relevant entry in Westin’s catalog of privacy is the interest
in limited and protected communication.269  All mature persons
exercise discretion and reserve in our communications; we are not
always completely candid.270  This aspect of privacy provides each
person with needed opportunities to share “confidences and
intimacies with those he trusts.”271  Disclosures are made because the
individual expects the confidences to be maintained.272  Societies that
respect this aspect of privacy must then construct a set of boundaries,
through law or otherwise, that define what is expected to remain in
confidence and what may be shared with others in various
relationships.273

264. See id. at 33 (observing that “[i]n democratic societies, there is a fundamental
belief in the uniqueness of the individual, in his basic dignity and worth as a creature
of God and a human being, and in the need to maintain social processes that
safeguard his sacred individuality”).
265. Id.
266. See id. (describing various theorists’ view that an individual has “zones of
privacy” which surround and protect a “core-self” in an attempt to protect an
individual’s “ultimate secrets—those hopes, fears, and prayers that are beyond
sharing with anyone”).
267. Id. (recognizing the potential psychological effects of having one’s inner
most zone of privacy, the “core-self,” penetrated by those people to whom the
individual does not wish to expose his or her most private thoughts).
268. Id. at 34 (reflecting on the concept that one requires time alone to truly
understand their own feelings and individuality).
269. See id. at 37-39 (reasoning that communication with others must be limited
because “[t]he greatest threat to civilized social life would be a situation in which
each individual was utterly candid in his communication with others, saying exactly
what he knew or felt at all times”).
270. See id. at 37-38 (suggesting that limited communication is central to “psychic
self preservation” when one is continually confronted with people unknown to the
individual).
271. Id. at 38 (indicating that limited communication with strangers allows for a
needed openness with intimate acquaintances such as spouses, family members, and
close personal friends).
272. See id. (reasoning that personal privacy is still maintained when inner secrets
are divulged to those people close to the individual because civilized society dictates
against those acquaintances breaching that confidence).
273. See id. (discussing how law has provided privileges to intimate
communications with attorneys, clergy, doctors, and psychologists so that people will
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The potential clash of these variants of privacy and surveillance is
easy to visualize.  Individuals value the ability to move from place to
place anonymously, to be alone or to commune with others. Yet
surveillance may shadow the individual, even where she goes to be
alone.  Because national security surveillance is secret, conducted so
that the target is not aware of the surveillance, the very uncertainty
surrounding whether surveillance has occurred may compromise
personal privacy.274  In addition, surreptitious recording and filming
of individual communication may impact freedom of expression,
when individual communication is chilled by the suspicion, whether
well-founded or not, that she is being recorded.275
Yet Westin also recognizes that Western democratic societies have
long employed surveillance as a means of social control.276  Although
surveillance devices cause many to recoil because they invade
individual privacy, those same devices are used to ensure the public
safety, without which privacy becomes unattainable:
Parents watch their children, teachers watch students, supervisors
watch employees, religious leaders watch the acts of their
congregants, policemen watch the streets and other public places,
and government agencies watch the citizen’s performance of
various legal obligations and prohibitions. . . . Without such
surveillance, society could not enforce its norms or protect its
citizens . . . and . . . the means of protecting society [must] keep
pace with the technology of crime.277
2. The development of privacy as property
The conceptual separation of public and private spheres has been
recognized since antiquity.278  Aristotle expected the polis, the
province of politics and government, to remain strictly separated
from the oikos, the private sphere attached to the individual and the

be able to feel protected when divulging the “core-self” to people who would
normally fall outside the sphere of individuals to whom one might divulge extremely
personal information).
274. See id. at 58 (describing the fact that one may not know that they are under
surveillance as “psychologically taxing” because the individual does not know how to
properly conform their behavior to the observing authority).
275. See id. at 62 (examining the unique privacy threat of surveillance with film
media in that every aspect of a person’s actions, including voice inflection, subtle
body movements and other “private intercourse” are preserved for the observing
authority).
276. See id. at 57 (recognizing the existence of societal surveillance since the days
of the Greek city-state).
277. Id.
278. See id. at 22 (stating that no society “with a reputation for liberty” has failed to
place limits on state sponsored surveillance).
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home.279  During ancient and medieval times, a range of activities
involving individuals and family in the home were held free from
public governance.280  By the time of John Locke, the public/private
dichotomy was firmly entrenched, but the relationship between the
two spheres had become more complex.281
In Locke’s social contract and in England, the state existed as a
means of protecting the private sphere. The government was charged
by individuals to maintain civic order as a means for protecting life,
liberty, and property.282  Still, as protector of the private sphere,
government also had to respect boundaries.  In 1604, an English
judge observed that “the house of every one is to him as his castle and
fortress, and well for his defence against injury and violence, as for
his repose.”283  A century and a half later Blackstone found that:
[T]he law in England has so particular and tender a regard to the
immunity of a man’s house, that it stiles it his castle, and will never
suffer it to be violated with impunity:  agreeing herein with the
sentiments of ancient Rome. . . . For this reason no doors can in
general be broken open to execute any civil process; though, in
criminal causes, the public safety supersedes the private.284
The U.S. Constitution followed the Lockean principle that the
powers of government were limited and that legal rules confined
official discretion.285  Intrusions into the personal life of a citizen may
occur only pursuant to rules enacted with lawful authority.286  Just as
Locke’s social contract complicated the relationship of the public
and private spheres, the Constitution placed the government as both
protector of individual liberties and as a threat to their enjoyment.
Although the text of the Bill of Rights does not incorporate a right
of privacy, contextual evidence indicates that the Fourth Amendment

279. See generally ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 1127-34 (Richard McKeaon ed. &
Benjamin Jowett trans., Random House 1941) (explaining the separation of the state
from the family and the individual).
280. See WESTIN, supra note 260, at 11-18 (describing how personal activities in the
“primitive world” were traditionally free from any type of governmental interference
or invasion).
281. See id. at 22 (linking the complexity of the public/private dichotomy to
western societal development).
282. See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 70-71 (Thomas P.
Peardon ed., 1952) (reasoning that men relinquish some of their natural freedom to
government authority to protect their “lives, liberties & estates”).
283. Semayne’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B. 1604).
284. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *223.
285. See LOCKE, supra note 282, at 75-82 (noting that governmental power is
inherently limited in that it may not exceed the power granted to it by those who
have freely chose to be governed and discussing generally the extent of legislative
governmental power).
286. See id. (noting that the governmental structure embodied in a constitution is
limited by the natural rights and surrendered freedoms of the governed).
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was designed as a species of privacy protection.287  In advocating the
adoption of the Bill of Rights, Patrick Henry claimed that officials
“may, unless the government is restrained by a bill of rights . . . go
into your cellars and rooms, and search, ransack, and measure,
everything you eat, drink, and wear.”288  In more recent years, the
Supreme Court noted that “it is familiar history that indiscriminate
searches and seizures conducted under the authority of ‘general
warrants’ were the immediate evils that motivated the framing and
adoption of the Fourth Amendment.”289  Due to the unspecific
language of the Bill of Rights, it was left for the courts either to find
privacy protections in the Fourth Amendment, or to fashion a right
of privacy out of the constitutional whole cloth.
During the framing period and through most of the nineteenth
century, individual communication occurred only through direct
speech or by letter.  Physical surveillance was, therefore, conducted
with only eyes and ears.  Legal protections, thus, addressed privacy in
the home and the protection of the basic means of communication.
Lacking significant Supreme Court interpretations of the First and
Fourth Amendments before the Civil War, scholars offered insight
into the interpretation of constitutional privacy.
In his 1833 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States,
Justice Joseph Story wrote that the First Amendment’s protections
were intended to secure the rights of private sentiment and private
judgment.290  In 1853, Francis Lieber added that the First
Amendment embraced the right to form and conduct affairs in
associations without surveillance by “the spy, the mouchard, the
dilater, the informer, and the sycophant . . . [of] . . . police
government.”291  Story also wrote that the Fourth Amendment was
“indispensable to the full enjoyment of the rights of personal security,
personal liberty, and private property.”292

287. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures . . . .”).
288. 3 PATRICK HENRY, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
448-49 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Ayer 1987) (1836).
289. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583-84 (1980) (discussing various versions
of the Fourth Amendment considered by the House of Representatives while
considering the Bill of Rights).
290. See STORY, supra note 89, at 722-46 (discussing the various personal liberty
interests protected by the First Amendment in the context of religious expression,
speech protection and libel, peaceable assembly and the right to petition the
government).
291. FRANCIS LIEBER, ON CIVIL LIBERTY AND SELF GOVERNMENT 1003-105 (1853).
292. STORY, supra note 89, at 1895.
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The usual, but mistaken, date associated with the birth of privacy
law in the United States is 1890, when Samuel Warren and Louis
Brandeis published an influential law review article titled The Right to
Privacy.293  Warren and Brandeis acknowledged Judge Thomas
Cooley’s 1868 treatise, Constitutional Limitations, which described the
citizen’s “immunity in his home against the prying eyes of the
government” alongside protection from “arbitrary control of the
person” as the foundations of personal liberty.294  Cooley elaborated:
[I]t is better sometimes that crime should go unpunished than that
the citizen should be liable to have his premises invaded, his desks
broken open, his private books, letters, and papers exposed to
prying curiosity, and to the misconstructions of ignorant and
suspicious persons . . . . [It is unthinkable that] ministerial
officers . . . take such liberties, in endeavoring to detect and punish
offenders, as are even more criminal than the offenses they seek to
punish.295
By the early twentieth century, technological breakthroughs such
as the invention of the telephone, microphone, and dictograph
recorder, and development of instantaneous photography, altered
what had been a fairly simple balance between privacy and
surveillance.296  It was no longer sufficient for the law to protect only
physical sites from invasion.297  Although the new technologies made
it clear that privacy was in fact an inherently personal attribute not
dependent on the location of its exercise, constitutional law
continued to treat privacy as a property idea connected to a physical
place.298
As early as 1877, the Fourth Amendment was found to protect
personal privacy from government surveillance.299  In Ex parte Jackson,

293. Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
294. See THOMAS G. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 367 (4th
ed. 1878) (introducing the author’s analysis of unreasonable search and seizure).
295. See id. at 375 (referring to a statute that would “permit the breaking and
entering [of] a man’s house” by government  authorities for investigative purposes).
296. See O’BRIEN, supra note 6, at 50-51 (discussing how the development of
modern technology led to problems in discerning reasonable searches and seizures
under the Fourth Amendment).
297. See id. (recognizing that new technology employed by law enforcement
officials resulted in the destruction of the “constitutionally protected areas”
doctrine).
298. See id. at 51 (noting that upon the advent of the ability of police to intercept
telephone conversations, the Supreme Court in Olmstead still applied traditional
property concepts in finding that intercepting such messages was not an invasion of
personal privacy because there was no search of “constitutionally protected areas”
and thus the Fourth Amendment did not apply).
299. See Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 736-37 (1877) (upholding the
constitutionality of outlawing the use of the postal system for “the distribution of
matter deemed injurious to the public morals”).
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Fourth Amendment warrant requirements were held applicable to a
sealed letter entrusted to the mail.300  In 1881, tort relief was granted
in Demay v. Roberts301 when the Court determined that observing
childbirth without consent was a violation of privacy.302  The court
opined that the “plaintiff had a legal right to the privacy of her
apartment at such a time, and the law secures to her this right by
requiring others to observe it, and to abstain from its violation.”303
The courts continued to focus on privacy as a property concept,
based on the content and area of governmental surveillance.304  In
1886, the Supreme Court held in Boyd v. United States305 that a person’s
private papers were protected from seizure by the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments.306  The Court determined that a federal statute
permitting the government to order the accused in a criminal case to
produce shipping invoices of allegedly illegally imported goods
violated the reasonableness clause of the Fourth Amendment.307
Justice Bradley, relying on principles established by the King’s Bench
in Entrick v. Carrington308 in 1765, reasoned:  “It is not the breaking of
his doors, and rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence
of the offense; but it is the invasion of this indefeasible right of
personal security, personal liberty and private property . . . which
underlies and constitutes the essence of [the court’s] judgement.”309
In their article, Warren and Brandeis argued for an expansion of
the common law:  “political, social, and economic changes entail

300. See id. at 733 (reasoning that the Fourth Amendment’s protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures afforded to papers in a private home applied
equally to letters in the postal system).
301. 9 N.W. 146 (Mich. 1881).
302. See id. at 149 (basing the right to personal privacy upon both the nature of
the event, such as childbirth, and the location of the event, such as the plaintiff’s
home).
303. Id.
304. See United States v. Three Tons of Coal, 28 F. Cas. 149, 158 (E.D. Wis. 1875)
(No. 16,517) (upholding the constitutionality of a government order requiring the
production of private papers because those papers pertained to the defendant’s
distilling business and the government’s collection of revenues).
305. 116 U.S. 616, 638 (1885).
306. See id. at 633-34 (reasoning that the threat of a default judgment used to
compel the production of records and papers affected an unreasonable seizure and
also violated the Fifth Amendment by allowing those records to be used against the
defendant).
307. See id. at 635 (noting the seizure in the instant case lacked “many of the
aggravating incidents of actual search and seizure,” yet noting that allowing such
seizures could justify future unconstitutional acts).
308. 98 Eng. Rep. 807, 817-18 (K.B. 1765) (setting forth the principle of
unreasonable search and seizure as the injury to the person’s privacy rather than the
physical trespass).
309. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630 (locating the injury from unreasonable search and
seizure outside the actual physical violation of property and instead focusing on the
intangible injury to “the privacies of life”).
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recognition of new rights and the common law . . . grows to meet the
demands of society.”310  Warren and Brandeis cited new technologies,
such as high-speed presses and cameras that “have invaded the sacred
precincts of private and domestic life.”311  The privacy at stake was a
right to control publicity about individuals as part of their right to
personhood:  the right of “inviolate personality.”312  They argued that
the common law of defamation and breach of trust already
recognized the privacy principle and allowed judges merely to apply
the principle to new facts to protect individuals from those who
would record personal information.313  The fact that Warren and
Brandeis were concerned with private rather than official invasions of
privacy helps explain why the logic of expanding common law
categories did not catch on in the area of official surveillance.314
3. From property to persons
In a wooden application of the property-based conception of
Fourth Amendment principles to electronic surveillance, the
Supreme Court ruled in Olmstead v. United States315 that Fourth
Amendment protection did not extend to telephone conversations
because of the lack of entry, search, and seizure involved in
intercepting them.316  Chief Justice Taft stressed that when authorities
tapped the defendant’s phone from outside his home and office,
such action did not constitute an “actual physical invasion” or the
taking of “tangible material effects.”317  Justice Brandeis dissented,
and in drawing upon arguments from his 1890 law review article,318
argued that:

310. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 293, at 193 (describing the evolution of the
common law principle of the “right to life” from the narrowly construed protection
from only physical injury or deprivation, such as battery or theft, to the broadly
construed protection from intangible injury, such as nuisance, slander or libel).
311. Id. at 195 (noting the ease with which photographs and newspapers permit
the widespread distribution of information).
312. Id. at 201, 205 (arguing that private writings and “other personal
productions” should be afforded legal protection against unwanted publication
under the general principle recognizing “the right to be let alone” rather than the
principle of private property).
313. Id. at 205 (suggesting the accepted legal protection provided the King under
breach of trust and defamation as the axiomatic starting point for the extension of
the common law to protect personal information).
314. See id. at 215 (“The general object in our view is to protect the privacy of
private life . . . .”).
315. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
316. See id. at 464-65 (rejecting the argument that communications over wires are
analogous to mailed letters, which receive Fourth Amendment protection).
317. See id. at 466 (stating that persons who install telephones intend “to project
[their] voice to those quite outside” and noting that the government did not
intercept the conversations “in the house of either party to the conversation”).
318. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 293, at 148-99.
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[T]he makers of our Constitution . . . sought to protect Americans
in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions, and their
sensations.  They conferred, as against the Government, the right
to be let alone . . . .  To protect that right, every unjustifiable
intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual,
whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the
Fourth Amendment.319
Brandeis noted that technological changes continued to permit the
government to employ more subtle and expansive means of invading
privacy.320  For the near-term future, Olmstead insured that the courts
would not view wiretapping as “search” and thus not subject even to
the additional Fourth Amendment requirement that surveillance be
“reasonable.”321
As new surveillance technologies continued to emerge322 and
changing threats to national security clashed with the civil libertarian
backlash against surveillance of citizens during the Civil Rights
movement and Vietnam War,323 the law of privacy and surveillance by
government was forced to modernize.324  The courts were forced
finally to develop a legal theory of privacy in the surveillance context
that did not depend upon the outmoded property model.325  As part
of this basic re-design, the judges were required to shed their
preoccupation with the existence of a “search” of tangible things.326
The first signs of a maturing constitutional base for privacy

319. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with Chief
Justice Taft’s narrow reading of the Fourth Amendment).
320. See id. at 473 (emphasizing that at the time of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendment’s adoption, the government’s means of effecting seizure and/or
compelling testimony rested primarily upon direct and coercive measures, such as
breaking and entering a home or torture).
321. See, e.g., United States v. Weiss, 103 F.2d 348, 351 (2d Cir. 1939) (citing
Olmstead as authority to allow use of evidence obtained by wiretapping for a
conviction of mail fraud); Smith v. United States, 91 F.2d 556, 557 (D.C. Cir. 1937)
(citing Olmstead as authority to permit the trial court to use evidence obtained
through wiretapping to convict for the sale of non-taxed alcohol); Kerns v. United
States, 50 F.2d 602, 602 (6th Cir. 1931) (citing Olmstead to allow use of evidence
obtained by wiretapping for a conviction of violating the National Prohibition Act).
322. See WESTIN, supra note 260, at 67-168 (discussing the government’s increased
use of new surveillance technologies).
323. See JENSEN, supra note 45, at 230-67 (discussing post-World War II national
security concerns, the corresponding increase in surveillance of civilians by
government agencies, and the public’s subsequent response).
324. See O’BRIEN, supra note 6, at 203-38 (discussing the increasing importance of
personal privacy and the resulting impact on public policy and lawmaking).
325. For a discussion of how the Court has allowed a charge of unreasonable
search and seizure without evidence of actual physical trespass, see infra note 347 and
accompanying text.
326. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967) (emphasizing the
expectation of privacy rather than actual place of alleged unreasonable search and
seizure as controlling).
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occurred in the area of associational privacy.327  In NAACP v. Alabama,
the Court struck down an Alabama law that required the NAACP to
turn over its membership lists in order to be admitted as an out-of-
state corporation.328  Justice Harlan acknowledged “the vital
relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in one’s
associations . . . .  Inviolability of privacy in group association may in
many circumstances be indispensable to the preservation of freedom
of association, particularly where a group espouses dissident
beliefs.”329  The idea that associational privacy provides an individual
“breathing space”330 has often been an issue in national security
surveillance case law since the late 1950s,331 albeit not always the basis
for overturning government surveillance.332
In Watkins v. United States,333 the Supreme Court recognized a right
of “political privacy” in assessing the pertinence of congressional
demands for information in an investigation.334  Justices Frankfurter
and Harlan espoused political privacy more broadly when concurring
in Sweezy v. New Hampshire,335 which reviewed questions directed at a
guest lecturer at the University of New Hampshire by a state official
investigating alleged subversive activities in New Hampshire.336  The
Justices’ rationale for reversal balanced “two contending principles—
the right of a citizen to political privacy . . . and the right of the State
to self-protection.”337

327. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958) (setting
forth bases for recognizing constitutional protection for freedom of association).
328. See id. at 466 (ruling NAACP’s membership list protected from state scrutiny
by the Fourteenth Amendment).
329. Id. at 462.
330. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-33 (1963) (emphasizing that
standards for allowing vague statutory language are narrower for First Amendment
freedoms).
331. See generally Americo R. Cinquegrana, The Walls (and Wires) Have Ears:  The
Background and First Ten Years of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 793 (1989) (discussing jurisprudence of electronic surveillance and the
Fourth Amendment viewed through the development and application of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act).
332. See Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 115
(1961) (upholding a Federal statute that required the Communist Party to register
with the government as “Communist-action organization” because the court’s record
demonstrated the Communist Party operated primarily at the behest of a foreign
government).
333. 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
334. See id. at 215-16 (reversing petitioner’s conviction for contempt of Congress
for refusing to answer questions regarding petitioner’s former associates and their
political activities with the Communist Party).
335. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
336. See id. at 236-44 (outlining proceedings during which the petitioner was
interrogated about his involvement with various political parties that espoused
communist or socialist ideologies).
337. Id. at 266-67 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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Finally, in 1965 when the Court decided the Connecticut
contraceptives case, Griswold v. Connecticut,338 many thought that the
stage was set for wide application of modern privacy.339  In locating a
constitutional right of privacy outside the historical and doctrinal
lineage of the Fourth Amendment,340 the Court struck down a
Connecticut statute that banned the use of contraception and the
distribution of any information related to contraception.341  The
constitutional possibilities for privacy protection multiplied in
Griswold when four opinions offered different articulations of the
privacy right that the contraceptive law threatened.342  Justice
Douglas’s opinion for the Court was ridiculed as unprincipled and
impossible to apply.343  Still, his emphasis on the “penumbral” aspects
of privacy, the zones of privacy that may apply in different contexts
and are protected by several of the Constitutional provisions, reflects
much of the still-evolving constitutional law of privacy.344  In addition,
Douglas’s linkage of the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments
provides an early sign of connection between the shared values of
privacy and free expression.345
The constitutional law of privacy and surveillance advanced in
1967, when the Supreme Court held in Katz v. United States346 that the

338. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
339. See id.
340. See generally Robert A. Sedler, The Legitimacy Debate in Constitutional
Adjudication:  An Assessment and a Different Perspective, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 93, 109-37
(1983) (discussing the Supreme Court’s review of constitutional questions by
applying values outside those recognized and/or declared constitutional by the
Framers).
341. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86 (noting the Connecticut statute violated the
“familiar principle”—that the government’s means to achieve regulatory objectives
cannot be so broad as to improperly infringe on protected rights).
342. See id.  Justice Douglas, delivering the opinion of the Court, stated the statute
violated the right to privacy long afforded to married couples.  Id. at 486.  Justice
Goldberg, Chief Justice Warren, and Justice Brennan, concurring, reasoned that the
statute should be struck down because the Fourteenth Amendment protects both
enumerated and unenumerated fundamental rights.  Id. at 486-87 (Goldberg, J.,
concurring).  Justice Harlan, concurring in the judgment, reversed the statute
because “the enactment violates basic values ‘implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty . . . .’”  Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).  Justice White, also concurring in the judgment, concluded
that the statue deprived married couples of their liberty without due process.  Id. at
502 (White, J., concurring).
343. See Robert G. Dixon, Jr., The “New” Substantive Due Process and the Democratic
Ethic:  A Prolegomenon, 1976 BYU L. REV. 43, 84 (1976) (writing “Justice Douglas . . .
skipped through the Bill of Rights like a cheerleader . . .” and arguing that Griswold
dealt not with privacy but with the denial of access to information).
344. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (discussing the “zones of privacy” of the First,
Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments).
345. See id. at 483-85 (noting the Fourth and Fifth Amendment’s protection
against the state’s infringement on one’s home and life coincided with the extension
of First Amendment protection to association).
346. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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Fourth Amendment’s warrant provision applied to electronic
surveillance.347  The FBI, therefore, violated Katz’s rights when its
agents listened in on his calls from a public telephone by means of a
device attached to the outside of the booth.348  For the first time, the
Supreme Court explicitly ruled that the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places.349  Katz had a justifiable expectation of privacy
with respect to his telephone conversation even though the
conversation took place in a public phone booth.350  The Court thus
accepted Brandeis’s assertion forty years earlier that surveillance can
disrupt one’s privacy outside the home.351
As articulated by Justice Harlan, concurring in Katz, an individual
must assert an actual expectation of privacy of the sort that society is
willing to recognize as “reasonable.”352  While this standard is far from
precise, it reflects a continuing effort by the courts to fashion limits to
government surveillance out of respect for individual privacy.353
Notwithstanding the Fourth Amendment’s advance in Katz,354 the
smorgasbord approach to privacy in Griswold 355 foreshadowed a
fractured and incomplete privacy jurisprudence that has evolved little
since 1965.356  Perhaps the most revealing and comprehensive effort
by the Court to define the right of privacy since Griswold came in
1977, in Whalen v. Roe.357  In upholding a New York statute that

347. See id. at 353, 359 (removing the necessity of actual physical trespass to find
the unwarranted search and seizure unconstitutional).
348. See id.
349. See id.  Compare id. at 351 (applying Fourth Amendment protection against
unwarranted search and seizure to wire-tapping), with Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (ruling that there is no Fourth Amendment protection afforded
to telephone calls).
350. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 351-52 (emphasizing the intention or expectation of
privacy rather than the location as the controlling factor for Fourth Amendment
protection).
351. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478-79 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (focusing on the
actual invasion of privacy resulting from a wiretap rather than the actual physical
location of the wiretap); see also Warren & Brandeis, supra note 293, at 206
(articulating possible privacy invasion and the loss of control over the dissemination
of one’s personal information from “the too enterprising press, the photographer, or
the possessor of any other modern device for recording or reproducing scenes or
sounds.”).
352. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring) (defining the
“reasonable” standard as not only a consideration of the expectation of privacy but
also the place where that expectation arises).
353. See id. (Harlan, J., concurring).
354. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353, 359 (removing a required showing of physical
trespass to hold the unwarranted search and seizure unconstitutional).
355. See supra note 342 and accompanying text (describing that the four opinions
of Chief Justice Warren and Justices Douglas, Goldberg, Brennan, and Harlan differ
in analysis but agree in result).
356. See generally Symposium, The Right to Privacy One Hundred Years Later, 41 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 643 (1991) (discussing the evolution of privacy rights and the law).
357. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
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required centralized computer records of the names and addreses of
patients who were prescribed lawful yet dangerous drugs,358 the
Supreme Court found that security provisions in the statutory scheme
showed “proper concern” for privacy protection.359
According to the Court, privacy embraces an “individual interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters”360 and an “interest in
independence in making certain kinds of important decisions.”361
However, the Court in Whalen did not describe freedom from
governmental intrusion, but freedom from governmental
regulation.362  As Louis Henkin observed, the post-Griswold privacy
cases, despite being “swept together into the basket labeled ‘right of
privacy,’”363 are not about “official intrusion into my home, my
person, my papers, my telephone; about my right to be free from
official surveillance.”364
In Katz, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the President had
claimed special authority for warrantless surveillance in national
security investigations.365  The Court explicitly declined to extend its
holding to cases “involving the national security.”366  In 1968,
Congress responded to Katz by enacting Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act.367  Title III established the
conditions for judicial authorization of electronic surveillance for the
investigation of specified crimes, based in part on findings in each
case that traditional surveillance methods were ineffective.368  Like the
Supreme Court in Katz, however, Congress explicitly stated that:
[N]othing in Title III shall . . . be deemed to limit the
constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he
deems necessary to protect the United States against the overthrow
of the Government by force or other unlawful means, or against

358. See id. at 603-04 (finding a statute that mandated the recordation of the
prescriptions of potentially addictive drugs, such as opium, cocaine, and methadone
to be constitutionally permissible).
359. See id. at 594 (“Public disclosure of the identity of patients is expressly
prohibited by the statute and by a Department of Health regulation.”) (footnote
omitted).
360. Id. at 599 (footnote omitted).
361. Id. at 599-600 (footnote omitted).
362. See id. at 603-04 (focusing on recordation of the prescription of dangerously
addictive drugs).
363. Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1424 (1974).
364. Id.
365. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 (1967) (noting the government
requested an exception to normal prior legal authorization for surveillance involving
national security issues).
366. Id. at 358 n.23.
367. Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 802, 82 Stat. 197, 212 (1968) (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)).
368. See id.
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any other clear and present danger to the structure or existence of
the Government.369
4. The Keith decision
The Supreme Court first confronted the tensions between
unmonitored executive surveillance and individual freedoms, in the
national security setting, in a 1972 case, United States v. United States
District Court (hereinafter Keith).370  Keith arose from a criminal
proceeding in which the United States charged three defendants with
conspiracy to destroy government property.371  One defendant was
also charged with the dynamite bombing of a CIA office in Ann
Arbor, Michigan.372  Defendants sought electronic surveillance
information, held by the prosecution, that the CIA obtained during a
potentially illegal wiretap.373  The defendants wanted to determine
whether such information formed any part of the information on
which the government relied in the indictment or in the
government’s case for conviction, and thereby suppress any tainted
evidence at trial.374
The Attorney General admitted that a warrantless wiretap had
intercepted conversations involving the defendants.375  After an in
camera review of the surveillance logs and a review of an affidavit, the
district court was not persuaded that the surveillance was a
reasonable exercise of the President’s national security powers.376
The Court found that this surveillance violated the Fourth

369. Id. § 802.
370. 407 U.S. 297, 299 (1972) (noting that this is the first case in which the
Supreme Court addressed issues regarding the President’s power to approve
electronic surveillance weighed against a citizen’s right to privacy).
371. See id. (stating that the charge of conspiracy to destroy government property
violated 18 U.S.C. § 371); see also 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994) (defining the charge,
punishment, and exceptions involved in conspiracy to commit an offense or defraud
the United States).   
372. See Keith, 407 U.S. at 299 (distinguishing conspiracy to destroy government
property—the charge against all the defendants—from a dynamite bombing, the
charge against Plamondon).
373. See id. at 299-300 (noting that the defendants filed a motion to compel
evidence obtained by the government through electronic surveillance in the pretrial
phase of litigation).
374. See id. (adding that the defendants also sought a hearing to determine if the
government’s information gained through electronic surveillance constituted tainted
evidence).
375. See id. at 300-01 (examining the Attorney General’s affidavit and deposition,
which conceded that government agents overheard certain conversations involving
defendant Plamondon through the use of wiretaps approved by the Attorney
General).
376. See United States v. Sinclair, 321 F. Supp. 1074, 1080 (E.D. Mich. 1971)
(ordering the government to disclose defendant Plamondon’s monitored
conversations and ordering a hearing to decide whether such information tainted
evidence used in the indictment and to be used at trial).
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Amendment, and ordered disclosure of the overheard conversations
to defendant Plamondon.377  On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision.378
Before the Supreme Court, the government defended its actions
on the basis of the Constitution and the national security disclaimer
in the Crime Control Act.379  Justice Powell, writing for the Court,
rejected the statutory argument.380  Although Justice Powell conceded
that the statutory provision may constitute “an implicit recognition”381
of the President’s constitutional authority to protect the nation’s
security, he concluded the “language is essentially neutral”382
concerning the President’s electronic surveillance power:
“Congress . . . simply did not legislate with respect to national security
surveillances.”383
The Court first emphasized that it was deciding only the right of
the government to engage in warrantless electronic surveillance of a
domestic organization with no alleged connection to a foreign
government.384  Justice Powell framed the constitutional inquiry as a

377. See id. at 1079-80 (adopting the holding in United States v. Smith, 321 F.
Supp. 424 (C.D. Cal. 1971), which emphasized that the government is not exempt
from the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement in domestic national security
cases); see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV (mandating the right to be secure against
unreasonable searches and seizures, and the rule that warrants be issued only upon a
showing of probable cause); see also Smith, 321 F. Supp. at 425 (clarifying that the
President is subject to the restrictions of the Fourth Amendment, regardless of
statutory exceptions).
378. See Keith, 444 F.2d 651, 669 (6th Cir. 1971) (affirming District Judge Keith’s
finding that defendant Plamondon’s telephone conversations were illegally
intercepted and therefore, the government’s petition for writ of mandamus was
denied).
379. See Keith, 407 U.S. at 302-03 (stating that the government relied on section
2511(3) of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, which emphasizes the
President’s inherent constitutional power to protect national security free of any
limitations); see also Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L.
No. 90-351, § 802, 82 Stat. 197, 212 (reiterating that the President may authorize
necessary steps void of judicial approval in cases of national security).
380. See Keith, 407 U.S. at 303 (concluding that neither the language of section
2511(3) of the Crime Control Act, nor the legislative history of the statute, support
the government’s argument that the President’s power to authorize national security
surveillance is limitless); see also Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 802, 82 Stat. 197, 212 (noting
the pertinent language:  “Nothing contained in this chapter . . . shall limit the
constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to
protect . . .” against specified dangers).
381. Keith, 407 U.S. at 303 (acknowledging that the President has “certain powers”
to protect against hostile acts or attacks by foreign powers).
382. Id. (explaining that the language’s neutrality does not confer upon the
President additional power to unilaterally order or permit electronic surveillance).
383. Id. at 306 (acknowledging parts of the Crime Control Act in which Congress
explained in detail permissible exceptions and conditions, and concluding that
Congress would have exercised similar care in drafting sections related to national
security surveillance had it intended to legislate on this issue).
384. See id. at 321-22 (clarifying the scope of the decision as only involving
domestic threats to national security and refusing to address matters of foreign
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determination of the “reasonableness” of the surveillance in light of
the Fourth Amendment Warrant Clause.385  He found that the
authority for the surveillance was implicit in the President’s Article II
Oath Clause, which includes the power “to protect our Government
against those who would subvert or overthrow it by unlawful
means.”386  He further found this power to be sufficient justification
for electronic surveillance of would-be subversives.387  However, the
“broader spirit” of the Fourth Amendment, as expressed in United
States v. Katz,388 and “the convergence of First and Fourth Amendment
values”389 in national security wiretapping cases, made the Court
especially wary of possible abuses of the national security power.390
The Court proceeded to balance “the duty of Government to
protect the domestic security, and the potential danger posed by
unreasonable surveillance to individual privacy and free
expression.”391  Justice Powell found that waiving the Fourth
Amendment probable cause requirement could lead the executive to
“yield too readily to pressures to obtain incriminating evidence and
overlook potential invasions of privacy and protected speech.”392
Justice Powell stated that maintaining separation of powers and
protecting individual freedoms requires a judicial role in issuing
warrants.393

powers or foreign agents).
385. See id. at 322-23 (recognizing that different means may not violate the Fourth
Amendment if such means are reasonably related to a legitimate government interest
and protect citizens’ rights).
386. Id. at 310 (citing the President’s fundamental and constitutional duty under
Article II, Section 1, to “preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United
States”); see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (mandating the Presidential Oath:  “I do
solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the
United States, and will to the best of my ability, preserve, protect and defend the
Constitution of the United States.”).
387. See Keith, 407 U.S. at 310 (conceding that the President, through the Attorney
General, may find it essential to utilize electronic surveillance regarding the plans of
those persons who intend to commit unlawful acts against the United States).
388. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (insisting that a warrant is
absolutely necessary under the Fourth Amendment in the surveillance of crimes
distinct from those involving national security, and expanding this protection to
include speech as well as tangible property and physical items).
389. Keith, 407 U.S. at 313 (observing that this connection between the First and
Fourth Amendments is unique to national security cases and is generally not at issue
in common criminal cases).
390. See id. (realizing that although the executive may find a greater need for
more in-depth investigative techniques in national security cases, there is also greater
risk of infringing on constitutionally protected speech).
391. See id. at 314-15 (recognizing that a balance is necessary because the
stipulations of the Fourth Amendment are not absolute).
392. Id. at 317 (explaining that Fourth Amendment protections are based on a
historical review, which indicates that unchecked executive discretion may often
infringe on individual freedoms).
393. See id. (asserting that the constitutional protections of individual rights will
BANKSPP.DOC 8/15/2001  11:33 AM
52 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1
The government argued for an exception to the warrant
requirement, citing the unique characteristics of ongoing national
security intelligence gathering, the complexity of the factors involved
in such surveillance, and the fear that leaks could endanger sources
and methods of intelligence gathering.394  The Court, however,
determined that the potential for abuse of the surveillance power in
this context, along with the regular dealings of courts with highly
complex matters and their ability to protect sensitive information in
an ex parte proceeding, weighed against granting the exception.395
Justice Powell wrote that the inconvenience to the government is
“justified in a free society to protect constitutional values.”396
Before concluding, Justice Powell emphasized that this case
involved only the domestic aspects of national security:  “We . . .
express no opinion as to, the issues which may be involved with
respect to activities of foreign powers or their agents.”397  Finally, the
Court left open the possibility that different warrant standards and
procedures than those required in a normal criminal investigation
might be applicable in a national security investigation.398  Thus, the
Court implicitly invited Congress to promulgate a set of standards for
such surveillance.399
The Court avoided resolving the tension that pervades the overlap
between the collection of foreign intelligence information and
domestic law enforcement activities, although its opinion preserved
the traditional legal distinctions between intelligence gathering and
law enforcement.  The Court similarly acknowledged the existence of

best be preserved through a division of powers among the governmental branches,
including the judiciary); see also John M. Harlan, Thoughts on a Dedication:  Keeping the
Judicial Function in Balance, 49 A.B.A. J. 943, 943-44 (1963) (commenting that the
founders were wary of centralized authority and thus, formed a governmental
structure based on the separation of executive, judicial, and legislative powers).
394. See Keith, 407 U.S. at 318-19 (admitting that the government’s arguments are
legitimate and require the most vigilant consideration because they involve both the
President’s authority and the nation’s security).
395. See id. at 319-20 (specifying the risk of infringing on protected speech and
noting that federal judges will understand the differences in national security cases
and common criminal cases, and continue to handle sensitive information with the
conscientious abilities they exercise in all proceedings).
396. Id. at 321 (recognizing that although it is justified to require a warrant for
electronic surveillance, the Attorney General may face additional burdens in
obtaining a warrant prior to surveillance).
397. Id. at 321-22 (limiting the scope of the decision to domestic matters of
national security).
398. See id. at 322 (recognizing that national security surveillance can be more
long term, involve more sources, require more types of information, present more
difficulties in identifying exact targets of surveillance, focus more on prevention or
preparedness, and generally lack the precision of ordinary criminal cases).
399. See id. (encouraging Congress to consider establishing different standards for
ordinary criminal surveillance and national security surveillance).
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presidential authority to authorize national security surveillance, but
did not spell out the scope or limits of such power.400
5. Case law after Keith—electronic surveillance
Many constitutional issues concerning warrantless wiretapping
remain unsettled, although statutory and regulatory developments
since Keith have muted the debate.  Keith sharpens the issues but does
not resolve them.401  For example, the Court’s analysis leaves
unresolved the proper approach to the warrant question when the
origins of the threat cannot be determined in advance.  Indeed,
finding out whether a domestic organization has any significant
connection with a foreign power is often a primary objective of
surveillance.
Although undecided by the Supreme Court in Keith, several lower
courts have addressed the important question of surveillance of
foreign sources.  In United States v. Brown,402 the Fifth Circuit upheld
the legality of surveillance when the defendant, an American citizen,
was incidentally overheard as a result of a warrantless wiretap
authorized by the Attorney General for foreign intelligence
purposes.403  The Court found that, on the basis of “the President’s
constitutional duty to act for the United States in the field of foreign
relations, and his inherent power to protect national security in the
context of foreign affairs . . . the President may constitutionally
authorize warrantless wiretaps for the purpose of gathering foreign
intelligence.”404  Similarly, in United States v. Butenko,405 the Third
Circuit upheld electronic surveillance conducted without a warrant
after finding that the primary purpose of the surveillance was to

400. See id. at 323-24 (stating that the Court’s opinion does not establish precise
guidelines for domestic national security warrants, but does establish the necessity of
prior judicial approval for domestic security surveillance such as wiretaps).
401. See id. at 321-24 (clarifying the requirement of judicial approval of warrants
for domestic national security surveillance, yet failing to clarify policies for foreign
national security surveillance or specify procedures for domestic warrants).
402. 484 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973).
403. See id. at 427 (citing the reasoning of United States v. Clay, 430 F.2d 165 (5th
Cir. 1970), in holding that the information obtained by a wiretap regarding the
defendant’s conversation had no relevance to the crime at issue in the case); see also
Clay, 430 F.2d at 170 (holding that when surveillance is authorized regarding persons
other than the defendant, for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence, the
executive branch has acted reasonably and legally).
404. Brown, 484 F.2d at 426 (reaffirming the holding of Clay); see also Clay, 430
F.2d at 170 (allowing wiretaps in order to obtain foreign intelligence); Zweibon v.
Mitchell, 363 F. Supp. 936, 943-44 (D.D.C. 1973) (holding that the President can act
through the Attorney General to constitutionally obtain intelligence relating to
foreign affairs and national security matters).
405. 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc).
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obtain foreign intelligence information.406
In Zweibon v. Mitchell,407 the D.C. Circuit insisted that a warrant be
obtained before a wiretap can be installed on a domestic organization
that has no arguable connection with a foreign power.408  The Court
also questioned whether any national security exception to the
warrant requirement would be constitutionally permissible.409  The
Court considered and rejected all the government arguments for
judicial deference addressed by the Supreme Court in Keith.410  It also
dismissed the following arguments:  (1) the standard of probable
cause might be more difficult to meet in a prior judicial
proceeding;411 (2) a judge’s error before surveillance occurs would
more likely harm the national security than an error in post-
surveillance proceedings;412 and (3) pre-surveillance review could
deny the government the benefits it would gain from the fact that
most individuals would not challenge surveillance after-the-fact “on
the mere possibility that they were the subject of an unreasonable
wiretap.”413
The plurality similarly rejected the fear of leaks as a rationale to
avoid warrant proceedings.414  The Court applied the Keith Court’s
assessment that the ex parte warrant proceeding before a judge, whom
the government may select on the basis of a reputation for discretion
and loyalty, poses little security risk.415  In addition, the Court

406. See id. at 606.
407. 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
408. See id. at 614 (limiting the holding to only require a warrant for wiretaps used
to monitor domestic organizations with no ties to a foreign power and failing to
address electronic surveillance on a broader level).
409. See id. at 654 (concluding that any activity could be said to relate to national
security matters involving foreign affairs and, therefore, such a broad exception to
the warrant rule would potentially endanger individual rights against warrantless
searches and seizures).
410. See id. at 624 (emphasizing that the judiciary, as a body of neutral officials, is
the appropriate branch to oversee and, when necessary, limit the power of the
executive branch to authorize and conduct electronic surveillance).
411. See id. at 645 (concluding that as a matter of law, the standard for probable
cause is the same as a prior or post hoc judicial proceeding and suggesting that
judges are likely to give great deference to the executive branch regarding the
necessity of a wiretap due to the national security interest at stake); see also Note,
Foreign Security Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, 87 HARV. L. REV. 976, 984 (1974)
[hereinafter Foreign Security Surveillance] (suggesting that judicial errors in warrant
proceedings would likely favor the government, not the individual, as judicial officers
will recognize their own lack of knowledge on national security matters and defer to
the executive branch).
412. See Zweibon, 516 F.2d at 646 (deciding that the prevention of erroneous
denials of intelligence information is not more important than erroneous invasions
of personal privacy resulting from a lack of pre-surveillance judicial review).
413. Id. at 646-47 (emphasizing that even if individuals fail to dispute wiretaps
post-surveillance, all searches and seizures remain subject to judicial review).
414. See id. at 647.
415. See id. at 647-48 (refuting the government’s argument regarding security
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reasoned that the risk of leaks are no greater in after-the-fact review,
unless a leak were to thwart the tap itself.416  The judge is only
required to find probable cause before authorizing surveillance, thus,
the government will ordinarily be able to avoid disclosing most of its
data.417
In Zweibon, the Court dismissed the argument that internal security
information is “strategic” and thus unlike the information obtained
for use in a criminal prosecution.418  The Court stated that national
security information often is used in the criminal context.419  The
Court also noted that warrantless surveillance risks imposing a
burden on constitutionally protected speech and privacy “whether its
purpose be criminal investigation or ongoing intelligence
gathering.”420
As for the concern about risking the loss of essential intelligence
information by delay, the Court reiterated that exigent circumstances
may justify departures from prior judicial approval if irreparable
harm may ensue from the warrant requirement.421  Again, the
availability of such an exception turns on the exigency, not the origin
of the threat.422  The Court recognized the Fourth Amendment
principle that “[a]bsent exigent circumstances, all warrantless
electronic surveillance is unreasonable and therefore
unconstitutional.”423 A similar recognition occurred in Berlin

leaks by noting that warrant proceedings are conducted ex parte, and therefore,
information can be restricted to judges “whose loyalty and discretion [the
government] considers unimpeachable”); see also Keith, 407 U.S. 297, 321 (1972)
(emphasizing an enhanced judicial responsibility in cases of espionage, sabotage,
and treason involving both domestic and foreign security matters).
416. See Zweibon, 516 F.2d at 648 (noting that it is only a “possibility” and not a
likelihood that judicial review would ruin the wiretap and further noting that this risk
would still exist during post hoc review due to continuing surveillance or similar
surveillance situations as those under review).
417. See id. (raising the possibility that the government could withhold the name
or other facts which would identify an agent or information, thereby protecting
valuable data).
418. See id. at 648.
419. See id. (noting that incriminating evidence used in criminal proceedings is
often discovered through the use of electronic surveillance and often asserted by the
executive branch in criminal cases).
420. Id. at 649 (quoting Keith, 407 U.S. at 320).
421. See id. at 649-50 (extending the rule regarding exigent circumstances and
warrantless searches to cover electronic surveillance).
422. See id.
423. Id. at 614 (recognizing this policy but limiting the holding to only require
warrants before wiretaps are installed to monitor domestic organizations that have
no relation to foreign powers and failing to establish any further standards for
issuing such warrants); see also S. REP. NO. 95-604, at l4, l5 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3914 (stating that Zwiebon “involves only the domestic aspects of
national security”).
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Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld,424 where a warrant was required to wiretap
Americans living in West Germany despite Department of Defense
arguments about dangers to United States forces and to American
foreign policy.425
Thus, the Zweibon and Berlin Democratic Club results favor the use of
a warrant and discourage the application of the national security
exception.426  The Brown and Butenko cases accepted the exception to
the warrant requirement, where the facts clearly indicate the need for
foreign intelligence.427  On balance, the result in Keith and the
application of the Keith reasoning in Zweibon suggest that, in the
absence of a known direction by a foreign power, the Constitution
requires some form of judicial approval before engaging in electronic
surveillance of domestic organizations.428
Although “exigent circumstances,” mentioned in Zweibon, could
affect the need for a warrant, the likely exigency—an imminent
internal security threat—does not require the foreign versus domestic
threat distinction.429  In addition, the domestic organizations’
activities’ connection to U.S. foreign policy interests in Zweibon and
Berlin Democratic Club suggest careful nuances that the Court must
address in sorting out the origin of the internal security threat.430  The
proper balance between the First and Fourth Amendment rights of

424. 410 F. Supp. 144 (D.D.C. 1976).
425. See id. at 157-59 (supporting the decision to require a warrant because the
American citizens living in Berlin had no involvement with a foreign power).
426. See Zweibon, 516 F.2d at 673 (holding the warrantless electronic surveillance
conducted in this case to be illegal and unconstitutional); see also Berlin Democratic
Club, 410 F. Supp. at 157-59, 164 (holding for plaintiffs because the government
conducted warrantless electronic surveillance of American citizens living abroad with
no links to a foreign power).
427. See United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 427 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding that a
warrant was not required because the information disclosed by electronic
surveillance was irrelevant to the crime in question); see also United States v. Butenko,
494 F.2d 593, 608 (3d Cir. 1974) (affirming the district court’s judgment, which
denied disclosure of government information obtained by electronic surveillance).
428. See Keith, 407 U.S. 297, 323-24 (1972) (holding that judicial approval is
required prior to electronic surveillance in domestic national security situations); see
also Zweibon, 516 F.2d at 612-13 (relying on the reasoning employed in Keith, which
concluded that no exceptions exist to the requirement of prior judicial approval in
domestic national security matters).
429. See Zweibon, 516 F.2d at 649-50 (explaining that exigent circumstances, under
which delay would cause irreparable harm, can justify a warrantless use of electronic
surveillance regardless of whether it is a domestic or foreign national security
matter).
430. See id. at 605-07 (noting that plaintiffs were members of the Jewish Defense
League (JDL) and that the government conducted electronic surveillance of the
group’s U.S. headquarters based on the belief that the JDL’s activities threatened
peaceful relations between the United States and the Soviet Union); see also Berlin
Democratic Club, 410 F. Supp. at 147-48 (stating that plaintiffs, who were electronically
monitored by the United States government, were American citizens and members of
the Berlin Democratic Club living in Berlin, Germany).
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the individual and the government’s interest in surveillance to
protect the national security is still invariably resolved in the first
instance by the FBI, on the basis of fact-sensitive inquiries, without
clear judicial criteria for deciding when a prior judicial warrant is
required.
6. Case law after Keith—physical searches431
Before 1966, the FBI conducted over two hundred warrantless
surreptitious entries for intelligence purposes, in addition to
microphone installation, such as physically searching and
photographing or seizing documents.432  Although the Attorney
General apparently was not informed, the FBI Director or his deputy
authorized these operations in writing.433  Most records of
surreptitious entries were destroyed soon after a completed entry.434
The use of warrantless searches against domestic targets declined
radically after J. Edgar Hoover banned such “black bag jobs” in
1966.435
The Supreme Court has not recognized a national security

431. Like many legal issues of national security, the authority of the executive to
carry out warrantless physical searches is, in part, dependent upon congressional
power (whether or not exercised) over the same subject, and upon the limits
imposed by the Bill of Rights.  See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (mandating the right to be
secure against unreasonable searches and seizures, and the rule that warrants be
issued only upon a showing of probable cause).  Part II.F.2 of this Article will assess
the 1994 amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act  (FISA), in which
Congress legislated an exemption from traditional Fourth Amendment requirements
and provided authority to employ substitute procedures in carrying out some
physical searches for national security purposes.  See Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-359, 108 Stat. 3443 (codified as amended in 50
U.S.C. §§ 1821-1829 (1994)).  Although this statutory authority affects the
constitutional calculus of national security searches, Article II and Bill of Rights
issues remain.  It is possible, for example, that Congress may have violated the First
or Fourth Amendments in extending statutory authority for certain types of
warrantless searches.  Similarly, neither pre- nor post-FISA congressional authority is
necessarily determinative of the President’s power to act on the basis of his
independent Article II authority.  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (stating the Presidential
Oath).  As a practical matter, the enactment and amendment of FISA may have
diminished the practical importance of the purely constitutional scope and limits
questions.  Nonetheless, because the constitutionality of the FISA procedures for
physical searches has not been settled, and because constitutional authority and its
limits provide the backdrop for the consideration of FISA’s constitutionality, it
remains essential to understand the constitutional issues.
432. See 3 CHURCH COMMITTEE, supra note 186, at 355 (citing a staff report entitled
“Warrantless Surreptitious Entries:  FBI ‘Black Bag’ Break-Ins and Microphone
Installations,” which questions the legality of warrantless surreptitious entries).
433. See id. (noting that several Attorneys General knew that the FBI conducted
break-ins to install microphones; however, there is not evidence suggesting that these
Attorneys General knew that the FBI conducted break-ins for purposes other than
installing microphones).
434. See id. (specifying the practice of destroying records of surreptitious entries as
the “Do Not File” procedure).
435. See id.
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exception to the warrant clause for physical searches.  Nor has it
decided a physical search case akin to Keith, where it could begin to
sort the law of national security searches on the basis of the origins of
the surveillance target.  In 1960, the Supreme Court considered the
possibility of a national security exception to the warrant
requirements for a search in Abel v. United States.436  In an opinion
upholding the espionage conviction of a KGB agent, based in part on
a warrantless search incident to a valid deportation arrest, the Court
rejected the notion that national security justified an exception to
Fourth Amendment requirements.437
The Government has argued only twice for an exception to the
warrant clause in support of an internal security physical search.438
First, in United States v. Ehrlichman,439 Nixon assistants John
Ehrlichman and Charles Colson were among five defendants accused
of conspiring to deprive Los Angeles psychiatrist, Dr. Lewis Fielding,
of his Fourth Amendment rights through a surreptitious entry and
physical search of his office.440  During the summer of 1971, following
the publication of the Pentagon Papers,441 a decision was made to
establish a unit within the White House to investigate leaks of
classified information.442  This “Room 16” unit was composed of Earl
Krogh, David Young, G. Gordon Liddy, E. Howard Hunt, and
operated under the general supervision of John Ehrlichman.443  The
unit was instructed to obtain information on Daniel Ellsberg, who was
under indictment for disclosing the Pentagon Papers.444  After Dr.
Fielding refused to be interviewed by FBI agents about his former
patient, the unit decided to obtain copies of Ellsberg’s medical

436. 362 U.S. 217 (1960) (holding that items seized without a warrant to be
constitutionally admissible).
437. See id. at 219 (“Of course . . . the fact that [the case] was a prosecution for
espionage, has no bearing whatever upon the legal considerations relevant to the
admissibility of evidence.”).  Agents found the evidence of espionage in a hollow
pencil in a trash basket after Abel had paid his bill and left his hotel room.  Id. at 225.
The Court ruled that Abel had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the room or
the pencil after he had left them in the room.  Id. at 241.
438. See cases cited infra notes 439-71.
439. 376 F. Supp. 29 (D.D.C. 1974), aff’d, 546 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
440. See Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d at 913 (discussing the charges against Ehrlichman
and the procedural posture of the case).
441. A case study of the Pentagon Papers litigation is presented in DYCUS, supra
note 251, at 811-42; see also New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)
(explaining the factual background of the Pentagon Papers case).
442. See Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d at 914 (describing the origin and activities of the
“special investigations” unit).
443. See United States v. Barker, 546 F.2d 940, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
444. See id. (describing in detail the operations of the “special investigations unit”
of the White House).
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records by covert operation.445  Hunt had enlisted Watergate foot
soldier Bernard Barker, who in turn recruited Eugenio Martinez and
Felipe deDiego.446
On September 2, 1971, Hunt and Liddy met Barker, Martinez, and
deDiego at a hotel in Beverly Hills.447  Hunt instructed the team “to
enter an office, search for a particular file, photograph it, and replace
it.”448  The next evening, the burglars entered Dr. Fielding’s office
and, contrary to their plan, used force to effect the break-in.449  As
instructed, they spilled pills on the floor to make it appear that the
break-in had been a search for drugs.450  No Ellsberg file was found.451
Ruling on the defendants’ discovery motions, District Court Judge
Gesell found the warrantless search “clearly illegal under the
unambiguous mandate of the Fourth Amendment.”452  The
defendants claimed none of the traditional exceptions to the warrant
requirement, nor was there any argument that the break-in had to be
carried out before a warrant was sought.453  In response to the
defendants’ principal assertion that the President may suspend
Fourth Amendment requirements when exercising his “special
responsibilities” concerning national security, Judge Gesell
maintained that Fourth Amendment rules apply “even when known
foreign agents are involved . . . except under the most exigent
circumstances.”454  According to Judge Gesell, if there is an exception
to Fourth Amendment rules for intelligence collection, the exception
is limited to wiretapping, “a relatively nonintrusive search.”455  To
expand this exception to physical searches “would give the Executive
a blank check to disregard the very heart and core of the Fourth
Amendment.”456

445. See id. at 943.
446. See id. (describing how members of the special investigations unit were
recruited).
447. See id.
448. Id. at 944
449. See id. at 944.
450. See id.
451. See id.; see also Martin Arnold, Ellsberg Lawyers Weigh New Motion for Dismissal,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1973, at A1 (reporting on the eve of district court proceedings
that “the judge will be presented with an affidavit tomorrow confirming that the
psychiatrist’s office was in fact broken into; that his file cabinets were forced open,
including the one containing Dr. Ellsberg’s records; that the files were scattered
about the office . . . .  None of Dr. Ellsberg’s records were missing, so it is assumed
that the burglars copied or photographed them.”).
452. United States v. Ehrlichman, 376 F. Supp. 29, 33 (D.D.C. 1974).
453. See id. at 33-35.
454. Id. at 33.
455. Id. (discussing the differences between wiretapping and physical searches).
456. Id. at 34 (discussing why exceptions to the warrant requirement should not
be expanded).
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Judge Gesell also concluded that the President had not authorized
the break-in.457  The defendants made a fall-back argument that,
whether or not the President specifically authorized the break-in,
such authority was delegated to the defendants.458  Judge Gesell
responded that even if the President had the authority to authorize
such an act, he could not have delegated it to any of the defendants,
as they were not law enforcement officers and their claims for
delegated authority were based on “vague, informal, inexact terms.”459
The defendants were convicted following a jury trial.460
The D.C. Circuit affirmed Ehrlichman’s conviction.461 The panel,
however, was more circumspect than Judge Gesell.  The court merely
held that no “national security” exception to the warrant requirement
could be invoked without specific authorization by the “President or
Attorney General in a particular case.”462  Judge Wilkey elaborated:
The danger of leaving delicate decisions of propriety and probable
cause to those actually assigned to ferret out “national security”
information is patent, and is indeed illustrated by the intrusion
undertaken in this case, without any more specific Presidential
direction than that ascribed to Henry II vexed with Becket.  As a
constitutional matter, if Presidential approval is to replace judicial
approval for foreign intelligence gathering, the personal
authorization of the President—or his alter ego for these matters,
the Attorney General—is necessary to fix accountability and
centralize responsibility for insuring the least intrusive surveillance
necessary and preventing zealous officials from misusing the
President’s prerogative.463
In a split and internally inconsistent decision, the same panel
reversed the convictions of burglars Barker and Martinez.464
Because of the controversy surrounding it, the Ehrlichman
precedent is hardly one on which the government would rely today in
making an argument for a national security exception for a
warrantless search.  There was no accusation that Ellsberg or his
psychiatrist had any relationship to a foreign power.465  John N.

457. See id. (stating that the President both “lacked the authority to authorize” the
break-in and did not give any directive to allow such break-ins generally).
458. See id. at 34 (holding the President had no authority to delegate approval of
national security break-ins).
459. Id.
460. See United States v. Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d 910, 913 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
461. See id. at 914 (upholding the conviction on all counts).
462. Id. at 925 (discussing why executive authorization was needed for a “national
security exception”).
463. Id. at 926.
464. See United States v. Barker, 546 F.2d 940, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (containing
divergent majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions).
465. See generally Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d at 940 (describing the factual background of
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Mitchell, the Attorney General at the time of the Fielding break-in,
subsequently was sent to prison for perjury and conspiracy in
connection with efforts to cover up the burglary of the Democratic
National Committee headquarters at the Watergate in Washington.466
President Richard M. Nixon was named an unindicted co-conspirator
in the same affair.467  At the Watergate hearings, when Ehrlichman
defended the warrantless Fielding break-in as the right of the
President to exercise his national security powers, Senator Talmadge
asked, “Isn’t there an ancient sacred principle we all learned in law
school about a man’s home being his castle?”468  Ehrlichman
arrogantly replied, “Well Senator, I believe that principle has eroded
in America recently.”469  Talmadge erupted, “Not where I come from,
Mr. Ehrlichman.”470
The second judicial review of warrantless physical searches carried
out for national security purposes arose out of the investigation, and
eventual criminal conviction, of Ronald Humphrey and Truong Dinh
Hung.471  Humphrey and Dinh Hung were convicted of several
espionage-related offenses for transmitting classified U.S.
government information to representatives of the government of
North Vietnam.472
In 1976, after living in the United States for more than a decade,
Vietnamese citizen David Truong met Dung Krall, a
Vietnamese-American wife of an American Naval Officer who had
many contacts among Vietnamese living in Paris.473  Truong
persuaded Krall to carry packages for him to the Vietnamese in Paris
at the time of the 1977 Paris negotiations between North Vietnam
and the United States.474  The packages contained copies of U.S.
diplomatic cables and other classified papers dealing with Southeast
Asia.475  Truong obtained the materials from Ronald Humphrey, an
employee of the United States Information Agency, who

Ehrlichman and his psychiatrist and their relation to the Pentagon Papers).
466. See United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (describing
the fate of the various participants in the Watergate scandal).
467. See id. (listing eighteen individuals as coconspirators).
468. Physical Searches for Foreign Intelligence Purposes, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Legislation of the Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 101st Cong. 15 (1990)
[hereinafter Hearing on Physical Searches] (statement of Professor Samuel Dash).
469. Id. (statement of John Ehrlichman).
470. Id. (statement of Senator Talmadge).
471. See United States v. Humphrey, 456 F. Supp. 51 (E.D. Va. 1978), aff’d sub nom.
United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980).
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surreptitiously copied, removed classification markings, and delivered
the stolen materials to Truong.476  Humphrey later stated that his
motive was to improve United States/North Vietnam relations so that
he could be reunited with a woman imprisoned by the North
Vietnamese government.477
Krall, however, was a CIA and FBI informant.478  After the
intelligence agencies first learned from Krall that Truong was
transmitting classified documents to Paris, President Carter and
Attorney General Bell authorized warrantless physical searches of the
packages.479  After presenting the packages Truong had given her to
the FBI for inspection, copying and approval, Krall was permitted to
carry the documents to Paris.480  During this time the FBI monitored
Truong and Humphrey closely, from approximately September,
1976, until January 31, 1978.481
The package searches led to the secret installation of closed-circuit
television equipment in Humphrey’s government office, the
placement of a wiretap on Truong’s telephone, and a microphone
bugging device in Truong’s apartment.482  Truong’s phone was
tapped and his apartment was bugged from May 1977 to January
1978.483  The telephone interception continued for 268 days; nearly
every conversation was monitored and virtually all were taped.484  The
eavesdropping device was operative for approximately 255 days and it
ran continuously.485  The FBI never sought or obtained court
authorization for the installation and maintenance of the telephone
tap or the bug.486
After their indictment, Truong and Humphrey moved to suppress
the evidence obtained by the government without a warrant.487
Following the rationale of the decisions in Brown488 and Butenko,489 the
District Court determined that because the surveillance was “for the

476. See id. at 911-12.
477. See id. at 911.
478. See id. at 912.
479. See id. at 911 (discussing the need for executive authorization for warantless
searches).
480. See id. (describing the extensive surveillance procedures used by the FBI and
CIA).
481. See id. at 912 (same).
482. See id. at 912-16 (same).
483. See id. at 912 (same).
484. See id.
485. See id.
486. See id. at 912 (asserting that the FBI surveillance was secret and lacked outside
authorization).
487. See id. at 911 (setting forth the defendants’ multiple grounds for their motion
to suppress).
488. 484 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973).
489. 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1974).
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primary, or even sole, purpose of foreign intelligence gathering,”490 a
foreign intelligence exception to the warrant requirement applied.491
On the basis of this standard, the Court upheld most of the electronic
surveillance, but agreed to suppress a portion that had been collected
after the investigation shifted its focus from intelligence gathering to
criminal prosecution.492
The Court independently considered the constitutionality of the
searches of packages Truong sent to Paris with Krall.493  A letter and
package searched with executive authorization but without a warrant
before the date at which the surveillance became, in the Court’s view,
criminal in nature, were treated as governed by the foreign
intelligence warrant exception.494  According to the court, another
package, which was searched without executive authorization or a
warrant, was not covered by the foreign intelligence exception to the
warrant requirement, but was nonetheless constitutional because
Truong had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the package.495
In sustaining the bulk of the surveillance, the Fourth Circuit
agreed “that the Executive Branch need not always obtain a warrant
for foreign intelligence surveillance”496 where its primary purpose is to
gather foreign intelligence:
We think that the district court adopted the proper test, because
once surveillance becomes primarily a criminal investigation, the
courts are entirely competent to make the usual probable cause
determination, and because, importantly, individual privacy
interests come to the fore and government foreign policy concerns
recede when the government is primarily attempting to form the
basis for a criminal prosecution.497
The Truong investigation concerned surveillance for a clear foreign
intelligence purpose, which the Court said enabled it to reconcile its
decision with Keith.498  The Court apparently considered the physical

490. United States v. Humphrey, 456 F. Supp. 51, 58 (E.D. Va. 1978) (discussing
the requirements for a “foreign intelligence” warrant exception to apply).
491. See id. at 57-58.
492. See id. at 58-59 (describing the point in time at which the focus of the
surveillance shifted from foreign intelligence gathering).
493. See United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 916-17 (4th Cir. 1980)
(discussing the packages searched without executive authorization).
494. See id. (asserting that the subject package search was for intelligence
gathering purposes only).
495. See id. (asserting that Truong had not made a diligent effort to conceal the
contents of the package).
496. Id. at 913 (employing the analytical approach the Supreme Court formulated
in Keith).
497. Id. at 915 (rejecting the government’s assertion that the executive may ignore
the warrant requirement if surveillance is directed at gathering foreign intelligence).
498. See id. (noting that because there was ample evidence showing collaboration
on the part of Truong, the surveillance satisfied the foreign intelligence exception to
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searches analytically indistinct from the electronic surveillance in the
case because it concluded that all of the surveillances that occurred
before the investigation became primarily prosecutive in nature and
were lawful.499  The court did not attach any significance to the fact
that the searches in question were of packages and personal property
rather than searches of the person or residence.500
In its assessment and eventual approval of the warrantless
surveillance, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that:
[A]ttempts to counter foreign threats to the national security
require the utmost stealth, speed, and secrecy.  A warrant
requirement would add a procedural hurdle that would reduce the
flexibility of executive foreign intelligence initiatives, in some cases
delay executive response to foreign intelligence threats, and
increase the chance of leaks regarding sensitive executive
operations.  More importantly, the executive possesses unparalleled
expertise to make the decision whether to conduct foreign
intelligence surveillance, whereas the judiciary is largely
inexperienced in making the delicate and complex decisions that
lie behind foreign intelligence surveillance. . . .  Perhaps most
crucially, the executive branch not only has superior expertise in
the area of foreign intelligence, it is also constitutionally designated
as the pre-eminent authority in foreign affairs. . . . Just as the
separation of powers in Keith forced the executive to recognize a
judicial role when the President conducts domestic security
surveillance, so the separation of powers requires us to
acknowledge the principal responsibility of the President for
foreign affairs and concomitantly for foreign intelligence
surveillance. . . .501
The reasons the Truong Court provided for allowing warrantless
surveillance were thus as applicable to physical searches as to
electronic surveillance.
The Court, however, sought to limit warrantless surveillance to
situations in which the executive interests are “paramount,”502 and
where the surveillance is conducted “primarily” for foreign
intelligence purposes.503  The Court indicated that it found the
“primary purpose” test an effective compromise between the

the warrant requirement).
499. See id. at 916-17 (analyzing the reasonableness of the electronic surveillance
and the package search).
500. See id. (concluding that package searches were lawful because Truong had no
reasonable expectation of privacy).
501. Id. at 913-14 (citations omitted).
502. Id. at 915 (defining “paramount” to include only those instances where the
target of the surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power).
503. See id. (adopting the lower court’s test).
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government’s assertion that any foreign intelligence connection
ought to exempt surveillance from the warrant clause, and the
defendants’ claim that surveillance should be free from the warrant
only when the surveillance is conducted “solely” for foreign
intelligence purposes.504  Balancing the privacy interests of the target
and the prerogatives of the executive in foreign intelligence matters,
the court was unwilling to impose the “solely” test “because almost all
foreign intelligence investigations are in part criminal
investigations.”505  Thus, agreeing with the district court that July 20,
1977, represented the date that the Criminal Division of the Justice
Department took a “central role” in the investigation, the surveillance
before that date was properly exempted from the warrant
requirement.506
7. A summary of the evolving judicial role
The Keith Court’s objection to the wiretap as a species of “search”
was influenced by the “convergence of First and Fourth Amendment
values”507 and the evolving societal expectations of privacy.508  Fitting

504. See id. at 915-16 (rejecting the “solely” test because it would require the
executive to obtain a warrant for almost all foreign intelligence surveillance).
505. Id. at 915.
506. See id. at 916.  FISA was enacted in 1978 to provide a special procedure for
conducting electronic surveillance in national security settings.  See Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1863 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)); see also Act of Dec. 3,
1999, Pub. L. No. 106-120, 113 Stat. 1606 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C.) (adding
further amendments to FISA).  Before it was amended in 1994 to extend physical
search authority, Congress’ failure to prohibit or regulate warrantless searches may
have constituted acquiescence in presidential authority in the area.  Thus, FISA may
have “invite[d] . . . measures on independent presidential responsibility.”  Dames &
Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678 (1981) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952)).  While congressional acquiescence may enable
the development of customary law, the requirements for the creation of custom are
stringent; there must be a long-standing, knowing, and unbroken chain of
acquiescence by Congress to the executive practice.  See Peter Raven-Hansen &
William C. Banks, Pulling the Purse Strings of the Commander in Chief, 80 VA. L. REV. 833,
848-56 (1994) (analyzing the role of custom and congressional acquiescence in the
evolution of national security law).  Warrantless physical searches for intelligence
purposes likely will fail to meet the requirements for customary law.  First, the history
of their use is, like much intelligence gathering, murky and not widely known or
even acknowledged to Congress or to the people.  See Brown & Cinquegrana, supra
note 28, at 106-07 n.46 (noting the power of the President to issue warrantless
searches without congressional authorization or knowledge).  Second, the two
judicial decisions reviewed above are the only pre-FISA cases where the government
expressly sought to legitimate warrantless physical searches for intelligence purposes.
Third, the judiciary upheld the warrantless search in only one case, and then only
incident to the authority to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance.  See Truong
Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d at 916.  If any residual customary authority had been created
over time, it was curtailed by the 1994 amendments to FISA.  See Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-359, 108 Stat. 3443 (codified
as amended at 50 U.S.C.).
507. Keith, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972).
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18th century concepts of search and seizure into the realities of
modern society required the Court’s examination of the “broader
spirit” of the Fourth Amendment, although the telephonic
expression obviously implicated First Amendment freedoms.509  This
combination of privacy and expressive freedom—protecting freedom
of expression through electronic media-—may be critical to
sheltering the most intimate and important thoughts and feelings of
citizens.  In our society, it is often argued that uninhibited expression
is the core freedom, that which makes our other rights meaningful
and enables a participatory democracy to function.510
The internal security law that emerges from Keith and the
subsequent decisions of lower courts also reflects the importance of
knowing the origins of the threats to national security.  Unlike
executive branch claims of unilateral authority to act for the nation
when the threat is urgent,511 the reason to depart from traditional law
enforcement procedures to conduct internal security surveillance
derives from the perceived existence of a foreign-based threat. Thus,
suppose that individuals were planning to blow up CIA offices in
various locations around the United States.  If an informant provided
this tip to the FBI less than a day before the bombings were supposed
to occur, should the FBI be required to obtain a warrant before
eavesdropping on a suspect’s phone conversations to learn the where
and when of the attacks?  If time is of the essence, the warrant
requirement could interfere with the surveillance objective.  The
successful bombings could result in loss of life, injuries, and property
damage.  Yet, it is not so much national security as the immediate
danger that leads to legitimating the warrantless surveillance in this
hypothetical instance.
If the basis of the Government’s efforts to avoid law enforcement
mechanisms is the foreign origin of the domestic security threat,
rather than the urgency of the situation, the calculus for determining
Fourth Amendment “reasonableness” may change.512  The foreign

508. See id. at 317 (stating the fear that unreviewed executive discretion could
overlook potential invasions of privacy and protected speech).
509. See id. at 313 (noting that the Fourth Amendment also protects speech from
unreasonable surveillance).
510. See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-9 (1970)
(discussing the system of freedom of expression in a democratic society).
511. See supra Part II.D.3 (discussing Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Acts giving the President unlimited discretion to protect the United
States against any “clear and present danger”).
512. See 68 AM. JUR. 2D Searches & Seizures § 10 (2000) (observing that in evaluating
the reasonableness and scope of the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court looks
to the traditional protections afforded by the common law at the time of the framing
of the Constitution and Bill of Rights).
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threat justification assumes that the foreign origin of the threat may
be determined in advance of the surveillance.  In addition, by the
time of Keith, legal analyses increasingly had begun to suggest that
more precise distinctions may be required between surveillance of
groups that are controlled from afar, and those with domestic
operatives whose foreign connections are concealed.513
In light of the potentially greater intrusiveness of electronic
surveillance, it may be reasonable to expect greater executive
discretion to conduct warrantless searches than warrantless wiretaps.
According to the courts, however, the logical difference has not
created a legal distinction.  In fact, the judges who have compared
the two forms of surveillance have continued to embrace the
historical regard for the sanctity of the home and the related
experience of governmental intrusions in England and in the
colonies, and have not acknowledged that electronic surveillance may
be the more pernicious form.514  It has been maintained that “[t]he
loosening of Fourth Amendment standards for purposes of electronic
surveillance should not in any way affect the clear and unambiguous
standards well in place for physical searches and seizures.”515
Similarly, Judge Leventhal argued that “the safeguard against [the]
chief evil is not to be whittled away on abstract grounds of
symmetry.”516  Although symmetry is hardly a compelling reason to
give similar legal status to potentially different activities, it is not
merely the degree of the intrusion that should be the measure for
applying the warrant clause.517  Judge Leventhal also noted that while
long-term, continuous electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence
gathering might not be amenable to a judicial warrant requirement,
physical entries should require a warrant because of the more serious
individual interest threatened by an intrusion, and because such a

513. See Foreign Security Surveillance, supra note 411, at 987-88 (arguing that
domestic political activity might consequently be subject to warrantless wiretapping
under the guise of foreign intelligence surveillance); see also Peter E. Quint, The
Separation of Powers under Nixon:  Reflections on Constitutional Liberties and the Rule of
Law, 1981 DUKE L.J. 1, 23 n.101 (noting that a distinction between foreign and
domestic security surveillance is not easy to draw or apply).
514. See Keith, 407 U.S. at 313-17  (discussing the historical evolution of the Fourth
Amendment); United States v. Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d 910, 934-35 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(Leventhal, J., concurring) (same).
515. Hearing on Physical Searches, supra note 468, at 37 (prepared testimony and
statement for the record of Morton H. Halperin & Gary M. Stern, American Civil
Liberties Union).
516. Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d at 937-38 (Leventhal, J., concurring).
517. But see FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL
OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, S. REP. NO. 94-755, at 46
(1976) (noting that the warrant requirement depends on both “the purpose and
degree of intrusion”) (quoting Attorney General Levi).
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search is more limited in time and target.518
In retrospect, it is clear that the political imperatives suggested by
the Church Committee and the greater attention to the legal issues
by the judiciary were harbingers of change.519  As the Church
Committee urged the enactment of legislation to regulate the
intelligence community, President Ford sought to forestall new
legislation with surveillance rules developed by the executive
branch.520  By the mid-1970s, the issues were far from settled.
E. Executive Branch Regulation521
Both criminal and national security investigations are premised on
the duty to protect the public against dangers, whether foreign or
domestic.522  While there is an absolute duty to protect, “that duty
must be performed with care to protect individual rights and to
insure that investigations are confined to matters of legitimate law
enforcement interest.”523  As with most governmental activities,
procedures have been created for both types of investigations to
ensure the protection of personal liberties.524  In the years since
President Ford’s initiative, the Attorney General has promulgated
procedures for domestic, criminal investigations525 and separate,
classified procedures for national security investigations involving
foreign agency or support.526
The modern versions of these procedural safeguards stem from
guidelines promulgated by Attorney General Edward Levi in 1976.527
The most pertinent Levi Guidelines focused on freedom of speech

518. See Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d at 938 (discussing how the importance of the interest
protected has bearing on the permissibility of warrantless intrusions).
519. See supra Part II.C (discussing Church Committee).
520. See United States Foreign Intelligence Activities, Exec. Order No. 11,905, 41
Fed. Reg. 7701 (1976) (establishing policies for national security intelligence
operations).
521. See infra Part III (updating and applying the executive branch rules in Part III
of the Article).
522. See The Attorney General’s Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and
Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations, 32 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 3087 (Mar. 2, 1983)
[hereinafter Criminal AGG] (stating that it is the duty of the FBI to protect the public
against general and organized criminal activity).
523. Id.
524. See id. (setting forth procedures designed to assure the public that the FBI is
acting properly under the law).
525. See id. (promulgating guidelines to provide guidance for all FBI criminal
investigations).
526. Press Release, Department of Justice, Attorney General Guidelines for FBI
Foreign Intelligence Collection and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations (Apr.
18, 1983) [hereinafter FCI AGG].
527. See FBI Oversight, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 257-62 (1976) [hereinafter FBI Oversight
Hearings] (statement of Attorney General Levi).
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and freedom of the press.528  First, investigations based solely on
unpopular speech, where there is no threat of violence, were
prohibited.529  Second, techniques designed to disrupt organizations
engaged in protected First Amendment activity, or to discredit
individuals would not be used in any circumstance.530
At the same time, Attorney General Levi emphasized that the
Guidelines were intended to permit domestic security investigations
where the activities under investigation “involve or will involve the use
of force or violence and the violation of criminal law.”531  He testified
at the time that “the purpose of the investigation must be the
detection of unlawful conduct and not merely the monitoring of
disfavored or troublesome activities and surely not of unpopular
views.”532  To accommodate the inevitable reality that First
Amendment concerns would be raised, Levi also required
“compendious reporting” to the Department of Justice and limited
the techniques that could be used for various types of inquiries.533
By 1982 it had become clear that the threats of domestic violence
against which the Levi Guidelines were directed had not remained
static; both the sophistication of the threats and technology in
general had evolved.534  On March 7, 1983, Attorney General William
French Smith revised the Guidelines regarding domestic security
investigations.535  A press release accompanying the revision stated
that “the revisions are needed to ensure protection of the public
from the greater sophistication and changing nature of domestic
groups that are prone to violence.”536
The Smith Guidelines were intended to increase the investigative
avenues available to the FBI in domestic terrorism cases.537  Where the

528. See id.
529. See id.; see also Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (per curiam)
(holding that the comment “[i]f they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want
to get in my sights is L.B.J.” was protected speech because the remark was uttered
during a political debate and there was no indication that the President was actually
threatened).
530. See FBI Oversight Hearings, supra note 527, at 278-80.
531. Id.
532. Id. at 258.
533. See id. (requiring more involvement by the Department of Justice and the
Attorney General in reviewing FBI domestic security investigations).
534. See John T. Elliff, The Attorney General’s Guidelines for FBI Investigations, 69
CORNELL L. REV. 785, 792 (1984) (stating that the largest number of FBI
investigations in 1982 involved international terrorism).
535. See Criminal AGG, supra note 522, at 3087-93 (revising guidelines relating to
criminal enterprises).
536. Press Release, Department of Justice (Mar. 7, 1983), reprinted in Attorney
General’s Guidelines for Domestic Security Investigations, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Security and Terrorism of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 47 (1983).
537. The effect of the Levi Guidelines was dramatic.  In March 1976, the FBI
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Levi/Civiletti Guidelines had established a predicate investigative
standard of “specific and articulable facts,” the Smith version lowered
the threshold to require only a “reasonable indication” as the legal
standard for opening a “full” investigation.538  The Smith Guidelines
also established that the authority to conduct these investigations is
“separate from and in addition to the general crimes investigative
authority.”539  The “reasonable indication” standard is significantly
lower than the Fourth Amendment standard of probable cause
required in law enforcement.540  To balance the lowered threshold for
opening an investigation, Attorney General Smith emphasized that
investigations would be regulated and would “not be based solely on
activities protected by the First Amendment or the lawful exercise of
other rights secured by the Constitution.”541
Nonetheless, the Smith Guidelines authorized FBI Headquarters to
approve the use of informants to infiltrate a group “in a manner that
may influence the exercise of rights protected by the First
Amendment.”542  The Smith Guidelines also stated:  “In the absence
of any information indicating planned violence by a group or
enterprise, mere speculation that force or violence might occur
during the course of an otherwise peaceable demonstration is not
sufficient grounds for initiation of an investigation.”543
The Smith Guidelines were judicially tested in 1984 in Alliance to
End Repression v. City of Chicago.544  A consent decree prohibited the

conducted 4,868 “domestic security” investigations per month; however, by
December 1981, the average was reduced to only 26 per month.  Geoffrey R. Stone,
The Reagan Administration, the First Amendment and FBI Domestic Security Investigations, in
FREEDOM AT RISK:  SECRECY, CENSORSHIP, AND REPRESSION IN THE 1980S 272, 276-77
(Richard O. Curry ed., 1988).
538. Criminal AGG, supra note 522, at 3091-92.  An additional safeguard was built
into the full investigation standards.  The revised guidelines steer away from using a
single actor as a predicate for a lowered threshold for investigation, but rather
require that “two or more persons are engaged in an enterprise for the purpose of
furthering political or social goals wholly or in part through activities that involve
force or violence and a violation of the criminal laws of the United States.” Id.
539. Id. at 3092.
540. See id. (delineating factors the FBI must consider in determining whether an
investigation should be conducted).
541. Id. at 3088.  For example, the Attorney General said that “when persons
advocate crime, particularly violent crime—such as blowing up a building or killing a
public official—those persons cannot expect law enforcement agencies to refrain
from making reasonable further inquiry to ensure protection of the public.” Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Security and Terrorism of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th
Cong. 99 (1983).  Assistant Attorney General Jensen further qualified this position
when he stated that “[i]f it is apparent, from the circumstances or context in which
the statements are made, that there is no prospect of harm, then further inquiry
would not be authorized.” Id.
542. Criminal AGG, supra note 522, at 3093.
543. Id. at 3092.
544. 742 F.2d 1007 (7th Cir. 1984).
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FBI from conducting investigations in Chicago “solely on the basis of
activities protected by the First Amendment.”545  The challenge to the
Guidelines was based on a comparison between the standards for
opening a domestic security investigation and the standards
established in the consent decree.546  Plaintiffs argued that,
notwithstanding the Smith Guidelines, the consent decree was a
more stringent standard applicable to the limited geographical
area.547
The Seventh Circuit found no inconsistency between the decree
and the Guidelines.548  The Court pointedly noted that the FBI “need
not wait till the bombs begin to go off, or even till the bomb factory is
found.”549  The Court further found that the FBI “has a right, indeed
a duty, to keep itself informed with respect to the possible
commission of crimes; it is not obliged to wear blinders until it may
be too late for prevention.”550
At the time the Attorney General Guidelines were changing, so too
were Presidential Executive Orders.551  President Ford’s Executive
Order regulating intelligence activities552 was replaced with President
Carter’s Order,553 which was eventually replaced with President
Reagan’s Order.554  The Reagan Order contained specific
requirements for the protection of “United States Persons” (USP)
and each intelligence agency was required to implement those
requirements with procedures approved by the Attorney General.555
The FBI chose to implement these requirements by combining the

545. Id. at 1010.
546. See id. at 1017 (interpreting language in the consent decree and Levi
Guidelines).
547. See id. at 1010.
548. See id. at 1019-20 (finding that the critical sentence in the decree prohibits
improperly motivated investigations and thus maintains a proper separation of
powers).
549. Id. at 1015.
550. Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 742 F.2d 1007, 1015 (7th Cir.
1984) (citing Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney Gen., 510 F.2d 253, 256 (2d Cir.
1974) (per curiam)).
551. See, e.g., Exec. Orders of Presidents Ford, Carter, and Reagan, infra notes 552-
54 (stating Presidential policies on foreign intelligence activities).
552. See Exec. Order No. 11,905, 41 Fed. Reg. 7701 (1976) (exercising Presidential
authority to amend U.S. policy on foreign intelligence activities specifically with
respect to the duties and responsibilities of the various intelligence organizations).
553. See Exec. Order No. 12,036, 43 Fed. Reg. 3675 (1978) (placing new
restrictions on intelligence activities by the various intelligence agencies).
554. See Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1982), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401
note (1994) (redefining goals, directions, duties, conduct and responsibilities of the
intelligence community).
555. See id. at 59,950 (requiring that authorized intelligence organizations “collect,
retain, or disseminate” USP information in accordance with procedures approved by
the Attorney General).
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Executive Order’s mandatory USP protections with regulatory
guidance for national security investigations, similar to that followed
for criminal investigations.556  Although the national security
procedures are classified, they appear to follow the general purpose
and parameters of the unclassified criminal procedures.  An
unclassified portion of the national security guidelines establish that:
The FBI may collect foreign intelligence, foreign
counterintelligence, international terrorism and other information
as permitted by these guidelines.  Such collection shall be
accomplished by the least intrusive means that will provide
information of the quality, scope and timeliness required and in a
manner that is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the
United States, these guidelines and Executive Orders.557
Although classified, the criminal guidelines provide insight as to
the manner in which investigations are conducted.  According to the
criminal guidelines, a full investigation may be opened where there is
“reasonable indication” that two or more persons are engaged in an
enterprise558 for the purpose of furthering political or social goals
wholly or in part through activities that involve force or violence and
are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States.559
Additionally, if the “reasonable indication” standard is not met, but
the FBI receives information indicating the possibility of criminal
activity for which “responsible handling requires some further
scrutiny,” a preliminary inquiry may be appropriate.560  A preliminary
inquiry authorizes limited, non-intrusive investigation of initial leads
that must be complete within ninety days.561  Moreover, if it is

556. See id.; see also FCI AGG, supra note 526, § I.A.
These guidelines are established by the Attorney General to govern all
foreign intelligence, foreign counterintelligence, foreign intelligence
support activities, and intelligence investigations of international terrorism
conducted by the FBI pursuant to Executive Order 12,333.  They also govern
all FBI investigations of violations of the espionage statutes and certain FBI
investigations requested, or FBI assistance to investigations conducted, by
foreign governments.
Id.
557. FCI AGG, supra note 526, § III.A.1.
558. See Criminal AGG, supra note 522, at 3091-92 (explaining that if the target of
the investigation is not an enterprise, but an individual, a general crimes inquiry may
be triggered).
559. See id. (cautioning that the Bureau must consider all circumstances including:
(1) the magnitude of the potential harm; (2) the likelihood it will occur; (3) the
immediacy of the threat; and (4) the danger to privacy and free expression posed by
an investigation).
560. See id. at 3088.
561. See id. at 3089 (approving examples of non-intrusive techniques such as:
(1) examination of FBI indices and files; (2) examination of public records and
public sources of information; (3) interview of the complainant, informant or others
knowledgeable of the subject; and (4) physical or photographic surveillance of any
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apparent from the circumstance or context in which the allegedly
incriminating statement was made that there is no prospect of harm,
a preliminary inquiry is deemed inappropriate.562
In order to determine whether an investigation should be opened,
the FBI must also take into consideration the magnitude of the
threat, the likelihood that the threat will come to fruition, and the
immediacy of the jeopardy.563  In addition to physical danger, the FBI
must consider the danger to privacy and free expression posed by an
investigation.564  For example, unless there is a reasonable indication
that force or violence might occur during the course of a
demonstration, initiation of an investigation is not appropriate.565
Of course, even when the threshold standards for investigation are
met, the manner in which the investigation is conducted is of equal
importance.566  Every technique used for investigation must meet
constitutional, statutory, regulatory, and policy standards.567  These
standards include the Fourth Amendment, statutory warrant
requirements for electronic surveillance, and the Attorney General
Guidelines.568
Because investigations may be opened based on levels of suspicion
lower than those required for prosecution, the FBI must exercise
caution to ensure that an investigation does not intrude unacceptably
on personal liberties.569  One method of restraint is achieved when
jurisdiction is only authorized for an initial period of 180 days.570  If
the investigation is proposed for continuation beyond 180 days, the
proposal must be reviewed by senior officials to determine whether
the particular facts and circumstances warrant continued inves-

person).
562. See id. at 3088 (denouncing the initiation of investigations based solely on
statements receiving First Amendment or other legal protection).
563. See id. at 3091-92 (requiring that the FBI carefully balance all relevant
competing interests).
564. See id. at 3091-92 (maintaining that First and Fourth Amendment rights must
be considered in determining whether the initiation of an investigation is
appropriate).
565. See id. at 3092 (declaring that “mere speculation that force or violence might
occur” during an otherwise peaceful protest is insufficient ground for triggering an
investigation).
566. See id. at 3092-93 (admonishing that use of any FBI technique must comply
with appropriate legal restrictions).
567. See id.
568. See id.
569. See id. at 3092 (contending that damage to individual reputation and
personal privacy are key factors in judging the intrusiveness of a potential
investigation).
570. See id. at 3091-92 (setting criteria for the initial length of authorization for
domestic security and terrorism investigations and the process for extension).
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tigation.571  If the investigation fails to meet the threshold level of
causation and a practical test for the allocation of resources, the
investigation cannot be renewed and is terminated.572
The executive branch rules continue to serve as the primary source
of authority for national security surveillance. Controversy about the
rules increased in the 1990s, as terrorist threats again emerged in the
United States. The application of the Guidelines to the surveillance
of potential terrorist activity in the United States will be considered in
Part III of this Article.
F. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
1. The constitutional parameters for regulation
The Keith Court recognized the Executive’s power to obtain
intelligence information through electronic surveillance “of those
who plot unlawful acts against the Government.”573  This power is
implicit in the President’s duty to “preserve, protect, and defend the
Constitution under the Article II Oath Clause.”574  Yet, the Keith Court
was unwilling to permit warrantless surveillance of precisely such
threats due to “the convergence of First and Fourth Amendment
values.”575  While the Oath Clause may provide the authority for the
president to act in a national security emergency,576 the Clause, alone,
is hardly sufficient to support warrantless surveillance merely on the
basis of the foreign origin of the threat.577
The Executive’s implied foreign relations powers are shared with
Congress and may support the authority to collect foreign
intelligence information as a means of conducting the nation’s
foreign relations, subject to congressional regulation and the Bill of
Rights.578  Of course, Article II does not explicitly distinguish between

571. See id.
572. See id. (providing that closed investigations may be reopened upon a showing
of “reasonable indication” that the enterprise is involved in activities that involve
force or violence contrary to federal criminal law).
573. Keith, 407 U.S. 297, 310 (1972).
574. Id. (discussing the historical use of electronic surveillance by Presidents and
Attorneys General since 1946).
575. Id. at 313 (noting that national security cases often involve First and Fourth
Amendment issues not raised in “ordinary” criminal cases).
576. See supra note 386 and accompanying text (noting that the President’s Oath
Clause duty has been deemed sufficient to justify the use of electronic surveillance to
protect against those who plot unlawful acts against the government).
577. See Keith, 407 U.S. at 319-20 (rejecting the government’s attempt to gain a
complete exemption to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement based on the
argument that the President’s constitutional duties would be obstructed by obtaining
a warrant).
578. Although it has been argued that the “executive power” Clause of Article II,
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domestic and foreign national security threats.579  Additionally, as
Justice Sutherland acknowledged in the Curtiss-Wright case, all federal
power is subject to the restraints imposed by the Bill of Rights.580
In Keith, the Court recognized that Congress did not intend to
regulate every aspect of the executive branch’s constitutional
authority to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance for national
security purposes under the Crime Control Act of 1968.581  Instead,
Justice Powell obliquely extended an invitation to Congress to create
a framework for judicial review of internal security surveillance,
parallel to its system for domestic law enforcement.582  Although
Congress did not react immediately to the Keith Court’s prescription
for a flexible, Fourth Amendment standard in internal security
investigations, it provided an important impetus for the development
of such legislation.583
Through trial-and-error, the Executive and Congress sought to find
a legislative solution to the problem of warrantless searches.584  In
1976, President Ford submitted a bill to the Senate that would have
codified existing executive branch practices, and Attorneys General
William Saxbe and Edward Levi pledged their cooperation to work
with Congress to create legislation to regulate electronic

Section 1 of the Constitution was intended to reflect the existence of unenumerated
executive powers, the Clause has not been construed to include powers not listed or
implied elsewhere in Article II.  As Justice Jackson maintained in the steel seizure
case, “I cannot accept the view that this clause is a grant in bulk of all conceivable
executive power but regard it as an allocation to the presidential office of the generic
powers thereafter stated.”  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
641 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (holding that the President exceeded his
constitutional authority in ordering the seizure of the nation’s steel mills by the
Secretary of Commerce).
579. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (granting the executive branch power to the
President to “preserve, protect, and defend” the constitution without distinguishing
between domestic and foreign threats to security).
580. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)
(emphasizing that every exercise of federal authority is subject to constitutional
scrutiny, even where, as is the President’s case, all power has been vested “in the field
of international relations”).
581. See Keith, 407 U.S. at 306 (concluding that Congress did not intend to speak
to national security surveillance because “it would have been incongruous for
Congress to have legislated with respect to [such an] important and complex area in
a single brief and nebulous paragraph”).
582. See id. at 322 (suggesting that Congress enact “protective standards” for
domestic security surveillance based on the policy and practical differences between
such specialized surveillance and “ordinary crime”).
583. See id. at 323 (encouraging and instructing Congress as to various ways it
could address the issue, while declining to order “precise standards for domestic
security warrants”).
584. See Cinquegrana, supra note 331, at 794-95 (arguing that FISA was the
product of decades of effort by the Supreme Court, Congress and the President and
discussing these efforts).
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surveillance.585  Debate and discussion centered on the extent of the
executive’s inherent authority and whether the traditional criminal
law standard should be included in the legislation.586
Senator Kennedy introduced a bill in 1977 that would have
specifically repealed the disclaimer in the 1968 Crime Control Act
and thus expressly eliminated congressional recognition of inherent
executive power in this sphere.587  During hearings on the Kennedy
bill, the most controversy centered on the appropriate standards for
targeting Americans who were not accused of criminal acts.588  The
Carter administration supported the legislation in principle, and
after hearings in the House and Senate Intelligence Committees,
both chambers approved the amended Kennedy proposal to drop the
disclaimer repeal.589  The proposal included a “quasi-criminal”
targeting standard and more limited protections for aliens
representing foreign governments in the United States.590  In this
climate of reform and inter-branch compromise, Justice Powell’s
invitation was finally accepted when Congress passed, and President
Carter signed into law, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978 (FISA).591
2. Categories of surveillance
FISA defines four categories of electronic surveillance that may be
conducted, some of which go beyond conventional telephone taps
and hidden microphones.592  Wiretaps may be utilized in the United
States (as long as at least one party is in the United States) to obtain
voice communications, teleprinter, telegraph, facsimile, and digital
communications.593  In addition, FISA was intended to provide the

585. See id. at 809-11 (characterizing President Ford’s 1976 proposed legislation
on foreign surveillance as a “sizeable step” toward the ultimate enactment of FISA in
1978).
586. See id. (observing that proponents of the criminal law standard argued that
electronic surveillance should be limited to the criminal context because of the
inherent intrusiveness of such surveillance).
587. See id. at 810 (explaining the differences between Senator Kennedy’s
proposed legislation in 1977 and that of President Ford a year earlier).
588. See Hearings on S. 743, S. 1888, S. 3197 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and
Procedures of the United States Judiciary Comm., 94th Cong. 71, at 12 (1976).
589. See Cinquegrana, supra note 331, at 811.
590. See id. (describing the “quasi-criminal” standard as permitting surveillance of
Americans only if their conduct was both of “foreign intelligence interest” and had
the potential for violating U.S. criminal law).
591. See Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1801-1811 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)), amended by Act of Dec. 3, 1999, Pub. L. No.
106-120, 113 Stat. 1606.
592. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)(1)-(4) (1994) (defining the four categories of elec-
tronic surveillance under FISA).
593. See id. § 1801(f)(2).
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exclusive means for authorizing some categories of foreign
intelligence surveillance, including the interception of “international
radio or wire communications to or from a particular United States
person in the United States in circumstances where that person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required if
the interception or monitoring were undertaken for law enforcement
purposes.”594  The same rule applies to “a wholly domestic radio
communication, and the installation or use of any monitoring device
(such as a television camera or pen register) to acquire information
about a person’s activities other than the contents of the
communications,” and to the “interception . . . of a wire
communication to or from any person in the United States without
the consent of the party to the communication.”595
In developing and “implementing the FISA, the Justice
Department had not supported the extension of FISA procedures to
physical searches.”596  However, “after CIA spy Aldrich Ames597
pleaded guilty to espionage charges in April 1994, the Clinton
administration actively sought to extend the FISA to such searches.”598
A warrantless search of Ames’s office was used to develop the
government’s case against him, and, according to Ames’s lawyer, a
challenge to the constitutionality of this particular warrantless search
was planned.599  Although Ames’s guilty plea mooted the
constitutional challenge, the threat prompted the change of stance
by the Justice Department.600  According to Deputy Attorney General
Jamie Gorelick,601 “[o]ur seeking legislation in no way should suggest

594. Cinquegrana, supra note 331, at 811 (discussing the FISA authorized methods
of electronic surveillance).
595. Id. at 812.
596. DYCUS ET AL., supra note 251, at 665 (discussing the Department of Justice’s
change in stance on the extension of FISA to security-related physical searches due in
part to a constitutionally questionable, warrantless search of Ames’s office).
597. Aldrich Hazen Ames, a CIA case officer specializing in Russian intelligence
services, began spying for the Russians in 1985.  He was arrested by the FBI in
Arlington, Virginia on espionage charges on February 24, 1994, and sentenced to life
in prison without the possibility of parole. See PETER MAAS, KILLER SPY:  THE INSIDE
STORY OF THE FBI’S PURSUIT AND CAPTURE OF ALDRICH AMES, AMERICA’S DEADLIEST SPY
224-34 (1995).
598. Id. (positing that the spy scandal involving Aldrich Ames “prompted serious
consideration of counter-intelligence reforms” because of the feud it caused between
the CIA and the FBI over the handling of the investigation).
599. See id. (explaining that the constitutionality of the Ames warrantless search
was never litigated).
600. See id.; see also Benjamin Wittes, Surveillance Court Gets New Powers, LEGAL TIMES
(D.C.), Nov. 7, 1994, at 21 (noting that Associate Attorney General Gorlick conceded
that Ames’s lawyer’s threat to litigate the constitutionality of the search played a role
in the Department of Justice’s decision to support the extension of the FISC’s power
to issue warrants for physical searches).
601. Ms. Gorelick was the Deputy Attorney General of the United States from
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that we do not believe we have inherent authority . . . .  We do . . . but
as a policy matter, we thought it was better to have Congress and the
judiciary involved.”602
The pre-1994 history regarding the extension of FISA to searches
illuminates, in part, the context of this amendment. In 1980,
Attorney General Civiletti determined that approval of the special
FISA court—Foreign International Surveillance Court (“FISC”)—
should be sought for national security-related physical searches where
judicial review would not frustrate national security interests,
although he continued to maintain that the President retained the
constitutional authority to approve such searches without judicial
review.603  The Attorney General’s decision was based upon the belief
“that the FISC provided a judicial forum with the security and
expertise necessary to review such matters.”604  When the Justice
Department sought approval from the FISC for three physical
searches in 1980, the Department acknowledged that FISA does not
provide jurisdiction over physical search requests.605  Instead, the
Department argued that the FISC judges could determine requests
for national security related physical searches based upon the
inherent power of federal judges to ensure the integrity of the
judicial process, the obligation to protect the Fourth Amendment
interests of the targets of searches, and the All Writs Act.606  The
judges granted the three requests before they received a
memorandum from the clerk of the FISC, which concluded that FISA
did not provide jurisdiction to determine requests for physical
searches and any inherent power or authority derived from the All
Writs Act did not extend to the specialized FISC.607

March 1994 to May 1997.
602. Wittes, supra note 600, at 21 (reporting that the FISC was invested with new
authority over national security-related physical searches as a direct result of the
Aldrich Ames spy scandal).
603. See Cinquegrana, supra note 331, at 821 (reaching the conclusion that “those
who argued that the creation of the Foreign International Surveillance Court
(“FISC”) would blur constitutional lines of responsibility” for national security were
vindicated by Attorney General Civiletti’s decision, which required approval of such
physical searches by the FISC where national security interests would not be
undermined).
604. Id. (discussing the logic behind the Attorney General’s decision that requests
for electronic surveillance under FISA should be submitted to the FISC for judicial
review).
605. See id. (discussing the Department of Justice’s three 1980 requests to the FISC
for physical searches).
606. See id. at 821; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1994) (stating that “except as
otherwise provided by an Act of Congress, the district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or proceedings commenced by the United States,
or by any agency or officer thereof expressly authorized to sue by Act of Congress”).
607. See Cinquegrana, supra note 331, at 821-22 (describing how uncertainty by
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After the inauguration of President Reagan in 1981, William
French Smith, his new Attorney General, submitted a fourth
application for a national security physical search to the FISC.608  In
this instance, the Justice Department apparently decided to send a
different message from the one conveyed by Civiletti, which was that
the President does not need congressional approval to conduct
warrantless searches, or, perhaps, Congress lacks the authority to
limit the President’s conduct of such searches.609  Thus, the
Department asked that the application be rejected on the basis that
the FISC had no jurisdiction to approve such an application.610  In the
only published opinion of the FISC, the Court held that it had no
jurisdiction over physical searches.611  Judge Hart, however, embraced
the Department’s statutory rather than constitutional argument.612
In 1994, as part of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1995,613 Congress amended FISA to authorize the submission of
applications to the FISC for orders approving physical searches of the
“premises, property, information or material of a foreign power or
agent of a foreign power” in the United States, conducted for the
purpose of collecting “foreign intelligence information.”614  The
prerequisites for a FISA search thus parallel those for electronic
surveillance.
In 1998, again as part of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1999,615 Congress amended FISA to permit FBI use of pen
registers616 and trap and trace devices617 that followed FISA procedures

congressional intelligence committees led to the clerk’s legal memorandum, which
limited FISC authority).
608. See id. at 822 (outlining the new administration’s desire to conduct physical
searches without FISC approval).
609. See id. (arguing “on the face of the statute that FISA contemplated only
electronic surveillance applications” and that Congress intended to deal with physical
searches at a later date).
610. See id.
611. In the Matter of the Application of the United States for an Order
Authorizing the Physical Search of Nonresidential Premises and Personal Property
(1981), reproduced in DYCUS ET AL., supra note 251, at 469.
612. See Cinquegrana, supra note 331, at 821-23 (rejecting any authority to approve
physical searches by relying “solely on the language and purposes of FISA”).
613. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-359, 108
Stat. 3423 (1994) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1822 (Supp. IV 1998)).   
614. Id. § 302(a)(1).  Pursuant to the 1994 amendment, applications may be
submitted only if the President has, by prior written authorization, empowered the
Attorney General to approve such submissions.  Id. § 309; see also Exec. Order No.
12,949, 60 Fed. Reg. 8169 (Feb. 1995) (providing authorization for such approvals by
the Attorney General).
615. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272,
§ 601, 112 Stat. 2396, 2404 (1998) (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1842).
616. A pen register records the dialed numbers identifying outgoing calls on a
surveilled line.  Id.
617. A trap and trace device records the number of origin for incoming calls.  Id.  
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in counterintelligence and international terrorism investigations.618
The same act authorized FISA surveillance procedures that regulate
government access to hotel, car rental, bus, airline, and other
business records.619  The statutory pen register and trap and trace
authority requires that the requesting agency “demonstrate” that the
line to be tapped has been or is about to be used in activities that
“involve or may involve a violation of the criminal laws.”620  Ironically,
this standard asks more of the agency than the traditional criminal
law enforcement rule for using the same surveillance techniques.621
Similarly, the government asked Congress to grant the equivalent of
an administrative subpoena, allowing FBI officials to demand
business records without judicial intervention.622  The 1998
amendment to FISA instead requires that business record requests
obtain approval from the FISC, like all other surveillance permitted
by FISA.623  In criminal cases, conversely, it is possible for a grand jury
to issue subpoenas without judicial approval.624
3. Surveillance target
FISA authorizes the Attorney General to approve applications for
warrants to conduct electronic surveillance or physical searches
within the United States for the purposes of foreign intelligence,625 if

618. Id. (adding Title IV to FISA).
619. Id. § 602 (adding Title V to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act).
620. Id. § 601.
621. The criminal law enforcement standard requires that an attorney for the
government, or a state law enforcement or investigative officer, certify that the
information likely to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.  See
18 U.S.C. § 3123(a) (1994) (outlining who may request the installation of a pen
register or trap device).
622. See JAMES X. DEMPSEY & DAVID COLE, TERRORISM & THE CONSTITUTION:
SACRIFICING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY 143 (1999).
623. See Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272,
§ 602, 112 Stat. 2396, 2410 (1998) (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1861).
624. DEMPSEY & COLE, supra note 622, at 144.
625. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e) (1994).
‘Foreign intelligence information’ means—
(1) information that relates to, and if concerning a United States person is
necessary to, the ability of the United States to protect against—
(A) actual or potential attack or other grave or hostile acts of a foreign
power or an agent of a foreign power;
(B) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or an agent of a
foreign power; or
(C) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of
a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power; or
(2) information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that
relates to, and if concerning a United States person is necessary to—
(A) the national defense or the security of the United States; or
(B) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States. . . .
Id.
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the target is a “foreign power”626 or “agent of a foreign power.”627  If
the Attorney General approves an application for a warrant pursuant
to FISA, the request is then submitted to any of the judges who sit on
a specially constituted court.  In enacting FISA, Congress relied on its
Article III power to “ordain and establish” the lower federal courts to
create the FISC.  The FISC consists of seven United States district
court judges designated by the Chief Justice who meet in secret and
are empowered “to hear applications for and grant orders approving
electronic surveillance and physical searches anywhere within the
United States under the procedures set forth” in FISA.628  Similarly,
FISA aurthorizes a three-judge appellate panel, designated by the
Chief Justice.  This special Court of Appeals consists of three district

626. Id. § 1801(a).
‘Foreign power’ means—
(1) a foreign government or any component thereof, whether or not
recognized by the United States; . . .
(4) a group engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation
therefor;
(5) a foreign-based political organization, not substantially composed of
United States persons; or
(6) an entity that is directed and controlled by a foreign government or
governments.
Id.
627. Id. § 1801(b), amended by Act of Dec. 3, 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-120, 113 Stat.
1606, 1619-20.
‘Agent of a foreign power’ means—
(1) any person other than a United States person, who—
(A) acts in the United States as an officer or employee of a foreign power . . .
(B) acts for or on behalf of a foreign power which engages in clandestine
intelligence activities in the United States contrary to the interests of the
United States, when the circumstances of such person’s presence in the
United States indicate that such person may engage in such activities in the
United States, or when such person knowingly aids or abets any person in
the conduct of such activities or knowingly conspires with any person to
engage in such activities; or
(2) any person who—
(A) knowingly engages in clandestine intelligence gathering activities for or
on behalf of a foreign power, which activities involve or may involve a
violation of the criminal statutes of the United States;
(B) pursuant to the direction of an intelligence service or network of a
foreign power, knowingly engages in any other clandestine intelligence
activities for or on behalf of such foreign power, which activities involve or
are about to involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the United States;
(C) knowingly engages in sabotage or international terrorism, or activities
that are in preparation therefor, or on behalf of a foreign power; . . . .
Id.
628. See id. § 1803(a).  Although each FISC judge may hear any FISA application,
the FISC meets two days monthly, and two of the judges are routinely available in the
Washington, D.C. area on other days.  The FISC also has a legal adviser, a clerk, and
a security officer.  Statement of Mary C. Lawton, Counsel for Intelligence Policy, Before the
House Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice, June 8,
1983, at 8.
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or court of appeals judges who hear appeals by the government when
its applications are denied.629  From this panel decision, the
government may appeal to the Supreme Court.630
Surveillance of an official foreign power, a foreign government,
terrorist group or political organization controlled by a foreign
government, may be permitted by the FISC after a request that need
not describe the communications sought, the means for
accomplishing the surveillance, or the surveillance devices to be
employed.631  Examples of groups that would meet the definition of
“foreign power” include high-profile candidates such as the Irish
Republican Army, Hezbollah, and the PFLP.632  Targeting an “agent
of a foreign power” is easier for the government to accomplish if an
individual is not a “United States person” (USP) as defined in FISA.633
These agents may be targeted if they “act on behalf of a foreign
power” that carries on intelligence activities in the United States and
the “circumstances . . . indicate that such person may engage . . .
or . . . aids or abets . . . or conspires” in “intelligence activities in the
United States contrary to the interests of the United States.”634  FISA
expressly provides that no USP may become a target of FISA
surveillance “solely upon the basis of activities protected by the First
Amendment.”635  Applications for surveillance of USPs may be
approved if the judge finds that certification indicating that the
information sought is “necessary to”636 further U.S. defense or foreign
affairs interests, or the ability of the United States to protect against
hostile acts of a foreign power, is not “clearly erroneous.”637  An order
of the FISC may approve surveillance of an agent of a foreign power
for ninety days.  The FISC may approve surveillance of a foreign
power for a year.638  Additional periods may be granted according to
the same terms, except that targets who are foreign powers may be
subject to surveillance for an additional year if there is probable

629. See 50 U.S.C. § 1803(b) (1994) (providing a three-judge court of review for
application denials).
630. See id.
631. See id. § 1804(b) (outlining which requirements are not necessary to conduct
electronic surveillance of facilities or places that are owned, based, or exclusively
used by a  foreign power).
632. See generally DAVID E. LONG, THE ANATOMY OF TERRORISM (1990) (providing a
detailed discussion of profiles of known international terrorist groups).
633. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(i) (1994) (defining U.S. person to include any U.S.
citizen, permanent resident alien, group composed largely of such persons, and U.S.
corporation).
634. Id. § 1801(b)(1)(B).
635. Id. § 1805(a)(3)(A).
636. Id. § 1801(e)(1).
637. Id. § 1805(a)(5).
638. See id. § 1805(d)(1).
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cause to believe that no communication of any USP will be
acquired.639
4. Surveillance trigger
On the basis of the application, a FISC judge must find probable
cause that the target is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power,
and the facilities where the surveillance is directed are or will be used
by the target.640  For USPs, the FISC judge must find probable cause
that one of four conditions has been met:  (1) the target knowingly
engages in clandestine intelligence activities on behalf of a foreign
power which “may involve” a criminal law violation; (2) the target
knowingly engages in other secret intelligence activities on behalf of
a foreign power pursuant to the direction of an intelligence network
and his activities involve or are about to involve criminal violations;
(3) the target knowingly engages in sabotage or international
terrorism or is preparing for such activities; or (4) the target
knowingly aids or abets another who acts in one of the above ways.641
As noted, courts have attached conditions to the executive’s use of
warrantless surveillance, including the requirement that the
President or Attorney General authorize the search, the search
targets a foreign power or its agents, and the primary purpose of the
search is to gather foreign intelligence information.642  It remains
unclear whether substitution of the FISA review process assures
satisfaction of the Keith Court’s first measure of the reasonableness of
warrantless surveillance—whether the citizens’ interest in privacy and
free expression are better served by a warrant requirement.643  The
second element of the reasonableness inquiry framed in Keith—
whether a judicially imposed law enforcement warrant requirement
would “unduly frustrate the efforts of Government to protect
itself”644—may be more easily met in the foreign intelligence setting
because of the concern that detected surveillance would cause the
target to alter its activities, likely rendering the intelligence useless.645

639. See id. § 1805(d)(2).  This standard permits targeting of foreign missions and
the like, where direct lines of communication are employed with parent nations or
organizations.  Targeting direct lines raises no reasonable expectation that USPs will
be inadvertently overheard.
640. See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a) (1994).
641. See id. § 1801(b)(2) (defining an agent of a foreign power).
642. See Brown & Cinquegrana, supra note 28, at 128; see also Exec. Order No.
12,333, § 2.5, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1982), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 note (1994) (requiring
the approval of the attorney general for warrantless searches).
643. See Keith, 407 U.S. 297, 315 (1972).
644. Id.
645. See Brown & Cinquegrana, supra note 28, at 131 (defending the need for
secrecy attached to foreign intelligence gathering).
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5. Surveillance purpose
One question unresolved by FISA is the extent to which the FBI
can use FISA surveillance to obtain evidence for criminal
prosecution.  Ordinarily, law enforcement investigations have a
criminal prosecution purpose from the start.  In contrast, FISA
surveillances must have an intelligence purpose.646  Courts that have
allowed evidence gathered during the surveillance to support a
criminal conviction have required that intelligence be the “primary”
purpose of the surveillance,647 or at least a purpose, if not necessarily
primary.648
Both the FISA applications and the accompanying internal review
process contain assurances that the intelligence sought is foreign
intelligence or foreign counterintelligence.  Nonetheless, some
maintain that the rights of one accused of a crime are arguably
threatened by the introduction of evidence obtained ex parte and on
the basis of something less than probable cause.649  In addition to
these hurdles placed in the path of one accused of a crime based in
part on evidence obtained through FISA surveillance, the
government retains the procedures of the Classified Information
Protection Act (CIPA)650 to restrict the accused’s access to intelligence
sources and methods and information.651
The individual rights questions generated by FISA have arisen in
judicial challenges by criminal defendants, based on assertions that
the FISC-approved surveillance was not for the primary purpose of
foreign intelligence collection.  In each such challenge to date, the
lower federal courts have sustained the FISA-based surveillance under
the “primary purpose” test of the Truong decision.652  Although the

646. See 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B) (1994).
647. See United States v. Megahey, 553 F. Supp. 1180, 1189-90 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)
(affirming Truong Dinh Hung by requiring that foreign intelligence be a primary
purpose of an investigation to excuse a warrant).
648. See United States v. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. 1306, 1313 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (“Several
courts have ruled that . . . warrantless electronic surveillance is permissible when the
purpose of the surveillance it to obtain foreign intelligence information.”).
649. See David S. Eggert, Note, Executive Order 12,333:  An Assessment of the Validity of
Warrantless National Security Searches, 1983 DUKE L.J. 611, 629-44 (“The scales tip
decisively in favor of the warrant requirement.  Any inconvenience imposed on the
executive by the warrant requirement is substantially outweighed by the protection of
the privacy expectations.”).
650. See 18 U.S.C. App. § 6.
651. See United States v. Fernandez, 913 F.2d 148, 163 (4th Cir. 1990) (stating that
government’s use of CIPA to exclude evidence deemed essential to the defense in a
criminal case merits dismissal of the indictment).
652. See Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 913 (4th Cir. 1980).  See, e.g., United
States v. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. 1306 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (demonstrating that lower federal
courts have sustained the “primary purpose” test of Truong); United States v.
Megahey, 553 F. Supp. 1180 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (same).
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surveillance in each such case was conducted by the FBI, rather than
one of the pure intelligence agencies, the government’s defense of its
surveillance was aided by the prophylactic protection afforded by a
FISC judge’s prior approval of the surveillance.
For example, in United States v. Megahey,653 the defendants
unsuccessfully sought to suppress evidence derived from FISA-
authorized electronic surveillance as part of an FBI
counterintelligence investigation.654  Defendants were convicted of
violating firearms and munitions statutes in support of the
Provisional Irish Republican Army.655  In response to the defendants’
assertion that the surveillance had been carried out exclusively to
obtain evidence for the criminal prosecution, the Court determined
that the phrase “primary purpose” is the guidepost for FISA-derived
surveillance.656  The Court based this determination in part on a
ruling that “Congress clearly viewed arrest and criminal prosecution
as one of the possible outcomes of a foreign intelligence
investigation.”657  The Court of Appeals agreed, noting that, it is
foreseeable that collected intelligence may be used in a criminal
proceeding and “Congress recognized that in many cases the
concerns of government with respect for foreign intelligence will
overlap with those with respect to law enforcement.”658
Had Aldrich Ames gone forward with the claim that the search of
his office was unconstitutional, his argument would have been based
on the primary purpose standard from Truong and would have
argued that the investigation’s primary purpose was no longer to
collect foreign counterintelligence, but was instead to gather
evidence of a crime.659  Ms. Gorelick is almost certainly correct in her
assessment that “it was better to have Congress and the judiciary

653. See 553 F. Supp. 1180 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Duggan,
743 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1984).
654. See id. at 1185 (stating the defendants’ claim that surveillance violated their
Fourth Amendment rights).
655. See id. at 1182 (stating that defendants were further accused of being illegal
aliens and receiving, possessing, and transporting firearms in interstate commerce).
656. See id. at 1189-90.
657. Id. at 1189-90.
658. Duggan, 743 F.2d at 78.  Other courts have followed suit.  See United States v.
Johnson, 952 F.2d 565, 572 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that the fact that the terrorist
activity was directed at Northern Ireland was of no consequence to the legality of the
FISA surveillance); United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067, 1076 (4th Cir. 1987)
(concluding that “FISA surveillance is not tainted simply because the government
can anticipate that the fruits of the surveillance may later be used . . . in a criminal
trial”).
659. See Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d at 915-16 (granting surveillance targets
protection under the warrant requirement if the government is primarily building a
criminal prosecution).
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involved”660 in such searches, although, notwithstanding the
amendment to FISA, the constitutional question remains
unresolved.661
6. FISA surveillance of First Amendment activities
Although FISA states that surveillance of USPs may not be based
“solely” on protected First Amendment activities,662 and the 1978
Senate Judiciary Committee Report stated that activities protected by
the First Amendment may not “form any part of the basis” for
identifying a FISA target,663 the executive branch could construe
“activities that are in preparation” for terrorism to include protected
advocacy or fundraising.  Similarly, another portion of the “agent of a
foreign power” definition that applies only to persons within the
United States who are neither citizens nor permanent residents
permits surveillance of a person who “acts in the United States . . . as
a member” of a “group engaged in international terrorism or
activities in preparation therefor.”664  FISA surveillance based upon
such activities would, standing alone, violate the First Amendment
and be inconsistent with the spirit, if not the letter of FISA.665
Membership in, and activities in support of, an organization that
advocates even the violent overthrow of the government of the
United States are protected by the First Amendment, absent a
showing that the person specifically intends to further the
organization’s unlawful objectives.666  Congress also recognized that

660. Wittes, supra note 600, at 22.
661. See Malooly, supra note 39, at 417 (maintaining that despite Gorelick’s
assertion that “the extension of the FISA to include physical searches is not an
admission of the lack of inherent executive power, but rather an indication that as a
matter of policy ‘it was better to have Congress and the judiciary involved,’ . . . there
is no constitutional basis for the notion that there is a national security exception to
the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement based on the ‘inherent powers’ of the
President.”).
662. See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3)(A) (1994) (“No United States person may be
considered a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power solely upon the basis of
activities protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States.”); United States v. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. 1306, 1314 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)
(maintaining that FISA explicitly admonishes that no Americans may be considered
agents of a foreign power solely for First Amendment protected activities).
663. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 13, 23
(1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3924.
664. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(1)(A), (a)(4) (1994).
665. See United States v. Megahey, 553 F. Supp. 1180, 1184 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)
(acknowledging Senate report notes, which stated that the purpose of FISA was to
strike a balance between the need for surveillance and the protection of civil
liberties).
666. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 187 (1972) (holding that a group’s
philosophy of destruction is immaterial and would not justify the denial of their First
Amendment rights); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 607 (1967) (finding
BANKSPP.DOC 8/15/2001  11:33 AM
2000] NATIONAL SECURITY SURVEILLANCE 87
FISA surveillance could not be based on mere association with
terrorist groups.667  The secrecy that attends FISC proceedings, and
the limitations imposed on judicial review of FISA surveillance, may
insulate unconstitutional surveillance from any effective sanction.668
If such a situation arises, the officials that review FISA applications,
including the judges of the FISC, should construe FISA to avoid the
constitutional problem.669
A more subtle problem with FISA and the Bill of Rights may arise
when the phrase “agent of a foreign power” is defined to include
USPs who engage in lawful activities in support of foreign political
groups that may engage in both lawful and unlawful terrorist
activities.  Because FISA merely requires “probable cause to believe
that the target” of surveillance is an agent of a foreign power,670 the
failure to also require a finding of probable cause to believe that the
target has engaged in criminal activity may fall short of Fourth
Amendment requirements.671  Suppose, for instance, that following
the FISA definitions, the “agent of a foreign power” is someone who
“aids or abets” in “activities that are in preparation” for terrorism.672
If the government has labeled the “foreign power” assisted by the
agent as a terrorist by the government, the agent/fundraiser may be
subject to FISA surveillance, even where there is no probable cause to
believe that the person intends to further the unlawful terrorist
objectives of the foreign power, as opposed to the group’s lawful
aims.673  Consider the example of a Palestinian-American who engages
in fundraising for Palestinian causes.  If some of the cash supported
terrorist activities, would the Attorney General be required under

that “mere knowing membership without a specific intent to further unlawful aims of
organization is not adequate. . .” for imposing sanctions); Communist Party of Ind. v.
Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441 (1974) (determining that Indiana state law forbidding
groups that advocate overthrowing the government from being listed on an election
ballot was unconstitutional).
667. See S. REP. NO. 95-604, at 24, 28-29 (1997), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3925, 3929-30 (stating that the government must establish probable cause that a
prospective surveillance target knew of secret intelligence activities of a foreign state
and acted in furtherance of these activities).
668. See infra Part III.E.
669. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932) (“When the validity of an act of
the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is
raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a
construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.”).
670. See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3)(A) (1994).
671. See United States v. Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787, 789 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that
appellant argued that the FISA is deficient under the Fourth Amendment).  But see
United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067, 1075 (4th Cir. 1987) (finding that the
government’s legitimate need for intelligence information overrides the potential
infringements of an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights).
672. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(C), (E).
673. See infra Part III.E.
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FISA to demonstrate that the fundraising Palestinian-American had a
specific intent to engage in “activities that are in preparation” for
terrorism?”674  In United States v. Falvey,675 a federal district court found
implicit in FISA a requirement that the agent of a foreign power be
engaged in, or conspiring with, others who are engaged in
terrorism.676
7. Minimization and other application requirements
For potential targets of surveillance, an application to obtain an
electronic surveillance order must include the following:  The name
of the officer making the application; statements showing the
Attorney General’s approval of the application, identification and
description of the surveillance target, and affirmative support that the
target is an agent of a foreign power; a description of the information
sought and types of communications to be monitored, as well as the
procedures that will be employed to confine the boundaries of the
surveillance; and a statement by the National Security Advisor that
the information sought is foreign intelligence information not
obtainable through normal investigative means.677  The application
must also describe any past applications involving the target, the
surveillance devices to be employed, the means of installation
(including whether physical entry will be required), and the period
of time for conducting the surveillance.678
In an effort to reduce the risk that FISA surveillance could
interfere with the rights of U.S. citizens, the Act prescribes
“minimization procedures” that must be adopted by the Attorney
General and followed to the satisfaction of a FISC judge in order to
“minimize the acquisition and retention, and prohibit the
dissemination” of nonpublic information about USPs.679  Lawyers are
heavily involved in this and other parts of the FISA process.  When

674. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(C) (1994); see also United States v. Falvey, 540 F.
Supp. 1306, 1314 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding that “to obtain a FISA surveillance order,
the Government must provide the FISA judge with something more than the target’s
sympathy for the gods of the particular group. . . .”).  Cf. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444, 448-91 (1969) (ruling that advocacy of violence short of incitement is
protected by the First Amendment).
675. 540 F. Supp. 1306 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
676. See id. at 1315 (emphasizing that it is the duty of the judge, not of the
Executive branch, to make a finding of probable cause that the target of surveillance
is an agent of foreign power).
677. See 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a) (1994).
678. See id.
679. See id. § 1801(h); see also id. § 1805(a)(4) (stating that a judge may enter an ex
parte order approving electronic surveillance if § 1801(h) is followed); id.
§ 1805(b)(2) (explaining what an order approving electronic surveillance should
direct).
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initiated by the FBI, and before the FISC acts, the applications and
accompanying materials are drafted by lawyers, reviewed by other
lawyers, passed on to the Justice Department’s Office of Intelligence
Policy and Review, and then briefed to the Attorney General.680  The
minimization procedures adopted by the FBI are classified, although
the internal review mechanisms include standard goals for all
applications, as well as for situation-specific assessments for individual
applications.  FISA prohibits the disclosure of information obtained
from FISA surveillance, except in accordance with the minimization
procedures.681  There is no requirement to supply notice that
surveillance was conducted to any surveillance target.682  The
minimization procedures, however, permit “dissemination of
information that is evidence of a crime which has been, is being, or is
about to be committed and that is to be retained or disseminated for
law enforcement purposes.”683  Executive Order 12,333 also required
“agencies within the intelligence community” to follow minimization
procedures.684
8. Emergency surveillance
In emergency circumstances, the President is permitted, through
the Attorney General, “[n]otwithstanding any other law,” to authorize
electronic surveillance without a court order “for periods up to one
year” upon a written certification that such surveillance is either
“solely directed” at communications between or among foreign
powers, or focused on a technical intelligence from property or
premises “under the open and exclusive control of a foreign
power.”685  These emergency powers may be exercised only where
there is “no substantial likelihood”686 that a communication involving
a U.S. citizen will be acquired, and where the Attorney General meets
minimization requirements, reports them to the Intelligence
Committees, and transmits her certification of such surveillance
under seal to the FISC.687  Such certifications remain sealed unless an
application for the surveillance is made pursuant to ordinary FISA

680. See generally James E. Meason, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act:  Time for
Reappraisal, 24 INT’L LAW. 1043, 1048-50 (1990) (describing the review process).
681. See 50 U.S.C. § 1806(a) (1994).
682. See id. § 1806(j) (stating that on an ex parte showing of good cause, the court
may forego ordering service of notice).
683. Id. § 1801(h)(3).
684. See Exec. Order No. 12,333, § 2.3, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1982), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.
§ 401 note (1994).
685. 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(1)(A)(i), (ii) (1994).
686. Id. § 1802(a)(1)(B).
687. See id. § 1802(a)(1) (providing the terms for the President, through the
Attorney General, to authorize electronic surveillance without a court order).
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processes, or unless the certification is “necessary to determine the
legality of surveillance” upon judicial review of FISA surveillance.688
A similar provision is made for emergency employment of
electronic surveillance.  Pursuant to FISA, in order to obtain “foreign
intelligence information,”689 before an order from the FISC is
obtained, the following criteria must be met:  The Attorney General
must certify that “an emergency situation exists” that requires
surveillance before an order “can with due diligence be obtained;”
the “factual basis for issuance of an order” exists; and a FISC judge
will be informed of the surveillance.690  The emergency grant of
authority cannot extend for more than twenty-four hours from the
time authorization is supplied by the Attorney General until the
information sought is obtained, or until the FISC denies an
application for surveillance, whichever is earliest.691
9. The constitutionality of the FISC
Challenges brought to the FISC on the basis that its ex parte
proceedings fail to meet the case or controversy requirements of
Article III of the U.S. Constitution692 have been rejected, partly on the
basis that substantial precedents for specialized Article III courts
exist.693  Challengers of FISA surveillance orders also have asserted
that the FISC violates the separation of powers694 and principles of
judicial independence695 in Article III because the FISC judges’
appointments may be revoked during their seven-year terms, thus
potentially influencing a judge’s conduct on the FISC.  This attack on

688. See id. § 1805(e).
689. See id. § 1804(a)(7)(B).
690. See id. (noting the requirements of the Attorney General for authorizing
emergency employment of electronic surveillance).
691. See id. § 1805(e), (f).
692. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases . . . [and] Controversies . . .).
693. See United States v. Megahey, 553 F. Supp. 1180, 1197 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)
(holding that FISA proceedings before the FISC “involve concrete questions
respecting the application of the Act and are in a form such that a judge is capable of
acting on them. . .”); see also United States v. Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787, 791-92 (9th Cir.
1987) (emphasizing that FISA requires judicial approval); In re Kevork, 788 F.2d 566,
569 (9th Cir. 1986) (“The Act contains strict requirements as to the conditions which
must be satisfied before surveillance may be authorized.”); United States v. Falvey,
540 F. Supp. 1306, 1313 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (articulating the requirement of the FISA
judge to find that the target is actually involved in the terrorist acts).
694. See Cavanagh, 807 F.2d at 791 (stating that an Article III judge acts in a
judicial capacity when deciding FISA applications); see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.
737, 752 (1984) (“The law of Article III standing is built on a single basic idea—the
idea of separation of powers.”).
695. See Cavanagh, 807 F.2d at 791 (noting that an Article III judge acts in a
judicial capacity when deciding FISA application).
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the FISC has also been overturned.696  Courts that have reviewed
challenges to FISA surveillance orders have not been persuaded that
the political question doctrine bars review of the orders, holding that
the surveillance decision is for the President alone to make.  Instead,
reviewing courts have determined that the FISC engages in day-to-day
fact-finding like that performed regularly by judges.697  Any fears that
FISA and the FISC would undermine executive powers have vanished
in light of the fact that not a single request for an electronic
surveillance order has been denied by the FISC.698  Moreover, raw
executive power arguments are likely perceived within the executive
branch as a poor substitute for the power conferred by FISA.  If
anything, the Keith and Steel Seizure decisions cast doubt on any claim
that the President may act alone in this sphere, especially in defiance
of statute.
Although the Supreme Court has not considered the
constitutionality of FISA,699 the lower courts have uniformly followed
the conclusion in United States v. Duggan700 that FISA is a
“constitutionally adequate balancing of the individual’s Fourth
Amendment rights against the nation’s need to obtain foreign
intelligence information.”701  FISA does not resolve the Truong
problem—whether the primary purpose standard satisfies the Fourth
Amendment—yet Truong has guided the courts in deciding whether
to uphold the use of FISA-derived surveillance.  The FISA procedures
would have likely been upheld in Truong because of the similarity
between the facts in that case and the continuing instances in which
FISA orders are sought.  An alternative to recognizing a foreign
intelligence exception to the warrant requirement has been

696. See id. at 792 (stating that temporary assignment within the federal judicial
system is common and does not undermine judicial independence).
697. See United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 74-75 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding that a
limited judicial role in determining whether the target of a warrant is properly
subject to the prescribed procedure is not a political question and does not inject
courts into the making of foreign policy).
698. See Wittes, supra note 600, at 23.
699. See In re Kevork, 634 F. Supp. 1002, 1010 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (stating that the
“Supreme Court has not yet considered the constitutionality of FISA and declined to
define the Fourth Amendment’s requirements for national security electronic
surveillance”).
700. 743 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1984).
701. Id. at 73; see also United States v. Johnson, 952 F.2d 565, 575 (1st Cir. 1991)
(concluding that FISA satisfies Fourth Amendment requirements); United States v.
Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067, 1075 (4th Cir. 1987) (same); United States v. Ott, 827 F.2d
473, 475-77 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that ex parte review procedures do not violate
the Fourth or Fifth Amendment); Cavanagh, 807 F.2d at 790 (determining that FISA
satisfies the Fourth Amendment); see generally Cinquegrana, supra note 331, at 816-17
(discussing the constitutionality of FISA’s targeting and procedural standards under
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments).
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suggested.  Following precedent outside the national security context,
Gregory Birkenstock suggests that such surveillance be treated as akin
to an administrative search involving special governmental needs.702
Although FISA surveillance shares elements—the non-criminal law
enforcement objective, the need for stealth in situations such as
searches of munitions plants and the like—with some administrative
searches, the intrusiveness of FISA surveillance and the overlap of
FISA surveillance and enforcement of the criminal laws weakens the
analogy.703
In 1988, in an effort to prevent the executive branch from
bypassing the FISA procedures, Congress enacted an amendment to
Title III.704  The Amendment expressly eliminated the § 2511(3)
disclaimer central to the Keith decision and stated that FISA and Title
III are intended to be “the exclusive means” for the conduct of
electronic surveillance by the government.705
Although the repeal of the disclaimer did not eliminate the
constitutional issue, Congress’ action did sharpen any eventual
separation of powers contest between Congress and the President in
this sphere.  The clear intention of Congress to prescribe “the
exclusive means” for the conduct of surveillance would relegate the
President to Article II arguments in support of warrantless
surveillance.
III. NATIONAL SECURITY SURVEILLANCE TODAY:  INVESTIGATION OF
TERRORIST THREATS
Terrorism presents a unique set of challenges in the United
States.706  First, current criminal laws and traditional law enforcement
processes cannot provide absolute protection against terrorist acts.707

702. See Gregory E. Birkenstock, Note, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and
Standards of Probable Cause:  An Alternative Analysis, 80 GEO. L.J. 843, 866-71 (1992)
(adding that some courts, when addressing FISA’s relaxed standard of probable
cause, have been reluctant to refer explicitly to the administrative search doctrine).
703. Brown & Cinquegrana, supra note 28, at 134-37 (noting that complexity of
the issues, the need for security, and the risks associated with delay support a
national security exception to the warrant clause).
704. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat.
1783, 1797 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f)(1994)).
705. See id. (stating that the “procedures in this chapter or chapter 121 and the
[FISA] shall be the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance is conducted”).
706. See generally Terrorism in the United States:  The Nature and Extent of the Threat and
Possible Legislative Responses, Senate Judiciary Comm., 104th Cong. 155 (1997)
[hereinafter Terrorism in the United States] (prepared statement of James X. Demspey).
707. See Counterterrorism Threat Assessment and Warning Unit, National Security
Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Terrorism in the
United States:  1997, available at http://www.fbi.gov/library/terror/terr97.pdf (last
visited July 26, 2000) (discussing the formidable threat of terrorism).
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While arrest, prosecution, and incarceration serve well to help
prevent most crimes from occurring, the risk of catastrophic harm
from terrorist attacks forces us to consider other means of
prevention.708  Moreover, traditional Fourth Amendment requirements may
thwart many investigations of terrorism, which depend on stealth to
prevent terrorist plans before they are carried out.709
Second, while terrorism is at its core a national security problem,710
it represents an unusual confluence of phenomena for the
investigative community—the primary purpose of the investigation
may be simultaneously and in equal measure law enforcement and
national security.711  With few exceptions, the rules for gathering
intelligence about terrorism in the United States are no different
from the rules for ordinary criminal investigations.712
Third, most prognostications are for more threats of terrorism in
the United States in coming years, largely due to the perception that
our defenses against conventional attacks are so formidable.713
Greater threats thus place an additional premium on greater
intelligence resources and successes.714
The tradition of liberty in the United States casts a shadow over all
national security surveillance, and is an overriding problem in
addressing terrorism concerns.  The core openness of our society
permits all of us, including the potential terrorist, considerable
freedom to move about, to associate with others, and to act in
furtherance of political aims.715  As recent terrorist incidents in the
United States have created a sense of urgency among citizens and
government officials to find better preventive strategies, reflection
has also reminded us that hasty actions to thwart terrorism may

708. See RICHARD A. FALKENRATH ET AL., AMERICA’S ACHILLES HEEL:  NUCLEAR,
BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL TERRORISM AND COVERT ATTACK 12 (1998) (suggesting
increased funding and effort to contain and prevent terrorist acts).
709. See id. at 8 (commenting on the difficult balancing of investigative techniques
and civil liberties).
710. See id. at 9 (noting that national security policy is mainly concerned with
protecting national citizens and national institutions from attack).
711. See id. at 265 (discussing the need for rational planning that crosses
jurisdictional lines of law enforcement and national security).  Instances where the
two purposes might not coincide include the potential terrorist suspected of credit
card fraud.
712. See id. at 8 (maintaining that law enforcement has maintained the lead in
addressing terrorist crimes).
713. See id. at 261-64 (discussing the United States’ vulnerability to terrorism due
to a lack of attention and resources paid toward developing an organized strategy to
deal with a covert attack).
714. See id. (emphasizing the need for an overarching U.S. strategy and program
for gathering intelligence resources).
715. See id. at 8 (discussing the openness and freedoms of American society that
are significant in the anti-terrorism context).
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threaten the freedoms that permit an open society.716  Thus, in
seeking ways to investigate potential terrorist activity, just as in
fashioning better responses to terrorist incidents, the measures
adopted must not undermine our basic freedoms.717
Even as the United States began to mobilize resources to fight
terrorism in the 1980s and 1990s, the terrorist threats themselves
were evolving.718  Instead of the classic political terrorist, seeking
support for a political cause, terrorists of late have included religious
or cult terrorists, seeking far more calamitous outcomes.719  While the
threats themselves are changing, new technologies, such as the
widespread availability of information on the Internet, have made
access to bomb-building instructions, and to chemical, biological, and
nuclear weapons of mass destruction, more widely available.720  Even
without this new technology, ordinary and easily available farming
chemicals can kill and maim hundreds of people in a few seconds, as
the devastating attack on the Oklahoma City federal building in 1995
reminded us.721
This section will begin by briefly reviewing the authorities available
to the government for conducting domestic terrorism investigations.
Next, we will assess two prominent terrorist incidents in the United
States in recent years, the World Trade Center and Oklahoma City
Federal Building bombings, to determine whether existing
investigative authorities could have thwarted these tragedies.  Then,
we will revisit the authorities and constitutional limits and consider
the status of the government’s national security surveillance authority
today.  Finally, an investigation of supporters of the Popular Front for
the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) will serve as a case study of the
authorities and unsolved problems presented in surveillance of
potential terrorist activities.

716. See id. (arguing that counterintelligence activities run the risk of infringing
on valued U.S. freedoms).
717. See id. at 8-9 (emphasizing the importance of finding ways to combat covert
terrorist attacks without undermining the basic freedoms and rights that U.S. citizens
enjoy).
718. See id. at 29-44 (giving a historical perspective of the threat of covert nuclear,
biological, and chemical attack).
719. See id. at 13-26 (citing examples of terrorist groups and attacks, including that
of the Japanese Aum Shinriko cult that released nerve gas in the Tokyo subway in
1995).
720. See id. at 100 (asserting that terrorist weapons are now more accessible and
easier to build).
721. See An “Indelible Trail of Evidence Cited”:  Witness Says McVeigh Sped Away, STAR-
TRIB. (Minneapolis), Apr. 28, 1995, at A1 [hereinafter Indelible Trail] (giving an
account of the Oklahoma City bombing).
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A. The Investigators and Their Authority
In one sense, the problems of investigating terrorism in the United
States are no different from those encountered generally in domestic
security investigations.  Judicial decisions, legislation, and executive
rules have shown that the origin of the threat is the largest distinction
between domestic law enforcement and internal security
investigations.722  Even the primary purpose standard, directed to the
distinction between law enforcement and intelligence gathering,
presumes that the intelligence gathering operation has targeted a
foreign source.723  The rules are thus more relaxed upon a showing
that the surveillance targets one or more foreign powers or their
agents.724  Yet experience demonstrates three harsh realities:  first, it is
often difficult to isolate U.S. persons from one or more foreign
surveillance targets in a place or through electronic monitoring;
second, it is often impossible to determine the relationship of a
potential terrorist to a foreign power early in an investigation; and
third, that U.S. persons are as capable as any other of wreaking
catastrophic havoc.725
Terrorist incidents on U.S. soil have increased dramatically in the
last few years.  Between 1985 and 1995, only two incidents of
international terrorism occurred on U.S. soil:  the World Trade
Center bombing in 1993, and the occupation of the Iranian Mission
to the United Nations by opponents of the Iranian regime in 1992.726
From 1990 through the first days of 1997, however, twenty-five
terrorist incidents occurred that were carried out by U.S. persons.727
They ranged from the highest profile news, such as the Unabomber
and the Atlanta Olympics pipe bomb, to numerous arsons in
department stores by animal rights activists.728  In recent years, the FBI
has annually engaged in approximately two dozen full domestic
terrorism investigations.729  Since the adoption of the 1983

722. See supra Parts II.D.4-7 (addressing judicial decisions), II.E (addressing
executive rules), and II.F (addressing legislation).
723. See supra notes 471-506 (discussing Truong decision).
724. See id.
725. See infra notes 766-83 and accompanying text (discussing the Oklahoma City
Bombing and the two U.S. citizens who perpetrated the terrorist act).
726. See Center for National Security Studies, Recent Trends in Domestic and
International Terrorism (Apr. 26, 1995), available at http://www.cdt.org/policy/
terrorism/cnss.trends.html (discussing the decline in the number of terrorist
incidents and the increase in the lethality of these incidents).
727. See Terrorism in the United States, supra note 706, at 22-23 (reviewing terrorist
incidents from 1990 to 1997).
728. See id.
729. Counter Terrorism Intelligence Gathering:  Hearings before U.S. Senate, Committee on
the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 155 (1995) (statement of James X. Dempsey, Deputy
Director, Center for National Security Studies) (discussing the low threshold
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Guidelines, about two-thirds of these full investigations were opened
before the commission of any crime.730  Among the successes was a
1993 effort that resulted in the arrest of several skinheads in Los
Angeles after an investigation determined that the group had been
planning to attack black, Jewish, and other religious targets.731  
The Justice Department, through the FBI, has been the lead
agency for terrorism investigations in the United States since 1982.732
By 1983, Attorney General William French Smith noted that threats
of terrorism originating from purely domestic sources had grown
more sophisticated, as the technology to inflict terrorist acts had
evolved.733  Thus, the standard for opening a “full” investigation
pursuant to the Guidelines for domestic security investigations was
revised from “specific and articulable facts” to “when the facts or
circumstances reasonably indicate that two or more persons are
engaged in an enterprise for the purpose of furthering political or
social goals wholly or in part through activities that involve force or
violence and a violation of the criminal laws.”734  The 1983 Guidelines
also emphasized that the domestic security investigative authority is
different from general crimes authority.735  Nevertheless, traditional
Fourth Amendment and other statutory and regulatory procedures
protect investigations of a USP.736

required for the FBI to open a full terrorism investigation).
730. See id. (explaining that the FBI can open a full investigation whenever it
reasonably believes from the facts or circumstances that two or more persons are
engaged in these types of activities).
731. See id. (describing the FBI’s successful preventative intervention).
732. See National Security Decision Directive 30, Apr. 20, 1982 (unclassified
version), reprinted in CHRISTOPHER SIMPSON, NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVES OF THE
REAGAN AND BUSH ADMINISTRATIONS:  THE DECLASSIFIED HISTORY OF U.S. POLITICAL
AND MILITARY POLICY, 1981-1991, at 113.  The Department of State coordinates
federal responses to terrorism abroad, and the Federal Aviation Administration is
concerned with terrorism aboard aircraft in the United States.  See Center for Non-
Proliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Federal Structure for
Terrorism Response, available at http://cns.miis.edu/research/cbw/response.htm (last
visited July 26, 2000) (outlining the responsibilities of the federal agencies dealing
with terrorism).  The Federal Emergency Management Agency is the lead agency for
consequence management, and provides a support role in crisis management in the
federal responses to terrorism.  See Exec. Order No. 12,148, 3 C.F.R. 412 (1980)
(outlining the functions of the Federal Emergency Management Agency).
733. See supra text accompanying notes 534-36.
734. Criminal AGG, supra note 522, at 3091 (outlining the Attorney General’s
Guidelines on Investigations).
735. See id. at 3092.
736. See id. at Part IV.
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B. Terror in the Heartland:  Bombings of the World Trade Center and the
Oklahoma City Federal Building
1. The bombing of the World Trade Center737
At lunchtime on February 26, 1993, a 1,200-pound bomb enclosed
in a rented van exploded in the parking garage beneath the World
Trade Center complex in downtown Manhattan.738  The blast killed
six, injured over one thousand and immeasurably harmed America’s
notions of security from terrorism.
The individuals charged with engineering the bombing
immigrated to the United States by using false passports, false visas,
or by claiming political asylum.739  Their base, the Al-Salam Mosque in
Jersey City, had been, since 1990, a center for the teachings of Sheik
Omar Abdel Rahman, an Egyptian cleric who had earlier adopted the
most violent strands of Islamic thought.740  Sheik Rahman, along with
eventual co-conspirator Ramzi Yousef, a highly trained terrorist from
Pakistan and veteran of the Afghan jihad, were on a State
Department list of persons suspected to have been involved in
politically motivated violence and were thus excludable from the
United States pursuant to statute.741  Rahman entered using a visitor’s
visa from Sudan.742  By the time the mistake was realized, he had
claimed political asylum.743  Rahman was released, at least partly due
to the overcrowding of detention centers, and he was told to appear
for a hearing on his asylum application within eighteen months.744
Yousef also entered with an Iraqi passport and sought asylum on the
basis that he would face persecution by Iraq if ordered to return.745
He also was released due to a lack of detention space.

737. This account is drawn from Gail Appleson, Sixth Suspect Indicted in the World
Trade Center Blast, REUTERS LIMITED, May 19, 1993, BC Cycle; Ralph Blumenthal, The
Bombing:  Retracing the Steps, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1993, at B1; Alison Mitchell, U.S.
Widens Charges in Trade Center Bombing, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1993, at B4; Nancy
Reckler, After Eight Months, Massive Terrorism Case Goes to Jury in New York, WASH. POST,
Sept. 24, 1995, at A11; Benjamin Weiser, “Mastermind” and Driver Found Guilty in 1993
Plot to Blow up Trade Center, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1997, at A1.
738. See This Time, It Didn’t Go Off, Tale of Terror from Feb. 26 to Yesterday, NEWSDAY
(N.Y.), June 25, 1993, at A10 (chronicling the World Trade Center bombing).
739. See Robert D. McFadden, Law is Satisfied, but Answers Don’t Cover Every Question,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1997, at A1.
740. See id.
741. See Immigation Act of 1990, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B) (1994) (barring aliens
who have engaged in terrorist acts entrance to the United States).
742. See Lynn Duke, Trail of Tumult on U.S. Soil, WASH. POST, July 11, 1993, at A1
(exploring Rahman’s activity in the United States).
743. See id.
744. See id.
745. See Blumenthal, supra note 737, at B1.
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Once released, the perpetrators made preparations for the
bombing.  On November 30, 1992, Mohammed A. Salemah, Yousef’s
roommate, rented a locker under an alias.746  FBI agents would testify
later that this locker had contained chemicals and bomb-making
devices.  On February 23, 1993, Salameh and Nidal Ayyad, a chemical
engineer, rented a van from a Ryder rental office in Jersey City.  On
Thursday, February 25, Mohammad Salameh visited the rented
locker.
Post-bombing activities further implicated the individuals.747  Less
than two hours after the explosion on the 26th, Mohammad Salameh
appeared at the Ryder agency, claiming that his van had been stolen.
Salameh returned repeatedly over the next few days in an attempt to
reclaim his deposit.  Meanwhile, FBI agents recovered the vehicle
identification number on part of the van that carried the explosives
and then traced the piece to the Ryder office in Jersey City. Federal
agents waited for Salemeh’s return to the Ryder agency, watched him
complete paperwork regarding the missing van, and then arrested
him when he left the agency.  FBI agents then searched Salemeh’s
rented locker and found chemicals, (including sulfuric acid and
shotgun powder), beakers, tubing and fuse.
The other actors fled the country.  Yousef, thought to have
planned the bombing, fled to Pakistan the day of the bombing, and
continued to engage in terrorist activities.748  Eyad Ismoil, a childhood
friend of Yousef and the driver of the bomb-carrying van, fled to
Jordan the same day. After a two-year pursuit, Yousef was
apprehended in Pakistan and Ismoil was arrested in Jordan in 1995.749
In the interim, two related trials were held.  On March 4, 1994,
Mohammad Salameh, Nidal A. Ayyad, Mahmud Abouhalima and
Ahmad Ajajfour were convicted of various offenses related to the
bombing of the World Trade Center.  On October 1, 1995, ten
defendants, including Sheik Rahman and Yousef, were found guilty
of charges related to a thwarted plan to blow up the United Nations
headquarters and to bomb other New York buildings, bridges and
tunnels.  Evidence at this trial also included statements in Yousef’s
computer about a coordinated plan to bomb twelve U.S. jetliners in
forty-eight hours.
Periodically throughout its investigation of terrorist groups before




748. See McFadden, supra note 739, at A19.
749. See id.
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wiretaps and an informant, Emad A. Salem, an Egyptian ex-
intelligence officer.750  FBI infiltration of the group planning to bomb
the New York City landmarks thwarted the plot and led to the 1995
convictions.751  Although Salem did not penetrate the cell of
individuals who were convicted of the World Trade Center bombing,
his testimony was critical in the 1995 trial.752  The government paid
$1.5 million in exchange for Salem’s testimony against the ten
defendants in the 1995 trial,753  but had previously decided against
using him as an informant after he failed a series of lie detector
tests.754
The culminating trial of Yousef and Ismoil was held in 1997 in New
York.755  After a three-month trial, a jury convicted Yousef of directing
and helping carry out the World Trade Center bombing and Ismoil
of driving the Ryder van that carried the bomb into the underground
garage of the Trade Center.756  Both received life sentences for
offenses involving the use of explosives to kill people.757
Although the government developed much of the its case against
Yousef in the earlier trials, new testimony was admitted from a Secret
Service agent who accompanied Yousef on his flight to the United
States from Pakistan in 1995.758  According to the testimony, Yousef
not only admitted to and explained in detail his role in the plot, but
he expressed regrets that more death and destruction had not been
caused.759  According to the Secret Service agent, Yousef stated that
the goal of the explosion had been to cause one of the towers to
topple into the other, killing up to 250,000 people.760  Yousef also
reportedly told the agent that he had recruited the conspirators,
picked the target, directed the making and delivery of the bomb, and
set its fuse, all to avenge the Palestinian people and to retaliate
against the United States for its support of Israel.761  Moreover, Yousef

750. Because the terrorist acts had already occurred, the investigations of the
World Trade Center bombing focused on the crime and were conducted pursuant to
the criminal Guidelines.  Investigations of terrorist groups are more likely to be
conducted pursuant to the FCI Guidelines, to the extent they have a foreign origin.
See supra notes 736-37 and accompanying text (explaining the guidelines).
751. See Reckler, supra note 737, at A11.
752. See id.
753. See id.
754. See James C. McKinley, Jr., Witness in Bombing Plot Once Failed Lie-Detector Tests,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1995, at B3 (stating that the FBI broke relations with Salem after
he failed several lie-detector tests in 1992).
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apparently confessed to plans for a suicide attack on CIA
headquarters, and an attempt to assassinate President Clinton with
phosgene gas.762  Ismoil also admitted to authorities that he had
driven the van that carried the bomb, although he claimed that he
thought he was delivering cartons of shampoo.763
Despite the extensive evidence amassed during the World Trade
Center bombing trials, it remains unknown who financed the plot,
and who, if anyone, directed Yousef.764  Although no evidence at trial
ever indicated that Yousef was working for a foreign power, as would
be traditionally defined, or for an organized terrorist group, some
investigators maintained that Yousef’s ability to move easily around
the world as a fugitive made it unlikely that he acted on his own.765
2. The Oklahoma City bombing
On April 19, 1995, a Ryder Rental Company truck parked in front
of the Alfred P. Murrah Building in Oklahoma City.766  At 9:02 a.m.,
the truck, burdened with 4,800 pounds of ammonium nitrate,
exploded.767  The resulting blast destroyed the Federal Building,
killed 168 people and wounded more than 500 others.768
After locating a partial vehicle identification number among the
rubble of the explosion, FBI officials traced the vehicle to a Ryder
Rental agency in Junction City, Kansas.769  Based on a description of
the men that rented the van, the FBI made composite drawings.770  A
motel manager in Junction City recognized the composite drawing as
a guest who was driving a Ryder truck and had registered under the
name Timothy McVeigh.771  On April 21, investigators entered
McVeigh’s name into the National Crime Information Center
computer and learned that he was jailed for a traffic violation in






766. See Indelible Trail, supra note 721, at A1.  The Murrah Building housed several
agencies, including:  the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; the Departments
of Agriculture, Housing and Urban Development, Labor, and Veterans
Administration; Drug Enforcement Administration; Federal Highway Administration;
General Accounting Office; General Services Administration; Social Security
Administration; U.S. Marine Recruiting; U.S. Army Recruiting; and Secret Service.
See Alfred P. Murrah Building History, at http://www.fireprograms.okstate.edu/
OCFD/htm/murrhist/htm (last visited July 26, 2000).
767. Dale Russakoff, An Ordinary Boy’s Extraordinary Rage, WASH. POST, July 2, 1995,
at A1 (giving an account of the Oklahoma City bombing).
768. See id.
769. See McVeigh’s Conviction, DENV. POST, June 4, 1997, at B7.
770. See Search for the Truth, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 31, 1997, at A6.
771. See id.
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bombing.772  The Bureau contacted the jail where McVeigh was being
held and notified the district attorney not to release the prisoner on
bail.773
The nature and extent of any ties McVeigh may have had to militia
or other organized groups remains unclear, although his
acquaintances reported that McVeigh had growing and obsessive
anger and distrust for the federal government.774  In addition,
McVeigh is known to have attended the same meetings as members
of right-wing militia groups, and to have been a true believer in
Andrew Macdonald’s The Turner Diaries, which tells of a group of
white supremacists who blow up FBI headquarters in Washington.775
McVeigh gave copies of the book to friends, sold it at gun shows, and
had a photocopy of a passage from the book in his car when he was
arrested following the Oklahoma City bombing.776  It was also
noteworthy that the bombing took place on the second anniversary of
the fire at the Branch Dividians compound in Waco, Texas.777
Following his arrest, McVeigh listed James Nichols as a reference.778
James Nichols’ brother, Terry Nichols, a friend of McVeigh’s,
surrendered to police when he learned that he was wanted in
conjunction with the bombing.779  Nichols, who claimed to be a
member of the Michigan Militia, was indicted along with McVeigh for
murder and other charges.780  Despite Nichols’ alleged militia activity
and accusations that he had detonated explosives on his farm, there
was no specific threat, by Nichols or any group, to the Murrah
building or its employees before the explosion.781
McVeigh and Nichols were convicted of the bombing in federal
court in Denver.782  Critical to the prosecution was the success of the
FBI in charging Michael Fortier, an acquaintance of both suspects,
with misprision of felony to induce Fortier’s cooperation against

772. See Peter Annin Evan Thomas, Judgment Day, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 24, 1997, at 42.
773. See id.
774. See Lois Romano & Tom Kenworth, McVeigh Guilty on All Counts, WASH. POST,
June 3, 1997, at A1.
775. See id.
776. See Michael Fleeman, The McVeigh Trial:  Suspect Had ‘Earplugs, Gun’; Witnesses
Detail Items Found in Search, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Apr. 29, 1997, at 15 (describing the
contents of McVeigh’s car).
777. See Supremacist Takes Fifth During Oklahoma Questioning, DENV. POST, July 17,
1997, at A1.
778. See Indelible Trail, supra note 721, at A1.
779. See United States v. Nichols, 897 F. Supp. 542, 548 (W.D. Okla. 1995).
780. See Terror in the Heartland, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 26, 1995, at 1.
781. See id.
782. See Karen Abbot, Nichols Wants Cases Merged for Appeal, ROCKY MOUNTAIN
NEWS, Aug. 6, 1998, at A21.
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McVeigh and Nichols.783
3. Similarities and differences
In many respects, the World Trade Center and Oklahoma City
bombings were similar. First, the bombers were members of or at
least believers in radical social networks that were outside the
mainstream political spectrum.784  Second, both groups had the
knowledge and access to materials needed to make bombs.785  Third,
both were able to gain access to powerfully symbolic targets.  Fourth,
both were caught up in the urgings of others to take violent actions
against the U.S. government.  Fifth, both investigations were
successfully conducted, albeit after the fact, working with existing
rules of investigation, including extensive and meticulous work at the
crime scene.786  Finally, both bombings illustrate U.S. vulnerability to
politically motivated violence, within its borders and by its citizens.
Nevertheless, the differences between the two episodes are equally
striking and perhaps more noteworthy for the purposes of
investigations of terrorist activity.  The World Trade Center bombers
were part of a structured group that had support abroad, possibly
including state sponsorship.787  The history of politically violent
radical Islam provided a powerful base of support.788  This made the
perpetrators all the more dangerous, potentially requiring great
efforts to locate and detain suspects throughout the world.789  Of
course, the group’s notoriety made it possible to prevent members
from entering the United States, making it possible to place an
informant inside the group, and to more easily locate suspects after

783. See Search for the Truth, supra note 770, at A6.
784. See HARVEY W. KUSHNER, TERRORISM IN AMERICA 49-50 (describing the World
Trade Center bombers’ radicalism); Beverly Allen, Talking “Terrorism”:  Ideologies and
Paradigms in a Postmodern World, 22 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 7, 10-11 (1996)
(describing the expulsion of the Oklahoma City bombers from the body politic).
785. See KUSHNER, supra note 784, at 50 (noting that the World Trade Center
bombers purchased most of the materials for the bomb for less than $9,000).
786. See Symposium, Post-Cold War International Security Threats:  Terrorism, Drugs,
and Organized Crime, 21 MICH. J. INT’L L. 527, 559 (1999) (remarks of Prof. Kate
Martin) (referring to the FBI’s response to both bombings as traditional and
successful law enforcement activity).
787. See JIM DYWER ET AL., TWO SECONDS UNDER THE WORLD 239-40 (1994)
(detailing a confession of one of the bombers linking the terrorist act to several
organizations); see also supra note 765 and accompanying text (discussing the
possibility of foreign involvement).
788. See Steven Emerson, Unholy War, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 14, 1998, at 1, 2 (noting
that the writings of radical Islamic fundamentalists advocating violence are widely
read throughout the Muslim world).
789. See Spencer J. Crona & Neal A. Richardson, Justice for War Criminals of Invisible
Armies:  A New Legal Approach to Terrorism, 21 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 349 (1996)
(discussing the international nature of the conspiracy and difficulty using traditional
law enforcement and prosecutorial tactics to combat terrorism).
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the bombing.790
Another large difference is the scope of potential follow-up
investigations.  Both incidents were investigated pursuant to the
Attorney General criminal guidelines.791  The Oklahoma City
bombing was a criminal act involving no foreign actors; the Attorney
General criminal guidelines dictated the only possible investigative
procedures related to that investigation.792
The World Trade Center was a more complex matter.  The post-
bombing circumstances led authorities to demand a speedy and
efficient criminal investigation.  The foreign element, however,
yielded the possibility of an investigation pursuant to the
counterintelligence guidelines.793
Oklahoma City bombing suspect Timothy McVeigh gave no
indications that he was involved in a terrorist organization, although
his personal history made him a likely candidate for violent
behavior.794  Unlike the World Trade Center bombing, there was no
group to infiltrate.  In this respect, McVeigh was more like
Unabomber Theodore Kaczyinski than the Islamic World Trade
Center bombers.
4. Lingering questions
The FBI lacked the intelligence needed to anticipate either of the
two bombings.  While the FBI employed wiretaps and an informant to
infiltrate the group responsible for the World Trade Center
bombing, neither the electronic surveillance nor the informant was
able to penetrate the particular cell that carried out the act.795
Preventing the Oklahoma City bombing was even more difficult.
No information credibly obtained to date indicates that there was
even an “enterprise” of “two or more persons” to investigate,
pursuant to criminal guidelines, prior to the Oklahoma City
bombing.796  Moreover, no information has connected the bombing
to an organization, militia, terrorist group or foreign power, the latter
two of which might merit investigation under counterintelligence

790. See Malcolm Gladwell, Sheik, 9 Others Convicted in N.Y. Bomb; 10 Convicted in NY
Conspiracy Case, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 1995, at A1 (detailing the FBI investigation of the
terrorist group, use of informants, and the volume of evidence obtained).
791. See Criminal AGG, supra note 522, at 3091.
792. See id. at 3087 (explaining the requirement that all criminal investigations
must be undertaken in accordance with these regulations).
793. See FIA AGG, supra note 525 (providing counterintelligence guidelines).
794. See Russakoff, supra note 767, at A1 (discussing McVeigh’s history).
795. See supra note 752 and accompanying text.
796. See Criminal AGG, supra note 522, at 3091 (indicating the need for a group,
not individual, object of investigation).
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guidelines.797
Indeed, as terrorists such as Yousef and Usama bin Ladin illustrate,
a primary threat from terrorism today appears to have evolved from
large, highly-organized state sponsored terrorist groups to loosely
organized but technically competent persons affiliated through
common goals, not national origin.  This new phenomenon, which
the FBI has labeled International Radical Terrorism (“IRT”), includes
any extremist movement or group, international in nature, that
conducts acts of crime or terrorism under the banner of personal
beliefs in furtherance of political, social, economic, or other
objectives.798  Because of the influence they wield, and their ability to
act globally, IRT groups now exercise the type of destructive power
historically held solely by nations and large, hierarchically structured
organizations.799  Today, practical reality displaces preconceived
notions of “foreign power.”800
Another problem with counterterrorist investigations concerns
ethnic or racial stereotyping.  For example, naturalized U.S. citizen
Abraham Ahmad left Oklahoma City for Chicago shortly after the
bombing on April 19, 1995.801  He planned to fly to Jordan via
Rome.802  When he landed in Chicago, federal agents detained him
and searched his carry-on baggage.803  The interrogation caused
Ahmad to miss his flight to Rome, so he flew instead to London.804
There, British immigration officials, upon discovering that Ahmad
had arrived from Oklahoma City, handcuffed him and questioned

797. See id. at 3087 (noting that investigations involving foreign intelligence,
foreign counterintelligence and international terrorism matters are subject to
separate guidelines); see also FIA AGG, supra note 525 (providing counterintelligence
guidelines).
798. See TERRORISM RESEARCH AND ANALYTICAL CENTER, NATIONAL SECURITY
DIVISION, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES 7 (1994);
see also COUNTERTERRORISM THREAT ASSESSMENT & WARNING UNIT, NATIONAL SECURITY
DIVISION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES 18 (1996) (listing a
current international terrorist threat as “loosely affiliated international radical
extremists”).
799. See, e.g., FALKENRATH , supra note 708, at 167-71.
800. See, e.g., Bruce B. Auster, An Inside Look at Terror Inc., U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Oct. 19, 1998, at 34 (providing a perspective into Osama bin Laden’s
organization, Al Qa’ida).  Al Qa’ida has no host nation, lacks a significant hierarchy,
has considerable financial backing, and is capable of supplying the means for
carrying out terrorist threats around the world. See id.  For more on the bin Laden
organization, see Stephen Emerson, Inside the Osama Bin Laden Investigation,
J. COUNTERTERRORISM & SECURITY INT’L, Fall 1998, at 16 (describing the elaborate
organization’s decade-long mission of terrorist attacks).
801. See William Booth, A Nightmare of a Stopover in London, WASH. POST, Apr. 24,
1995, at A12 (describing in great detail Ahmad’s detention).
802. See Paul Dean, It’s Just Your Look, Your Look, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1995, at E1
(reporting the incident and providing quotations from Ahmad).
803. See id.
804. See id.
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him for four to five hours, refusing to feed him.805  Then the British
authorities sent Ahmad under armed guard back to the United
States.  When he arrived at Dulles Airport near Washington, he was
taken in a closed van to an office, fingerprinted, and asked to sign a
statement that he had been read his rights.806  Ahmad refused to sign
the statement.807 After several hours, FBI agents released him without
charges.808  Ahmad returned to Oklahoma City, only to find that his
wife and daughters had fled their house under the intense media
scrutiny and abuse from passersby.809
Officials apparently detained Ahmad solely on the basis of his
ethnicity, name, and physical appearance.810  In the first few days after
the Oklahoma City bombing, before the FBI linked suspects McVeigh
and Nichols to the incident, the New York Post published a cartoon
with caricatures of Middle Eastern men laying siege to the Statue of
Liberty.811  Also, commentators opined in the print and broadcast
media that the bombing had all the characteristics of “a Middle
Eastern trait,” and that “the fundamentalists . . . [were] targeting
us.”812  In the days after the bombing, an anti-defamation group
reported 222 attacks against Muslims.813
The problems of racial or ethnic stereotyping and guilt by
association are long-standing and not unique to national security
settings.814  However, national security consequences are significant if
law enforcement agents were to make the opposite mistake to the
one made with Mr. Ahmad—failing to detain a culpable suspect
because positive information was unavailable.  When balancing
between requiring authorities to detain or otherwise interfere with
individual liberties only on the basis of firm information or positive
identification, and permitting the government to act based on some
reasonable suspicion, the government should receive greater
deference when the risks to internal security are greater.






810. See id. (portraying the Ahmad incident as ethnic-based profiling, as Ahmad
was the only passenger who appeared Middle Eastern, and the only one stopped).
811. See generally Mohammed Bazzi, The Arab Menace, THE PROGRESSIVE, Aug. 1995.
812. See id. at 40 (quoting Steven Emerson of the CBS Evening News).
813. See James Brooke, Attacks on U.S. Muslims Surge Even as Their Faith Takes Hold,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1995, at A1 (providing statistics of reported attacks on American
Muslims).
814. See id. (explaining that physical characteristics are commonplace factors used
to profile suspects); see also Michael Higgins, Looking the Part:  With Criminal Profiles
Being Used More Widely to Spot Possible Terrorists and Drug Couriers, Claims of Bias Are Also
on the Rise, 83 A.B.A. J. 48 (1997).
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To further complicate intelligence efforts, some self-styled citizen
militias have promoted “leaderless resistance” by confining the
planning of terrorist activities to individuals or small groups to
prevent infiltration by law enforcement agencies.815  There is
increasing evidence that terrorism in the United States, and
bombings of government installations in particular, do not fit the
stereotype of foreign agents seeking vengeance.816  Instead, “the face
of domestic terrorism is a bomber next door.”817  While the media has
concentrated on the two attacks described above, as well as
Unabomber Theodore Kaczynski’s activities, small towns and
suburban neighborhoods have suffered a significant increase in
bombings and attempted bombings.818  In a decade, the number of
such explosions tripled from 1,103 in 1985 to 3,163 in 1994.819
For example, in July 1996, FBI agents arrested members of the
Arizona Vipers, a paramilitary group, on charges of conspiring to
blow up government buildings, after an undercover agent infiltrated
the group and recorded some conversations between members.820  At
about the same time, the United States indicted nine people,
including a leader of the Washington State Militia, in Seattle on
federal charges of conspiring to make bombs for use against the U.S.
government and the United Nations.821  Members of the Washington
group included a chimney sweep, a mason, Boeing Company
workers, a religious teacher, and a television repairman.822  An FBI
agent infiltrated this group, recording some of its meetings.823  The
group possessed pipe bombs, increasingly popular weapons that
terrorists use against intended targets.824  The number of pipe bomb
explosions has doubled in the last ten years, and bombs aimed at
government installations increased from seventeen in 1990 to fifty-
one in 1994.825

815. See Keith Schneider, Bomb Echoes Extremists’ Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1995,
at A22 (describing “leaderless resistance” and its promotion and use by militant
citizen organizations).
816. See Timothy Egan, Terrorism Now Going Homespun as Bombings in the U.S. Spread,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1996, at A1 (acknowledging that today’s terrorist threats no
longer fit the stereotype of foreign militant zealots).
817. Id. (intimating that it is no longer possible to identify a terrorist by
nationality).
818. See id. (providing statistics to show heightened numbers of reported bombing
incidents throughout the non-urban United States).
819. See id. (quoting a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms report).
820. See id. (using the Vipers as an example of terrorist groups operating within
U.S. communities).




825. See id. (providing FBI statistics on terrorist bombs).
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C. Recent Antiterrorism Reforms
Following the World Trade Center bombing, Congress introduced
bills to expand the federal government’s capacity to combat
international terrorism.826  After the Oklahoma City bombing, the
Justice Department officials and members of Congress expanded the
reform agenda to include domestic terrorism.827  The Senate bill
passed by a lopsided vote in June 1995,828 and the House Judiciary
Committee approved a House version in the same month.829  The
House slowed the legislation down, however, after August and
September hearings left many members of Congress with the
impression that government agencies, particularly the FBI, had
overstepped their bounds in raids on the Branch Davidian Cult near
Waco, Texas, as well as in its shootout with white separatist Randall C.
Weaver at Ruby Ridge, Idaho.830  Ultimately, an “unusual coalition of
conservative Republicans and civil libertarian Democrats in the
House of Representatives” persuaded House leaders not to bring the
bill to the floor.831
After the Oklahoma City bombing, Justice Department officials,
including the FBI leadership, considered changes to the 1983 FBI
Guidelines.832  For example, Clinton administration officials
considered a proposal that would permit FBI infiltration of domestic
organizations or the use of informants to keep track of such groups’
activities.833  The proposal would allow such investigative techniques
without any indication that the targeted group was planning to
commit criminal acts of violence.834
At a May 3, 1995 hearing of the House Judiciary Committee’s
Subcommittee on Crime, FBI Director Louis J. Freeh and Deputy
Attorney General Jamie S. Gorelick indicated that, rather than

826. See Omnibus Counterterrorism Act of 1995, H.R. 896, 104th Cong. (1995);
Omnibus Counterterrorism Act of 1995, S. 390, 104th Cong. (1995) (House and
Senate bills introduced to combat terrorism).
827. See DEMPSEY & COLE, supra note 622, at 108-09.
828. See S. REP. NO. 104-735 (1995) (reporting that the Senate bill passed by a vote
of 98 to 1).
829. See Stephen Labaton, Bill on Terrorism, Once a Certainty, Derailed in House, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 3, 1995, at A1 (providing the legislative history of the bill).
830. See id. (describing the impetus of Congress’ intention to combat domestic
terrorism through legislation).
831. Id. (providing reasons for the bill’s failure to receive House approval).
832. See Neil A. Lewis, Clinton Plan Would Let FBI Infiltrate Menacing Groups, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 25, 1995, at A19 (indicating that private talks within the FBI following the
Oklahoma City bombing included an expressed need for more investigative
authority).
833. See id. (reporting the Clinton administration’s plan to permit the FBI to
exercise more of its own discretion in conducting investigations, even at the expense
of citizens’ liberty interests).
834. See id.
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rewrite the 1983 Guidelines, the administration had decided to
reinterpret them.835  The new interpretation would permit broad
investigations of “a domestic terrorism group if that group advocated
violence or force with respect to achieving any political or social
objectives.”836  Instead of finding an “imminent violation” of the law,
as the existing Guidelines required, the DOJ would permit an
investigation if it detected any potential conduct that “might violate
federal law.”837  According to the accompanying interpretive
memorandum prepared by the Justice Department, the FBI may
authorize a full investigation if there are statements threatening or
advocating the use of violence, and an apparent ability to carry out
the violence in a way that would violate federal law.838
If the FBI conducted full domestic security investigations whenever
it found any conduct that “might violate federal law,” it may be
difficult to reconcile the new guidelines with the portions of the 1983
Guidelines.  The 1983 guidelines require consideration of the
magnitude of the threat, its likelihood and immediacy, and the
danger to individual freedoms posed by an investigation.839  The
reinterpretation may authorize investigations that would violate
individual rights.840
Freeh also explained that the FBI could open a preliminary
investigation based on “partial information” and that “any lawful
investigative technique may be used in a preliminary inquiry . . .
[except] mail covers, mail openings, and nonconsensual electronic
surveillance. . . .  [A preliminary inquiry may include] the planting of
undercover agents in the [suspect] organization.”841  As a result of the
broader guidelines, the number of open security investigations
increased dramatically from about 100 in 1995 to more than 800 in
1997.842

835. See Stephen Labaton, U.S. is Easing Restrictions on Monitoring Some Groups, N.Y.
TIMES, May 4, 1995, at B14 (illustrating the domestic counterterrorism plan to allow
the FBI more freedom in its investigative actions).
836. Id.
837. Id.
838. Combating Domestic Terrorism:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House
Judiciary Comm., 104th Cong. 12, 20 (1995) [hereinafter Freeh testimony] (statement of
Louis J. Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation) (presenting the FBI’s
proposed investigative authorizations, but highlighting its limits as well).
839. See Criminal AGG, supra note 522, at 3091-92 (discussing FBI’s basis for
conducting domestic security and terrorism investigations).
840. See Labaton, supra note 835, at B14 (noting civil liberty interest groups’
opposition to the FBI’s plan as it would reduce citizens’ rights against unwarranted
searches and seizures).
841. Freeh testimony, supra note 838.
842. See Jim McGee, The Rise of the FBI, WASH. POST MAG., July 20, 1997, at 10, 25
(attributing the rise in investigations to a focus on individuals instead of groups).
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Eventually, in 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.843  The Act contained few of the
original Clinton Administration proposals.  Congress dropped the
proposals for enhanced surveillance capabilities for terrorism
investigations made after the World Trade Center and Oklahoma
City bombings from the bill.844  Unfortunately, the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act further complicated what was already a
potential clash of First Amendment interests and terrorism
prevention goals.  Among other provisions, the Act permits the
Secretary of State to designate any “foreign terrorist organizations”845
as supporters of “terrorist activity” that threatens U.S. national
security.846  If the Secretary makes such a designation, the State
Department would forbid anyone from providing any form of
assistance to the designated foreign organization, and would make
fundraising for such an organization a serious felony.847  Although the
labeled organization may seek judicial review of its designation, the
reviewing judge may permit the attorney general to release privately
to the court any information that the department believes would, if
released, potentially harm the national security.848  In addition, the
original designation decision is made by an administrative official—
the Secretary of State.849  Her decision may only be reversed by a
judge if it fails to satisfy the deferent “arbitrary and capricious”
standard of the Administrative Procedure Act.850
At the same time Congress created the designation process, it also

843. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
132, 110 Stat. 1214  (amending the Immigration and Nationality Act).
844. See Holly Idelson, Terrorism Bill is Headed to President’s Desk, 54 CONG. QTLY.
WKLY. 1044 (1996).
845. See 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (Supp. V 1999) (authorizing the secretary to designate
organizations as terrorist).   
846. See id. § 1182(a)(3)(B) (identifying and defining terrorist activities); see also
id. § 1189(a)(1), (c)(2) (enumerating right to identify terrorists in the interest of
national security).
847. Section 303 of the Antiterrorism Act and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
provides:  “Whoever, within the United States or subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States, knowingly provides material support or resources to a foreign terrorist
organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.” Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 303, 110 Stat.
1214, 1250 (1996) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (Supp. V 1999)).
848. See 8 U.S.C. § 1189(b)(1)-(2) (Supp. V 1999) (restricting judicial review to
the administrative record and providing for ex parte submissions by the
government).
849. See id. § 1189(a)(1) (vesting in the Secretary of State the power to designate
foreign terrorist organizations).
850. See id. § 1189(b)(3) (defining the appropriate standards for reviewing the
Secretary of State’s determination); see also Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A) (1994) (providing the appropriate standards for reviewing any
administrative act).
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permitted the deportation from the United States of any aliens
belonging to organizations deemed to be engaged in terrorism.851
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act thus eliminated
any requirement that an alien be shown to have any personal
connection to terrorist activities,852 and it permits deportation on the
basis of associational activities otherwise protected by the
Constitution.853  The Act also allows deportation of aliens suspected of
terrorism without providing the deportees access to the information
used in making the deportation decision,854 and expedites the
deportation process by removing certain defenses to deportation.855
In addition, Congress amended the Fair Credit Reporting Act in
1996 to require a consumer reporting agency to furnish to the FBI
for counterintelligence purposes the names and addresses of all
financial institutions at which a consumer maintains or has
maintained an account.856  Before the FBI may request such
information, the Director or his designee must certify that the
“information is necessary for the conduct of an authorized foreign
counterintelligence investigation,”857 and that there are “specific and
articulable” facts giving reason to believe that the consumer is a
foreign power or agent of a foreign power.858  The consumer
reporting agency must then furnish information to the FBI upon
demand,859 and a court may issue an ex parte order directing the

851. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(B) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (“Any alien who has
engaged . . . in any terrorist activity . . . is deportable.”); see also id.
§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)-(iv) (defining the term “terrorist activity”).
852. See Jennifer A. Beall, Note, Are We Only Burning Witches? The Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996’s Answer to Terrorism, 73 IND. L.J. 693, 708 (1998)
(discussing the broad associational standard for deportation).
853. See id. at 699-705 (arguing that the AEDPA severely restricts First Amendment
rights to speech and association).
854. See 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(3)(A) (Supp. V 1999) (restricting access and only
permitting judge in camera review).  Although a special court was created by 8 U.S.C.
§ 1532 to address the problems with access to confidential materials, this court was
never used because its function was replaced with the in camera review process which
occurs during the actual deportation hearing.  See id. § 1532 (providing for the
structure and makeup of the court); id. § 1534(e)(3)(A) (prescribing the process for
judicial examination of classified materials); see also DEMPSEY & COLE, supra note 622,
at 127, 138 (discussing the fact that although the Terrorist Removal Act has not been
used, one of its procedural powers is the use of secret evidence).
855. See 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(1) (Supp. V 1999) (making inapplicable otherwise
required notice to the defendant that the government intends to use FISA-derived
information in “alien terrorist” removal proceedings, and denying the defendant an
opportunity to suppress FISA evidence if illegally obtained).
856. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-93, 109
Stat. 974 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681u (Supp V. 1999)).
857. 15 U.S.C. § 1681u(a)(1) (Supp. V 1999).
858. Id. § 1681u(a)(2).
859. See id. § 1681u(a).
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release of such information provided the request was proper.860  The
agency must follow confidentiality requirements regarding any public
or private disclosure about the FBI inquiry.861  Furthermore, the FBI
must restrict dissemination of the information.862  Additionally, the
Attorney General must report to the Intelligence Committees
semiannually concerning all requests made pursuant to this
authority.863
Finally, in addition to the pen register and trap and trace Titles
added to FISA in 1998,864 Congress revisited a Clinton administration
request that it had rejected in 1996 and granted expanded authority
for roving wiretaps,865 or wiretaps that follow a target from telephone
to telephone.  As a practical matter, the change eases the
requirements for obtaining a roving wiretap.866  Before the 1998
amendment, investigators had to demonstrate to a judge’s satisfaction
that a target was changing phones purposefully to avoid
interception.867  Now agents must only show that the effect of the
target’s actions may be to evade interception.868  Under the 1998
amendment, the tap may remain for as long as it is reasonable to
presume that the target “is or was reasonably proximate” to the
tapped telephone.869
D. Fitting  “Primary Purpose” to Current Needs
The Rockefeller Commission first employed the “primary purpose”
concept, settling upon the phrase simply as a descriptor of properly

860. See id. § 1681u(c).
861. See id. § 1681u(d).
862. See id. § 1681u(f) (restricting the use of this information to internal FBI
inquiries or other federal foreign counterintelligence investigations).
863. See id. § 1681u(h).
864. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272,
§§ 601-605, 112 Stat. 2396, 2404-13 (1998) (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1846)
(adding Title IV to FISA); see also supra notes 616-23 and accompanying text
(discussing “pen registers” and “trap and trace” techniques).
865. See Pub. L. No. 105-272, § 604, 112 Stat. 2396, 2413 (amending 18 U.S.C.
§ 2518(11)(b) (1994)) (revising the criteria for granting a roving wiretap).
866. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11)(b)(ii) (1994) (requiring law enforcement to
show that the suspect was operating with the clear purpose to “thwart interception by
changing facilities”), with 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11)(b)(ii) (Supp. V 1999) (amended by
Pub. L. No. 105-272) (requiring only a showing that the persons “could have the
effect of thwarting interception”).
867. See DEMPSEY & COLE, supra note 622, at 143 (discussing the separate standards
for establishing a roving wiretap).
868. See supra notes 866-67 (discussing the alteration under the 1998
amendment).
869. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272,
§ 602, 112 Stat. 2396, 2413 (1998) (codified as amdended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 2518(11)(b)(iv) (Supp. V 1999)).
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directed intelligence gathering.870  Before Truong,871 the Third Circuit
relied upon the primary purpose standard in Butenko872 in upholding
electronic surveillance without a warrant, although the court also
noted that the surveillance was “solely for the purpose of gathering
foreign intelligence information . . . [and that] the accumulation of
evidence of criminal activity was incidental.”873
The extent to which the nation’s intelligence community may assist
law enforcement remains a question of practical importance today.874
Although this question is difficult to answer in the abstract, a few
parameters may be set out.  The intelligence community may only
collect foreign intelligence, and it may only rarely assist law
enforcement entities solely on the basis of a request for support of a
law enforcement function.875  Yet some criminal activity is also clearly
foreign intelligence,876 and most foreign intelligence investigations
are potentially criminal investigations.877  Thus, the primary purpose
criterion must be applied to determine whether the traditional law
enforcement warrant requirement applies.  According to the Fourth
Circuit, an investigation crosses over to primarily law enforcement
when “the government had begun to assemble a criminal
prosecution” and the Criminal Division of the Justice Department
had “taken a central role in the investigation.”878  In Truong, the court
properly excluded evidence obtained without a warrant after the

870. See ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 231, at 62 (“If the principal
purpose of the activity is the prosecution of crimes or protections against civil
disorders or domestic insurrection, then the activity is prohibited. . . .[I]f the
principal purpose relates to foreign intelligence or to protection of the security of
the Agency, the activity is permissible . . . .”).
871. See United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 911 (4th Cir. 1980)
(upholding the espionage conviction of Vietnamese persons and indicating the
admissibility of materials gathered in intelligence investigations).
872. See United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 606, 608 (3d Cir. 1974) (affirming
the conviction of a Soviet national despite the fact that some evidence was obtained
without warrants).
873. Id. at 606.
874. See, e.g., Kevin Fisher, Trends in Extraterritorial Narcotics Control:  Slamming the
Stable Door After the Horse Has Bolted, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 353, 372-74 (1984)
(noting the increasing overlap between traditional law enforcement, military, and
federal intelligence agencies).
875. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 403-3(d)(1) (1994) (establishing that the Central
Intelligence Agency “shall have no police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or
internal security functions”).  The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996
gave elements of the intelligence community the authority to collect information
outside the United States about individuals who are not U.S. persons, at the request
of a law enforcement agency.  See 50 U.S.C. § 403-5a (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)
(granting authority to assist law enforcement upon request).
876. See Elliff, supra note 534, at 793-94 (discussing federal criminal investigations
as relating to communist and revolutionary groups).
877. See id. (noting the overlap and occasional identity of foreign intelligence
investigations and some criminal investigations).
878. United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 916 (4th Cir. 1980).
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investigation became primarily law enforcement.879
One way to clarify the primary purpose inquiry may be to ask who
is collecting the information, and pursuant to whose request.  If the
collector is the CIA and the requester is the President, it may be
reasonable to presume that the information is foreign intelligence.880
If the CIA is investigating at the behest of FBI, the same presumption
may apply, noting that the investigation could change to a law
enforcement matter.881  If FBI is the investigator, the initial purpose
could be either intelligence collection or law enforcement.882
The government reliably believed that Truong was compromising
sensitive government information before any warrantless surveillance
was authorized.883  Although an informant advised the government
which documents were ultimately being delivered, the government
did not know the source of the leak.884  However, through the
informant Krall, agents knew that the materials related to the
negotiations with the North Vietnamese and that, given Truong’s
access to classified materials, he could have been transmitting
classified information unlawfully.885  It was thus persuasive for the
government later to maintain that its primary purpose in opening
Truong’s packages was to halt Truoung’s ability to compromise the
peace negotiations, most decidedly an intelligence concern.886
A qualitative standard such as “primary purpose” invites after-the-
fact subjective judgments made in evidentiary hearings, where judges
are inclined to defer to decisions of intelligence professionals.887  In
the early stages or even in the midst of an investigation, the need for
speedy action, along with problems of coordination among the
intelligence and law enforcement agencies, mean that there are no
boundaries for the inquiry into the purpose of the surveillance.888

879. See id.
880. See, e.g., Chagnon v. Bell, 642 F.2d 1248, 1254 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (discussing, in
a companion case to Truong Dinh Hung, the presumption under which the Attorney
General operates when conducting an investigation).
881. See, e.g., id. (observing the necessity of altering the surveillance when the
scope of the investigation changes, even though the CIA or FBI is still the party
conducting the surveillance).
882. See, e.g., id. at 1253 (noting the FBI’s dual role in intelligence and criminal
investigation of one of Truong’s friends).
883. See Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d at 911-12, 916 (describing Troung’s actions
and the resulting government surveillance).
884. See id. at 912.
885. See id.
886. See id. at 916-17.
887. See, e.g., United States v. Humphrey, 456 F. Supp. 51, 55-57 (E.D. Va. 1978)
(demonstrating the district court judge’s deference to conclusions and decisions
made by intelligence personnel in surveillance of Truong).
888. See Brown & Cinquegrana, supra note 28, at 118-19 (discussing the need for
rapid action in intelligence gathering and the application of FISA).
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Although the Truong requirements for warrantless searches will
“preclude application of this powerfully intrusive technique to all but
a very few members of the general population,”889 it is faith in the
judgments of intelligence professionals that justifies omitting the
magistrate from the process, along with the chance that a criminal
prosecution could be thwarted by evidence illegally obtained.890
Although it remains possible that a lawsuit for damages could be
successfully brought for wrongful official conduct involving
warrantless surveillance, the barriers to recovery are formidable.891
E. A Case Study:  Palestinian Activists and the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
1. The story
During the mid-1980s, a group of Palestinian activists from the Los
Angeles area drew the attention of federal officials for alleged ties to
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).892  One of
the activists, Khader Hamide, allegedly had asked for contributions at
a function “for the combatants in Lebanon and on the West Bank.
The revolution requires support.”893  On January 26, 1987, the FBI,
INS, and Los Angeles police department began a joint anti-terrorism
operation against the PFLP in the Los Angeles area.894  That morning,
authorities arrested eight people, known as the L.A. Eight.895

889. Id. at 145.
890. See, e.g., United States v. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d 830, 841-42 (2d Cir. 1980)
(discussing the exclusionary rule in light of a subjectively deferential standards to the
agents and the interest in criminal prosecution).
891. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 394-95 (1971)
(recognizing a right of recovery against individual agents for unconstitutional
seizures); Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 55-56 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that in order
to obtain damages against an officer personally, plaintiffs must show that the officer
acted intentionally to disrupt lawful organizations).
892. See Michael J. Ybarra, Domestic Dilemma:  Long Effort to Deport Terror Suspects
Raises Difficult Rights Issues, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 1991, at A1.  The PFLP is a Syria-
based splinter group of the Palestine Liberation Organization and known sponsor of
international terrorism that has been tied to bombings, assassinations, and the high
profile 1976 airline hijacking foiled by Israeli commandos at Entebbe in Uganda.
For a discussion of the group, see Frank Trejo, Lives on Hold:  Palestinians Accused of
Terrorism Fight to Stay in U.S.; Noncitizens Rights Seen as Key to Case, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Dec. 29, 1992, at 1A.
893. David G. Savage, The Great Alien Lockout:  Can Congress Bar Courts from Hearing
Deportation Challenges?, 84 A.B.A. J. 34 (1998).
894. See Trejo, supra note 892, at 1A.
895. See Ybarra, supra note 892, at A1.  Awakened by loud knocks on his door,
Khader Hamide, a permanent resident alien and aspiring U.S. citizen, along with
Hamide’s wife, Julie, opened the door.  The authorities arrested, handcuffed, and
whisked them away in separate cars.  Both were told that they were terrorists.  An
eighth suspect was later arrested while taking a college chemistry exam.  See id.
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For twenty-three days, six of the L.A. Eight sat in maximum security
cells.896  FBI Director William Webster admitted two months after
their arrests that no member of the L.A. Eight had been found to
have engaged in terrorist activities.897  He also conceded that, if the
Eight had been U.S. citizens, “there would have been no basis for
their arrest.”898  Nevertheless, Webster maintained that the FBI
conducted the investigation according to FBI Guidelines.899 
After a lengthy FBI investigation, in December 1986, the INS began
deportation proceedings against the L.A. Eight, claiming that they
were members of the PFLP, and that Hamide “was the California
head of an active but furtive recruiting and support system for the
PFLP.”900  Specifically, the INS charged them under the Cold War-era
McCarran-Walter Act with being deportable as aliens belonging to an
organization that advocates the “doctrines of world communism.”901
In April 1987, the L.A. Eight and several civil rights organizations
brought suit to challenge the constitutionality of the “world
communism” provisions facially and as-applied.902  A few days before a
hearing to decide the provision’s constitutionality of the ideological
grounds, the INS withdrew the original charges and reinstituted
deportation proceedings against the nonimmigrant aliens for routine
visa violations, and against the permanent residents for being
“members of an organization that advocates or teaches the unlawful
destruction of government property.”903  INS later added a charge

896. See id.
897. See Hearings Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on Nomination of
William H. Webster to be Director of Central Intelligence, 100th Cong. 94-95 (1987).
898. See id.
899. See id.
900. Ybarra, supra note 892, at A1.
901. See id.  The original proceedings against the permanent residents were
brought pursuant to the ideological deportation grounds of the McCarran-Walter
Act, which permitted deportation of those who advocated world communism.  See
Immigration and Nationality (McCurran-Walter) Act, ch. 414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952)
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1251(6)(D)-(H) (1994 & Supp. V 1999)).  After
Congress limited those provisions in 1987, and then repealed them in 1990, the INS
brought new charges for exclusion and deportation on the grounds that the
individuals engaged in terrorist activity.  See Immigration and Naturalization Act of
1990, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(B) (Supp. V 1999) (formerly 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4)(B)
(1994) (amending the McCarran-Walter Act after a federal judge declared the act
unconstitutional).  In fact, six of the eight entered the United States on student or
visitor visas between 1975 and 1983, while the other two, Michel Shehadeh and
Hamide, were permanent residents. See Trejo, supra note 892, at A1.  The L.A. Eight
maintained, however, that they only raised money for humanitarian projects (such as
clinics and hospitals in the Gaza Strip and West Bank), conducted seminars, and
distributed Palestinian magazines.  See id.
902. See American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1053
(9th Cir. 1995) [hereinafter American-Arab II] (reviewing the factual and procedural
background of the legal battle between the L.A. Eight and the government).
903. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(6)(F)(iii) (now 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(6)(F)(iii))
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that the two resident aliens “were associated with a group that
advocate[d] the unlawful assaulting or killing of government
officers.”904  The new charges were a tactical maneuver—the INS
regional counsel intended to deport the eight because of their
alleged association with the PFLP.905  After Congress repealed the
1952 McCarran-Walter Act’s “world communism” provision, the INS
brought new charges against the permanent residents for “terrorist
activities” under the Immigration Act of 1990.906
During the INS proceedings, some of the aliens requested that the
immigration judge order the government to affirm or deny the
existence of electronic surveillance directed against them or their
lawyers.907  The government responded that it would not present
evidence gathered by electronic means in the deportation
proceedings that had been gathered by electronic surveillance,
“without stating whether any such surveillance had occurred.”908  After
the immigration judge granted a motion requesting the government
to affirm or deny that such surveillance had occurred, the
government responded that there had been some video surveillance,
and that the FBI had placed a pen register on the telephone of one
of the parties.909  In addition, the government’s affidavit admitted that
some of the named aliens had been subject to electronic surveillance
approved by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC).910
Anticipating the aliens’ next move, the government sought a
determination of the legality of the surveillance from the federal
district court in California,911 citing section 1806(f) of FISA for its
authorization.912  The Attorney General submitted an affidavit
requesting an ex parte, in camera review of the surveillance records,
alleging that their disclosure, or even an adversary hearing about

as the basis for the INS’s new charges).
904. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(6)(F)(ii) (now 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(6)(F)(ii))
for the INS’s legal authority for this charge).
905. See id.
906. See id. at 1054.  The Immigration Act of 1990 authorizes deportation for
“[a]ny alien who has engaged, is engaged, or at any time after entry engages in
terrorist activity.”  Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(B) (Supp. V 1999), formerly at 8
U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4)(B) (1994)).
907. See United States v. Hamide, 914 F.2d 1147, 1148 (9th Cir. 1990).  Hamide
first learned that a significant investigation of his activities had occurred when he
asked one of the arresting agents why he looked familiar.  The agent told Hamide
that he had been his neighbor for nine months.  See Trejo, supra note 892, at A1.
908. Hamide, 914 F.2d at 1149.
909. See id.
910. See id.
911. See id. at 1149.
912. See id.; see also Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1801-1829, 1841-1846, 1861-1863 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
BANKSPP.DOC 8/15/2001  11:33 AM
2000] NATIONAL SECURITY SURVEILLANCE 117
them, “would harm the national security of the United States and
[would expose] intelligence sources and methods.”913  The district
court judge complied with the Government’s request and, after the ex
parte, in camera review, determined that the FISA surveillance was
lawful.914  The aliens appealed to the Ninth Circuit, and, while their
appeal was pending, they brought a civil action challenging the
surveillance in the district court for the District of Columbia.915
Based on the declaration submitted by the Justice Department in
their deportation proceedings, the alien plaintiffs sought a
declaratory judgment that the admitted surveillance was unlawful,
and, based on “information and belief,” they sought to enjoin any
ongoing surveillance against them.916  Their claims for relief included
violations of FISA, as well as their First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment
rights.917  In essence, the plaintiffs argued that they were singled out
for surveillance solely on the basis of their political beliefs and
associations as advocates for Palestinian causes.918  They claimed the
government violated FISA and the Constitution because it had no
basis for believing that the surveillance targets were agents of a
foreign power.919  In addition, the two resident aliens alleged that the
“agent of foreign power” determination was made “solely on the basis
of activities protected by the first amendment” and thus violated the
FISA proscription against such surveillance directed at permanent
residents.920
While the government acknowledged overhearing them in the
course of FISA-authorized surveillance, it never admitted that any of
the plaintiffs were targets of the past surveillance.921  Thus, the
government answered that plaintiffs may have been overheard
incidentally, and that the existence of ongoing surveillance could not
be confirmed or denied.922  The government then moved to dismiss
the action for failure to state a claim.  The district court granted the
motion to dismiss.923

913. Hamide, 914 F.2d at 1149.
914. See id. at 1150 (finding the electronic surveillance legal because a “court of
competent jurisdiction’ had authorized it).
915. See ACLU Found. of S. Cal. v. Thornburgh, Civ. No. 89-2248, mem. op.
(D.D.C. June 26, 1990) (unpublished opinion) (cited in ACLU Found. of S. Cal. v.
Bass, 952 F.2d 457 (D.C. Cir. 1991)).
916. See id. at 1-2.
917. See id.
918. See id. at 2-3.
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On appeal, the D.C. Circuit ruled that the legality of any past
surveillance was finally determined by the district court in
California.924  However, the court refused to sustain the dismissal of
the plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a claim regarding ongoing
surveillance.925  While past surveillance in no way proves ongoing
surveillance, noted the court, plaintiffs had to have a chance to prove
their claims.926  On remand, the plaintiffs would have to show that the
government intentionally targeted them and intended to disrupt
their lawful activities, and that the two resident aliens were targeted
“solely” on the basis of protected expressive activities.927  Because the
government is not obligated to affirm or deny any facts pertaining to
FISA surveillance, information and belief would not provide the
necessary support that there was some genuine dispute about the
material facts.928  The plaintiffs would be required to meet this burden
without the benefit of discovery.929  Because FISA obliges the
reviewing court to prevent disclosure of information relating to FISA
surveillance in adversary proceedings, the traditional discovery rules
do not apply.930  Thus, the government could seek and obtain
summary judgment even before they answer the complaint.  The
plaintiffs may not even obtain an ex parte hearing on the legality of
the surveillance.931
Eventually, the L.A. Eight sued to enjoin their deportation
proceedings on constitutional grounds.932  In essence, they argued

924. See ACLU Found. of S. Cal. v. Barr, 952 F.2d 457, 465 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(noting that the judge’s order “‘conclusively determine[d] the disputed question of
the surveillance’s legality’” (quoting United States v. Hamide, 914 F.2d 1147, 1151
(9th Cir. 1990)).
925. See id. at 467 (holding that a court may not dismiss a claim merely because it
is unlikely that the plaintiff will prevail).
926. See id. (stating the rule that “surveillance in the past does not prove current
surveillance”).
927. See id. at 469 (noting that plaintiffs carry the burden of proving ongoing
surveillance).
928. See id. at 468 n.13 (“[U]nder FISA [the government] has no duty to reveal
ongoing foreign intelligence surveillance”).
929. See id. (finding that plaintiffs in FISA cases are not entitled to any materials
related to surveillance until and unless the district court, in an ex parte, in camera
proceeding, determined that the surveillance was not “lawfully authorized and
conducted”).
930. See id. (stating that “the normal discovery rules must be harmonized with
FISA and its procedures . . . designed to prevent disclosure of information relating to
surveillance”).
931. See id. at 469.
932. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 883 F. Supp. 1365, 1370
(C.D. Cal. 1995) [hereinafter American-Arab I] (noting that plaintiffs attacked
§ 1182(a)(28)(F) as a violation of the First Amendment on its face because it
penalizes constitutionally protected associations), aff’d, 70 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1995)
[hereinafter American-Arab II], aff’d on remand, 119 F.3d 1367 (1997) [hereinafter
American-Arab III], vacated, 525 U.S. 471 (1999) [hereinafter American-Arab IV].
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that INS singled them out for selective enforcement of the
immigration laws in retaliation for the exercise of constitutionally
protected associational activities.933  After two rounds in the district
court and court of appeals, the Ninth Circuit in 1997 affirmed a
district court decision that the deportation proceedings of the
resident and non-resident plaintiffs should be preliminarily enjoined
on First Amendment grounds.934  The court found that INS sought
deportation on the basis of the plaintiffs’ mere membership in the
PFLP.935  There was no evidence in the record that any of the
plaintiffs had any specific intent to further the unlawful aims of the
PFLP.936
Meanwhile, Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996.937  The Act contains a provision
restricting judicial review of the Attorney General’s decision to
commence proceedings against any alien, leaving until a final order
of deportation is issued any opportunity for judicial review of even
constitutional rights violations associated with deportation.938
Although the Ninth Circuit found jurisdiction to review the plaintiffs’
claims under an exception for pending cases in the 1996 Act, in
American-Arab,939 the Supreme Court interpreted the 1996 provision to
deprive federal courts of jurisdiction over such lawsuits and thus
reversed the Ninth Circuit decision and ordered that the injunction
be vacated.940
2. Applying the legal authorities
The L.A. Eight have maintained throughout their immigration
proceedings that none of them is a member of the PFLP, much less a

933. See American-Arab II, 70 F.3d at 1054-59 (discussing plaintiff’s selective
enforcement claims).
934. See American-Arab III, 119 F.3d at 1374-76 (affirming the decision that
plaintiffs sufficiently demonstrated that the government had targeted them because
of their associations despite new evidence that plaintiffs participated in fundraising
activities for the PFLP).
935. See id. at 1376 (noting that “the government has not challenged the factual
finding made by the district court that the INS targeted the plaintiffs for their mere
association with the PFLP”).
936. See id. at 1375.
937. Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. c, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
938. See id. § 242 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (1994 & Supp. V 1999)) (“[N]o
court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien
arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General . . .”).
939. See American-Arab III, 119 F.3d at 1372 (finding that the language of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(g) “contemplates an exception to the statute’s general prohibition of judicial
review of Attorney General decisions”).
940. See American-Arab IV, 525 U.S. at 481 (interpreting the exclusive jurisdiction
clause of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) as “nothing more or less than a limit on injunctive
relief”).
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supporter of terrorism.941  Assume, contrary to their sworn statements,
that Hamide and Shehadeh were believed by the FBI to be engaged
in fundraising for the PFLP.  The PFLP is a “foreign power” under
FISA, based on the historical facts that it is a “group[] engaged in
international terrorism.”942  The FISA definition of “international
terrorism” encompasses the PFLP’s “violent acts . . . that . . . appear to
be intended . . . to influence the policy of a government by
intimidation or coercion.”943  The fact that the PFLP has also been
designated a “foreign terrorist organization” by the Secretary of
State944 only confirms what would be stated in the FISA application.
Agents would be seeking “foreign intelligence information . . . that
relates to . . . the ability of the United States to protect against
. . . international terrorism by a foreign power. . . .”945  But the
Popular Front does not maintain offices or any official place in the
United States.  FISA surveillance of Hamide and the other seven
could only be authorized if each target is an “agent of a foreign
power,” defined to include one who “knowingly engages in . . .
international terrorism . . . , or knowingly aids or abets any person in
the conduct of [such] activities.”946  Did Hamide “knowingly aid” the
PFLP’s terrorist  activities when he urged attendees at a fundraising
luncheon to contribute money “for the combatants in Lebanon and
on the West Bank”?  Moreover, was his speech protected by the First
Amendment and, if so, was the application for FISA surveillance
based “solely” on those protected activities?
The legislative history of FISA does not clarify what is meant by
“knowingly” engaging or aiding in acts of international terrorism.947
However, when the immigration exclusion provisions were

941. See David G. Savage, Ruling Eases Way for Deportation of Illegal Immigrants, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 25, 1999, at A11.
942. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a) (1994); see also Ybarra, supra note 892, at A1 (stating that
the PFLP is a Marxist splinter group of the Palestine Liberation Organization).  The
L.A. Eight maintained that the PFLP was not primarily a military organization, and its
efforts were mostly dedicated to operating youth clubs, hospitals, schools, and day
care centers.  The L.A. Eight said that they supported those peaceful efforts.  See
Savage, supra note 941, at A1.
943. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c) (1994).
944. See 62 Fed. Reg. 52,650 (1997) (noting the Secretary of State’s unilateral
designation of thirty organizations, including the PFLP, as terrorist organizations);
62 Fed. Reg. 55,112 (1999) (renewing the designation of the PFLP as a terrorist
organization).
945. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e) (1994).
946. Id. § 1801(b)(2).
947. See generally  S. REP. NO. 95-604, 3-65 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3904, 3904-73 (discussing the proposed legislation without defining “knowingly”); S.
REP. NO. 95-701, 5-73 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3973-4042 (same);
H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 95-1720, 19-35 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 4048-
64 (same).
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comprehensively revisited in 1990, Congress added “terrorist activity”
as a ground for deportation.948  Pursuant to the INA, the deportable
alien “engage[s] in terrorist activity” if he or she undertakes any “act
which the actor knows, or reasonably should know, affords material
support to any individual organization, or government in conducting
terrorist activity,” including “soliciting funds . . . for any terrorist
organization,” and “solicitation of any individual for membership in a
terrorist organization, terrorist government, or to engage in a
terrorist activity.”949
The objective of FISA surveillance is foreign intelligence
information, not information that may permit deportation of
surveillance targets by the INS.950  In the case of the L.A. Eight,
however, the context strongly suggests that the FBI was working
toward deportation proceedings from some early point in their
investigation.951  Deportation may be a legitimate goal of an
investigation, if the legal requirements are met.  However, at the
time, there were no criminal sanctions for fundraising for, much less
membership in, a foreign organization.952  No publicly released
material has ever suggested that the L.A. Eight ever planned to
participate in terrorist activities in the United States or elsewhere.953
No criminal acts were ever charged, and those arrested were released
once the deportation proceedings were initiated.954  It is at least
arguable, then, that obtaining “foreign intelligence information” was
not the primary purpose of the investigation, long before INS
deportation proceedings were initiated.

948. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (excluding aliens who
have engaged in, or are likely to engage in, terrorist activity from admission into the
United States).
949. Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii).
950. See S. REP. NO. 95-604, at 3, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3905 (stating
that Senator Kennedy introduced the bill “to provide a statutory procedure for the
authorization of applications for a court order approving the use of electronic
surveillance to obtain foreign intelligence information”) (emphasis added); S. REP. NO. 95-
701, at 6 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3973, 3974 (same).
951. See Ybarra, supra note 892, at A1 (reporting that the INS arrested Mr.
Hamide, one of the L.A. Eight, during the same week they told him he could become
a U.S. citizen after several years of delay).
952. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (amending FISA to
include the solicitation for and membership in a terrorist organization as grounds
for excluding aliens).
953. See Karima Bennoune, Usual Suspects:  FBI Arrest of One Arab-American and Seven
Resident Aliens for “Pro-Libya Actions”, THE NATION, Sept. 26, 1988, at 225 (stating that
the government arrested the eight on the “pretext” of terrorist activity but that the
INS based their charges on only literature the eight had carried and distributed).
954. See Trejo, supra note 892, at A1 (noting that the charges were all civil
proceedings, and that the judge released them on little or no bail).
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It may thus be reasonable to construe FISA in light of the INA with
respect to future surveillance applications where immigration
proceedings are a fairly predictable outcome of the surveillance.
Combining FISA and the 1990 INA permits FISA-authorized
surveillance only if it is asserted that a foreign agent “knows, or
reasonably should know” that he is providing financial support for
terrorist activities.955  In the abstract, the Constitution does not stand
in the way of surveillance of supporters of any terrorist organization,
for the purpose of learning whether the targets plan unlawful
violence.956  Problems arise, however, at the intersection of First and
Fourth Amendment interests, where protected expression may be
chilled by surveillance of groups or individuals selected on the basis
of advocacy of unpopular views, or where individuals are associated
with a terrorist group on the basis of religious, ethnic, or national
affiliation.957  Under FISA and the Guidelines, the investigators would
have to demonstrate foreign agency and, with respect to U.S. persons,
that the surveillance is not justified “solely” on the basis of protected
expressive activities.958
If someone in a similar situation to Hamide and his colleagues
sought support for humanitarian or other non-violent activities of
Palestinian organizations and expressed no support of the violent
aims of any group, overtly or covertly,959 targeting him for FISA
surveillance may violate the statute and the First Amendment.960  As a

955. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B) (1994  & Supp. V 1999) (providing that aliens
are inadmissible as citizens if they commit an act that the “know or reasonably should
know” affords material support to terrorist activity).
956. See Keith, 407 U.S. 297, 320-22 (1972) (requiring a search warrant for
domestic intelligence gathering but declining to extend the holding to foreign
intelligence surveillance); see also United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908,
912-14 (4th Cir. 1980) (adopting foreign intelligence exception to the warrant
requirement).
957. See Keith, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) (“National security cases, moreover, often
reflect a convergence of First and Fourth Amendments values not present in
“ordinary” crime.  Though the investigative duty of the executive may be stronger in
such cases, so also is there a greater jeopardy to constitutionally protected speech.”).
958. See ACLU Found. of S. Cal. v. Barr, 952 F.2d 457, 465 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(noting that 8 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3)(A) directed the court not to base any finding that
a person is a foreign power solely on a person’s First Amendment activities); see also
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws
and Procedures of the Senate Comm. On the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 23 (1977) (statement of
Attorney General Griffin Bell), quoted in S. REP. NO. 95-604, at 4 (1977), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3905-06 (noting the delicate balance between national
security and civil liberty).
959. The fact that a potential target of FISA surveillance is an avowed supporter of
the non-violent activities of an international terrorist organization does not deny the
possibility that the target’s covert activities could establish the facts necessary for a
foreign agency determination.
960. See American-Arab II, 70 F.3d 1045, 1063 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that the
government must establish a specific intent to further the illegal aims of the
BANKSPP.DOC 8/15/2001  11:33 AM
2000] NATIONAL SECURITY SURVEILLANCE 123
district court judge noted in reviewing the use of FISA surveillance
evidence in a criminal case,
“requiring the FISA judge to find that the target is involved in these
acts of international terrorism as part of its finding of probable
cause to believe that the target is an agent of foreign power, serves
to limit the generality of the terms ‘agent of a foreign power’ and
‘international terrorism.’”961
In American-Arab, the Ninth Circuit asserted that fundraising by
aliens for foreign terrorist organizations could only be the subject of
deportation if the accused has a specific intent to further the terrorist
activities of the organization.962  Although the 1996 Anti-Terrorism
Act also criminalizes “support” for “foreign terrorist organizations” by
U.S. citizens,963 it remains unclear whether the criminal provision
would be construed to extend to fundraising, say, for day care centers
or hospitals on the West Bank, or to mere payments associated with
membership in a designated organization.964  It is also unclear
whether FISA surveillance and deportation could be undertaken on
the basis of activities proscribed by the ban on fundraising.  Arguably,
if specific intent is required for deportation of permanent residents,
the same standard should govern the predicate for conducting
surveillance of such persons pursuant to the 1996 “support” crime.
Taking advantage of a special procedure to identify a target of
surveillance outside traditional Fourth Amendment processes should
not occur absent some indication that the target supports the
terrorist aims of the foreign power.965  The constitutional rights
provisions that are applied to limit deportation because of the
severity of the sanction should also extend to the surveillance that
provides the information upon which deportation is sought.

associated organization or the deportation would violate the First Amendment)
(citing Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 186 (1972)).
961. United States v. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. 1306, 1315 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).  The Falvey
court thus found that FISA was not overbroad.  See id.
962. See American-Arab II, 70 F.3d at 1063 (requiring a finding of specific intent to
further illegal aims to avoid violating the First Amendment).
963. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (Supp. V 1999) (“whoever . . . knowingly provides
material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or
conspires to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten
years, or both”).
964. A different panel of the Ninth Circuit upheld the criminal prohibition on
“support” for terrorist organizations in a suit brought by organizations and
individuals who wanted to give aid to Kurdistan and Tamil organizations.  See
Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 203 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub
nom., Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft, 121 S. Ct. 1126 (2001).
965. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a) (1994) (requiring that an application for an
order approving electronic surveillance include a statement by the applicant to
justify his belief that “the target . . . is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign
power”).
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Indeed, constitutional logic implies that any process that furthers
deportation should be attended by greater protections than those
associated with admission to the United States.966  It may be that FISA
itself should be construed to incorporate a specific intent element in
the foreign agency finding.967  Upholding the constitutionality of FISA
surveillance that helped make a case to support arms smuggling
charges against alleged IRA members, one court opined that “to
obtain a FISA surveillance order, the Government must provide the
FISA judge with something more than the target’s sympathy for the
goals of a particular group.”968  In Falvey, the federal district court
found implicit in FISA a requirement that the agent of a foreign
power be engaged in or conspiring with others who are engaged in
terrorism.969  Following this interpretation of FISA, if some of the cash
raised by the L.A. Eight supported terrorist activities, FISA would
require the Attorney General to demonstrate that the fundraising
Palestinian-American had a specific intent to “aid[] or abet[]” in
“activities that are in preparation” for terrorism.970  Additional
support for a narrowing construction of FISA comes from the FCI
Guidelines.971  In defining the “international terrorism” that would
unleash the most intrusive and classified forms of FBI surveillance of
foreign powers and their agents, the Attorney General identified
“violent acts dangerous to human life,”972 not advocacy or fundraising.
The six non-“U.S. persons” of the L.A. Eight could be subject to
surveillance pursuant to FISA even on the basis of activities that are
“solely” protected expression.973  If, however, FISA is construed to
include a specific intent requirement for the foreign agency finding,
raising funds for the PFLP would permit a finding of foreign agency

966. Cf. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (“[O]nce an alien gains
admission to our country and begins to develop the ties that go with permanent
residence, his constitutional status changes accordingly.”).
967. See United States v. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. 1306, 1313 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (opining
that implicit in FISA is a requirement to establish intent on the part of the target).
968. Id. at 1314 (addressing the IRA’s First Amendment argument that FISA
provides the government the opportunity to selectively use politically-motivated
surveillance).
969. See id. at 1313 (describing how the FISA standard for probable cause to
believe a target is an agent of a foreign power meets Fourth Amendment
requirements).
970. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2) (1994).  Cf. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-
49 (1969)(holding that advocacy of violence short of incitement is protected by the
First Amendment).
971. FCI AGG, supra note 526, § III, at 6.
972. FCI AGG, supra note 526, § II.N, at 4.
973. See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3)(A) (1994) (providing that U.S. persons may not
be “considered . . . an agent of a foreign power solely upon the basis of activities
protected by the first amendment,” but making no similar provision for non-U.S.
persons).
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only if it is determined that the target “knowingly” aided the
organization.974  Even if the FISA threshold is met, or if FISA does not
contain an intent requirement, it is possible that the FISA-authorized
surveillance was conducted in violation of the Constitution.
Membership and activities in support of an organization that
advocates even the violent overthrow of the government of the
United States are protected by the First Amendment, absent a
showing that the person specifically intends to further the
organization’s unlawful objectives.975  Congress also recognized that
FISA surveillance could not be based on mere association with
terrorist groups.976
CONCLUSIONS
The law of national security surveillance remains today a work in
progress.  Its development has been uncertain because the law
depends for its content and focus on actions that have little, if any,
counterpart to common crime, where centuries of experience guide
us.  In a simpler era, when national security meant fending off
foreign aggression, the President was free to engage espionage
agents, send military forces into harm’s way and even take
extraordinary measures within our own borders.977  Congress
provided funding, but little else, and was content to leave the
national security arena to the executive.978

974. See id. § 1801(b)(2).  The foreign agency determination could, of course, be
based upon activities other than the fundraising.  See id. (defining “agent of a foreign
power” as “any person who knowingly engages in clandestine intelligence gathering
activities for . . . a foreign power,” or “knowingly engages in sabotage or international
terrorism, or activities that are in preparation therefor”).
975. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 187-88 (1972) (finding that where a state-
funded college president denied recognition to a local chapter of Students for a
Democratic Society, a group with a reputation for violence and disruption, the
college “may not restrict speech or association simply because it finds the views
expressed . . . to be abhorrent”); see also Communist Party of Ind. v. Whitcomb, 414
U.S. 441, 450 (1974) (rejecting, where the state denied the Communist Party of
Indiana a place on the ballot because it failed to submit an acceptable loyalty oath,
the notion that “any group that advocates violent overthrow as abstract doctrine must
be regarded as necessarily advocating unlawful action”); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents,
385 U.S. 589, 607 (1967) (holding that, where a faculty member’s failure to provide
certification that he or she was not a Communist resulted in termination, “mere
party membership, even with knowledge of the party’s unlawful goals, cannot suffice
to justify criminal punishment”).
976. See S. REP. NO. 95-604, at 24, 28-29 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3904, 3993, 3997-98 (noting that “mere sympathy . . . for the goals of a foreign group,
even a foreign terrorist group” is not sufficient basis for FISA surveillance).
977. See supra notes 109-24 and accompanying text (discussing the nature of
intelligence activities in which early presidents engaged, which rarely concerned the
lives of ordinary citizens).
978. See supra notes 109-15 and accompanying text (referring to congressional
deference to the president in intelligence matters).
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In those early years, foreign aggression existed both at a distance
and at home.  It was probably only natural that, until well into the
twentieth century, executive prerogative in national security matters
was exercised both at home and abroad.  Domestic security and
national security were then virtually synonymous, a fact critical to
understanding the development of national security law in United
States.
Despite discrete appropriations and the occasional enactment of
laws approaching national security issues, the second branch of
government to become significantly involved with national security
law issues was not Congress, but the judiciary.  Judicial involvement
developed reluctantly.  When confronted with surveillance questions,
the courts clung to arcane visions of redcoats breaching the sanctity
of home and hearth.  Nevertheless, the ancient British right against
unreasonable search and seizure increasingly merged with extended
notions of personal liberty to augment Fourth Amendment concepts.
Still, it was not until 1967 that the Supreme Court abandoned the
view that a Fourth Amendment search necessarily involved a physical
intrusion.  Katz was a watershed case with respect to the Fourth
Amendment, and it was a powerful voice for societal interests in
privacy. However, Katz did nothing directly to prescribe presidential
prerogatives in national security.
For perhaps the first time in U.S. history, the Keith court focused
on the dichotomy of “domestic security.” Although the criminal
actions generating the case were threats to the government, the
perpetrators were Americans.  Moreover, the threat was primarily one
of common crime.  Although couched more elegantly, the Court
essentially concluded that the planned attack on a CIA facility was
ordinary crime for which ordinary legal procedure is adequate. There
was no external threat, the judicial processes of government could
respond to the problem, and U.S. persons merited the protections of
the Constitution.
In Keith, the Court left open the possibility of extraordinary
measures in support of national security exigencies, but did not
prescribe the parameters of more intrusive authorities. After Keith,
the lower courts found that the executive could be exempted from
traditional Fourth Amendment procedures and could authorize
surveillance to gather foreign intelligence,979 but not without a nexus

979. See United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 608 (3d Cir. 1974) (concluding
that American defense needs justified electronic surveillance of a Russian national
and, thus, did not violate the Fourth Amendment).
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to a foreign power, against U.S. persons.980  With the proper foreign
nexus, the executive can conduct surveillance of U.S. persons for
intelligence purposes, but not to acquire criminal evidence.981
Congress eventually was goaded into action by public sentiment, by
the fourth estate982 and, according to Senator Church, by a sense of
responsibility. Early in the century, Congress enacted laws permitting
censure, mail openings and restrictions on the right of assembly.
These measures, however, were more the product of fear and
xenophobia than concern for national security matters or citizens’
rights.  Congressional involvement in national security matters
continued to be sparse and remote well into the twentieth century.
Popular interest came only in the post-war years. With prosperity
and relative freedom from fears of foreign aggression, the public
began to assume that the rights of privacy, assembly and speech
should receive higher degrees of protection.  The public awakening
was prodded by the occasional judicial opinion, but more than
anything, technology drove the policies.  The development of
modern telecommunications placed more and more personal
information in jeopardy of exposure.  In an era when there were few
law enforcement agents and fewer telephones, the telephone wiretap
was not a societal threat.  Furthermore, when international telegrams
were confined to commerce and foreign policy, intercepted
telegrams did not greatly affect individuals.  As the world grew
smaller, however, electronic communications became affordable and
ubiquitous, and as a result, the potential exposure of private
information grew in geometric proportions.
Following the crafting of legislative and regulatory guidance for
national security surveillance, the unresolved questions concern
individual rights.  Neither FISA nor the FBI Guidelines follow
traditional Fourth Amendment procedures.  For example, FISA
appears to permit surveillance in certain circumstances without
previous identification of the target,983 a process that would be

980. See Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 652-55 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (holding that a
warrant is necessary for a wiretap on a domestic organization that is not acting for or
together with a foreign power).
981. See Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 915-16 (4th Cir. 1980).
982. The press is commonly referred to as “the fourth estate.”
983. See 50 U.S.C. § 1804 (1994).  The appearance may be more problematic than
the practice.  For example, it would be impossible to affect telephone surveillance
without identifying the target with sufficient particularity for a judge to authorize the
surveillance.  Moreover, it would be impossible for the communications carrier to
effect the tap without precise identification of the telephone and its subscriber,
whether wire or wireless.  Finally, it would be impossible for a judge to authorize a
seizure, without returning to the general warrant, unless the judge knew what was to
be seized.
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inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment’s insistence that the place
to be searched and the person and things to be seized be described
with particularity in a sworn statement.  Similarly, the ex parte review
of the warrant application and the extent to which the minimization
procedures of FISA fall short of traditional Fourth Amendment rules
has given rise to criticism of the scheme.  Additionally, unlike
magistrates reviewing a law enforcement warrant request, FISC judges
have no discretion to deny an application for surveillance if the
requirements of FISA are met.984  Finally, the FISA and Guidelines
standards for probable cause are less strict, the intrusions permitted
are longer, and the showing required before surveillance is
authorized does not require even a suspicion that laws are being
broken.985
In general, all “persons” in the United States are entitled to
protections of the Constitution986 and justifications for treating non-
U.S. persons or non-citizens differently than other residents should
be decided individually on the basis of the circumstances of each
case.987  However, FISA presumes that persons not permanently
affiliated with the United States are not loyal to the United States and
that any such person who acts on behalf of a foreign power that
conducts secret intelligence activities is an agent of that foreign
power. Putting the Constitution aside, the implicit judgments
reflected in this set of presumptions are questionable.  On the other
hand, a person acting on behalf of a foreign power must register as a
foreign agent under U.S. law.988  If such a person eschews that
requirement, the presumption is not unreasonable.
One answer to most of these criticisms is that the Fourth
Amendment does not apply to foreign powers.  While surveillance of

984. See id. § 1805(a) (mandating that the judge enter an ex parte order
approving the electronic surveillance, if the requestor meets certain conditions
under FISA).
985. See id. § 1805(a),(d); FCI AGG, supra note 526 (providing standards for
probable cause).
986. See generally Michael Scaperlanda, Partial Membership:  Aliens and the
Constitutional Community, 81 IOWA L. REV. 707 (1996) (exploring the role of
constitutional values in U.S. immigration policy).
987. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990) (“[A]liens
receive constitutional protections [only] when they have come within the territory of
the United States and developed substantial connections with this country.”).
988. See 18 U.S.C. § 951(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (“Whoever . . . acts in the
United States as an agent of a foreign government without prior notification to the
Attorney General . . . shall be fined under this title or imprisoned”); 22 U.S.C. § 612
(1994) (requiring public disclosure by person engaging in propaganda activities and
other activities for or on behalf of foreign governments); 50 U.S.C. § 85 (1994)
(“every person who has knowledge of, or has received  instruction or assignment in,
the espionage, counterespionage, or sabotage service or tactics of a government of a
foreign country . . . shall register”).
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a foreign government will necessarily concern individuals, the
intelligence operation is nonetheless directed at the foreign power,
not the persons.989  Likewise, FISA surveillance is permitted for
intelligence gathering purposes, not for law enforcement. Thus,
Fourth Amendment rules are most protective when criminal
sanctions are possible.
In dealing with U.S. citizens and permanent resident aliens, the
only legal authority for the investigation of suspected terrorists that
goes beyond traditional law enforcement methods and rules is the
FISA authorization for electronic surveillance or physical search if the
U.S. person is believed to be assisting in international terrorism as an
agent of a foreign power.990  Even then, FISA prohibits making the
“agent of a foreign power” determination for a U.S. person “solely
upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment [sic].”991
Likewise, the FCI Guidelines expand the Bureau’s use of electronic
surveillance and physical search techniques only when the target
group is acting “for or on behalf of a foreign power.”992  For domestic
security investigations, “the facts or circumstances” must “reasonably
indicate” that two or more persons are conspiring to further political
or social goals “through activities that involve force or violence and a
violation of the criminal laws of the United States.”993  Beyond this
threshold, First and Fourth Amendment limits still constrain any
surveillance that the Bureau wishes to perform.
Several factors complicate surveillance of would-be terrorists in the
United States.  Unlike the Cold War formula for homeland defense,
the modern threat is more diffuse and potentially more calamitous.
Weapons of mass destruction today include nuclear, biological, and
chemical variants, and each is capable of covert deployment in
unconventional ways.994  The perpetrators are no longer only
sovereign states, but may include sub- and non-state actors, as well as
homegrown malcontents.995

989. See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3)(A) (1994) (requiring that “the target . . . is an
agent of a foreign power”).  In addition, collection activities that target non-U.S.
persons abroad do not raise justiciable constitutional issues.  See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494
U.S. at 267.
990. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1802, 1822 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (providing for electronic
surveillance and physical search authorization).
991. Id. § 1805(a) (providing requirements needed for a judge’s approval of
electronic surveillance).
992. FCI AGG, supra note 526, at 7.
993. See Criminal AGG, supra note 522.
994. See supra notes 713-20 (providing authority on covert attacks with weapons of
mass destruction).
995. See id. (emphasizing the emergence of other perpetrators beside the “classic
political terrorist”).
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The government may abuse FISA in situations like that involving
the L.A. Eight, when intrusive electronic surveillance is undertaken
based on political activities, rather than on support for terrorist
activities.  Yet it is possible that FISA surveillance has been approved
in such instances based on covert activities, not on the target’s public
persona.  While the government has abused the Guidelines, most
notably in the 1980s FBI investigation of the Committee in Solidarity
with the People of El Salvador (CISPES),996 the Senate Intelligence
Committee has found “a pattern of adherence to established
safeguards for constitutional rights.”997
Members of the intelligence community should strive to focus on
the violent acts of terrorism, not on the ideologies that motivate
terrorists.  The dangers of ideologically motivated investigations have
been demonstrated throughout our history.  Aside from the symbolic
intolerance of differences among people and groups that such a
policy advertises, the stereotyping that accompanies the policy
simultaneously harms innocent people and risks missing the
changing character of terrorism.  Targeting groups for investigation
based on their political activities also may prevent healthy venting of
public dissent, central to our nation’s stability.  Finally, investigating
identifiable group members based on group affiliation or
characteristics may only stiffen the resolve of the groups to harm the
United States.998
Apart from constitutional concerns with the 1996 prohibition on
support for foreign organizations found to support terrorist activity,
the current posture of the intelligence community regarding
terrorism in the United States appears to balance reasonably the
need to protect political dissent with the importance of monitoring
groups that urge violent political acts.  To be sure, the monitoring
itself constitutes a threat to uninhibited expression.  However, the
price is not too high when the monitoring follows a considered policy
of preventing catastrophic terrorism.

996. See generally  Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence Inquiry Into The FBI Investigation
of the Comm. in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES), Hearings Before the Select
Comm. on Intelligence of the United States Senate, S. Hrg. 100-151, 100th Cong. (1988)
(addressing alleged lack of sufficient evidence of illegal or terrorist activity for the
FBI to have continued investigation of a group engaged in political dissent).
997. Id. at 64.
998. See DEMPSEY & COLE, supra note 622, at 14-15 (arguing that the FBI’s tactic of
focusing on political or religious ideologies, rather than on a group’s violent acts, is
an “imprecise and inefficient” approach, and stating that “politically focused
investigations are likely to be counterproductive and may actually contribute to
violence”).
